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Through treatment of selected interventions and artworks, the thesis investigates relationships 
between cybernetics, conceptions of intelligence and artistic practice. The works in question are 
primarily the artist’s own, documented in the thesis and a separate portfolio. Specifically, intelligence’s 
downside, the controversial notion of stupidity, has been reappropriated as a means of considering the 
way artists intervene and how art, as a system, functions. 
The term ‘artificial stupidity’ was invented in reaction to a particular construal of what Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) meant. The notion has been employed since, and the thesis discusses interpretations 
and uses of it. One meaning relates to an ability to become, or make oneself, ‘stupid’ in order to 
facilitate discovery. In the conclusions, the arguments are extended to ‘art as a social system’ (Niklas 
Luhmann), suggesting that it survives and reproduces through a wily kind of pretend idiocy combined 
with occasional acts of generosity to other systems. 
The research methodology is threefold. Firstly, unapologetically playful approaches, 
characteristic of the artistic process, were utilised to generate ideas. Thus, art becomes primary research; 
an equivalent to experimentation. Secondly conventional secondary research; the study of texts; was 
conducted alongside artistic production. Thirdly the works themselves are treated as raw materials to 
be discussed and written about as a means of developing arguments. 
Work was selected on the basis of the weight it carries within the author’s practice (in terms of 
time, effort and resources devoted) and because of its relevance to the thesis themes i.e. contemporary 
and post-conceptual art, the science of feedback loops and critiquing intelligence and AI. The second 
chapter divides interventions and outputs into three categories. Firstly, the short looping films termed 
‘simupoems’, which have been a consistent feature of the practice, are given attention. Then live art, in 
which a professional clown was often employed, is considered. Lastly a series of interactions with the 
everyday technological landscape is discussed. One implication, in mapping out this trajectory, is that 
the clown’s skills have been appropriated. ‘Artificial stupidity’ permits parking contravention images to 
be mistaken for art photography, for beauty to be found in courier company point-of-delivery 
signatures and for the use of supermarket self-checkout machines, but to buy nothing. 
The nature of the writing in chapter 2 and appendix A (which was a precursor for the approach) 
is discursive. Works are reviewed and speculations made about the relationship with key themes. The 
activities of artists like Glenn Lygon, Sophie Calle, Samuel Beckett are drawn upon as well as 
contemporary groupings Common Culture (David Campbell and Mark Durden) and Hunt and Darton 
(Jenny Hunt and Holly Darton). Chapter 3 includes a more structured breakdown and taxonomy of 
methods. Art theories of relevance including the ideas of Niklas Luhmann already mentioned, John 
Roberts, Avital Ronell, Mikhail Bakhtin, Andrew Pickering and Claire Bishop are called upon 
throughout the thesis. 
Interrogation of the work raises certain ethical or political questions. If there are good reasons for 
the unacceptability of ‘stupid’ when applied to other human beings, might it be reasonable to be 
disparaging about the apparent intellectual capacities of technologies, processes and systems? 
The period of PhD research provided an opportunity for the relationship between the artist’s 
activities and the techo-industrial landscape to be articulated. The body of work and thesis constitutes a 
contribution to knowledge on two key fronts. Firstly, the art works themselves, though precedents exist, 
are original and have been endorsed as such by a wider community. Secondly the link between systems 
and engineering concepts, and performance-oriented artistic practice is an unusual one, and, as a result, 
it has been possible to draw conclusions which are pertinent to technological spheres, computational 
capitalism and systems thinking, as well as art. 
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1. Background, overview, methodology, definitions 
 
1.1. Thesis structure 
 
The thesis, which is organised into four chapters, begins with the story of 
how the PhD question itself evolved and with a preliminary defining of some 
key concepts. In so doing chapter 1 demonstrates how creative practice can 
inform research and indeed how practice, even in its undoing of knowledge, is 
research. This relationship between actions, thinking and writing, amounts to 
the methodology. The key themes of the dissertation, simultaneously relevant 
to my practical activities and hopefully those of others, are revealed in this first 
chapter. The sequence of events which resulted in the notion of ‘artificial 
stupidity’, so central to the research from that point onwards, is outlined in 
chapter 1. 
Having established how art-oriented production can influence thinking, 
chapter 2 reviews specific works of mine from the past decade. This writing is 
carried out with the overriding themes of the thesis in mind but also in order to 
extract other meaning, and feed the categorising process which takes place in 
chapter 3. Chapter 2 is organised into sections dealing with the signature 
moving-image pieces I call ‘simupoems’, then live work, and lastly the 
interventions which have featured increasingly during the period of this PhD. 
Appendixes A and I, review an installation by artist Glenn Ligon and a short 
novel by Samuel Beckett respectively. The contents of these two appendices are 
mostly relevant to chapter 2. Appendix A laid the basis for the discursive and 
occasionally digressive approach which would be applied in treating my own 
output. Beckett’s piece was useful for interrogating the significance of medium, 
and questions of form and content. In chapter 2, reference to or reflection on 
works by artists such as Sophie Calle, Sarah Lucas, Paul McCarthy and 
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groupings which have become active in recent years like Hunt and Darton and 
Common Culture, informs the treatment. Writing by Mikhail Bakhtin and Claire 
Bishop is cited. 
Before attempting a more rigorous classifying of my work in the second 
part of chapter 3, it was considered important to locate which theoretical 
models are most usefully applied, to the framework of art, as it is discussed in 
this thesis. Niklas Luhmann’s systems approach, the cybernetics paradigm, and 
the ideas of writer and critic John Roberts, are given attention1. Then, taking 
into account chapter 2’s attention to particular works, the second part of chapter 
3 attempts to carry out as detailed a categorisation of my practice as possible. A 
table is produced listing day-to-day working methods, strategies, themes of 
interest and outcome intentions. This table forms the basis for segmenting the 
practice in other ways. It should be noted that part of the goal in being so 
analytical is to test the limitations of systematic breakdown and illustrate the 
possible ‘stupidity’ of such rigour: hence the section title ‘Analysis paralysis’. 
Finally, in chapter 4, the evolution and likely perspectives for my 
practice, are discussed. Research was art-practice led so the socio-political and 
psychological dimensions had not been fully investigated. However, with 
reference to a particular exhibition and associated writing, conclusions are 
distilled out which connect social attitudes to intelligence with ideas about 
technology and a broader definition of AI being posited. System theory and the 
invented concept, artificial stupidity, are brought to bear in discussing what 
artists do and what they produce. A concluding argument is that if we care to 
see art as a system, then it is one which perseveres through cleverly ‘acting the 
fool’ but occasionally offering gems to other functional systems. 
                                                 
1 Chapters 1, 2, appendices A and I, in their direct dealing with practice examples, and the 
concluding chapter 4, cite these too, along with other theorists and thinkers. 
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1.2. Introduction 
 
I completed the doctorate, mainly on a part-time basis, over six years. 
During that time the practice progressed from one in which the kind of activity 
described in section 2.2 was typical: scenarios involving performers, mainly a 
professional clown, were designed and directed. Appropriated objects, 
photographic tools, digital recording and display machineries were often 
incorporated into the orchestrated routines. The use of cameras, together with 
actors, in artist run spaces and galleries, meant an easy classifying of this kind 
of work as live art or conceptual photography. Oddly, also, the attempts to 
create routines for actors to perform in, appeared analogous to my experiences 
in fields of computer modelling and simulation. In both cases a desire for 
repeatability is satisfied through the creation of sequences of instructions, but 
the code can never be comprehensive enough to completely predict or control 
outcomes. This, and more patent links with computation, not least the fact that 
3D modelling and animation software was used to create the ‘simupoems’ 
discussed in section 2.1, made technology art, digital art or new media art 
potential homes for the practice too. The temptation to be comprehensively 
drawn in to communities associated with any of these disciplines, and others 
such as experimental film, art-activism and artists’ books publishing, has been 
resisted. On the other hand, the notion of the feedback loop and critiquing 
cybernetics and systems of control was important to me. So too were the 
reductive approaches and formal clarity associated with conceptual art 
historically, which remains influential today (Osborne, 2014). My special 
interest is in human engagement with technological, often photographic, and 
computational elements (but understood as components in overarching 
systems) whether the effect is seen as a tethering, about mediation or the 
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presumption that human beings are only one set of agents in a network of 
actors. 
Section 2.3 of the thesis marks a turning point for the practice2. The work 
I do now has its roots in the first project described in that section: Contra-
Invention (cf. infra, p.115). Instead of inventing routines, as I used to, everyday 
mechanisms are now interrogated directly. Initially the aim was to find 
contemporary ‘readymade’ artefacts, ostensibly mundane data and digital 
imagery, but the investigations themselves became interesting. These actions 
can be interpreted as a lampooning of functional apparatus. Recently I have 
been made aware of how, in the early twentieth century, US-based slap-stick 
comedians (Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton and Harold Lloyd in particular), as 
well as the Russian avant-garde of that time, were responding directly to the 
Fordist/Taylorist manufacturing society which was emerging at pace about 
them (Hatherley, 2016). My work would appear to be in-line with these 
historical movements, except that I am dealing with the digital and highly 
automated network of today. Production is no longer only centralized but 
distributed and understood as a ‘supply chain’ which includes transport, 
circulation, consumer activities, order-processing, demand forecasting, quality 
assurance and monitoring. The network does comprise similar elements to 
those which were important a century ago. Scientific management and in-effect 
Taylorist principles are still employed but now deeply encoded. The tendency 
is to overlook the older forms but motor vehicle and heavy transportation 
infrastructures for instance are still dominant in the digital era, having 
expanded and developed enormously. New sophistications, complexities, 
                                                 
2 This is a slightly modified version of a paper published in the proceedings for a conference of 
Computers and the History of Art (O’Connell, 2015c) 
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computational components and artificially intelligent elements are increasingly 
embedded in the flows. Past employment provided me with insights of this 
type3, and therefore the subject matter is of no surprise (cf. infra, p.151). 
Even though cascading upwards from this focus on systems would 
eventually lead to capitalism as a whole, no grand political ambitions are being 
claimed. Purposeful mechanisms are approached simultaneously as idiot and 
possessor of inside knowledge. I had experimented with comedy performance, 
the persona of the clown I worked with has perhaps been appropriated but also 
‘serious’ bodies of knowledge gained at different times from experience in 
engineering simulation, as a political activist, parenting and working in 
education are influential. The performing and interacting with the functional 
world is thus, to employ the phrase I invented in the course of the research, a 
prime example of ‘artificially stupidity’. My interactions are not really stupid, 
just as the technology being interacted with, is not, in my view, really 
intelligent. The term artificial stupidity then can be employed to describe both 
the methods of intervention described in section 2.3 and to poke at the auras 
which often surround AI, new media, today’s algorithms and plethora of 
applications. 
Simultaneously I was concerned about definitions of art including the 
gallery systems. A way of testing assumptions at first was to attempt to have 
works appreciated, literally, in art-space and gallery contexts. More often, but 
not always, it was a case of being left on the outside of established institutions. 
Now I am less concerned about immediate connections with formal structures 
(though ironically more opportunities have presented themselves to exhibit). 
The continuing partial sense of outsiderism, it should be added, is arguably of a 
                                                 
3 In fact, one of the simulation packages I specialised in for a number of years was named Taylor 
II (King, 1996) after Frederick Winslow Taylor. 
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very different kind to that ascribed to ‘outsider artists’ because the former 
position is by no means naïve. Standing at the boundary but having awareness 
for how the system inside works, of its fragility, as well as allowing integrity to 
be maintained, presents a potentially healthy threat to the institution within. 
Another change is that my tangible output now rarely comprises of 
physical readymades but mostly digital materials, appropriated data and 
photography, which may be compiled into moving image pieces, self-published 
books or used as components in fabricated works. The latter includes the 
looping films or ‘simupoems’ which remain a consistent feature of my practice 
(section 2.1). Increasingly also I provide instructive footage, tools and methods 
as well as documentation of interactions with the functional apparatuses. 
The PhD relies heavily on the notion of art as a complex communication 
system (Luhmann, 2000) but how is the work situated with respect to other 
debates on contemporary and especially post-conceptual art? John Roberts, in 
The Necessity of Errors, gives attention to three perspectives on modernism at the 
turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century (2011, pp.214–230). With 
reference to August Strinberg’s On Chance in Artistic Creation (1894) Roberts 
argues that the notion of ‘systematic antisystematicism’ (2011, p.218), as it 
emerged from impressionist and post-classical practices, continued to be a 
factor long into the twentieth century. This, despite the direct, as well as 
indirect, impact of the Russian Revolution on avant-garde activities, and 
despite Duchamp and the growth of conceptualism. Art ought to have ended 
apparently. George Santayan’s Reason in Art (1905) pointed to its necessary 
submission to utility: ‘[t]he job of the artist is to give “practice everywhere the 
greatest affinity to the situation”’ (Roberts, 2011, p.222). It was not until 
Debordian Situationsim, and later the rise of conceptual art proper, that a more 
self-destructive phase was ardently entered in to. 
12 
 
Claire Bishop’s elucidating on the end-of art is referred to in the 
dissertation (cf. infra, p.112) as is Roberts’ talk of ‘post-art art’, ‘art after the end 
of art’ (cf. infra, p.134) and the twentieth century as a deflationary and self-
ironizing period (cf. infra, pp.133, 176). I conduct my activities, fully aware of, 
and interested in this trajectory but wonder why, despite the momentum, what 
is called art (avant-garde and otherwise) has not fully left the stage (cf. infra, 
pp.112, 130) or been absorbed by other spheres. Two forces may be at play. The 
first of these is the unexpectedly drawn-out but eventual quenching of the 
Russian revolutionary project, which includes the stalling of linked twentieth 
century Leftist ambitions, most notably 1968. The aftermaths of key political 
events had given substance to a merging of art and productive life, and the idea 
that the distinction ‘art’ would become unnecessary. As Roberts points out, 
though Santayana was no Leftist this was the gist of his prophecy/desire 
(Roberts, 2011, pp.222–223). That is not what transpired however, as we have 
said. A second explanation arises from art being understood as a notion which 
has its origins, as a system, precisely during the period of Renaissance and 
Reformation. Luhmann’s analysis tends to support this (2000, pp.133–184, 137). 
Therefore, art as we know it, is closely connected with the advent of the 
bourgeois order, though it can claim for itself practices and propensities which 
were evident in the medieval period and before. Though art, in Luhmann’s 
sense, as a social system, was spawned during one revolutionary period and, 
paying attention to Roberts’ points, conceivably ought to have been killed off as 
a consequence of a second revolutionary stage, arguably it detached itself and 
became sovereign so to speak. In systems theory terms, ‘autopoiesis’ (cf. infra, 
pp.133-134, 167, 203) describes how systems give birth to others. Political 
processes then could dent or irritate but not determine a qualitative end to art. 
Roberts is critical of Luhmann’s dismissing the ramifications of art for other 
systems and vice-versa (2015, pp.57–63). I am sympathetic to Luhmann’s 
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position but less categorical, seeing potential for more substantial influences 
and overlaps than he does (as discussed in sections 3.1 and 4.3 for example). 
The line of thinking leads, on a practical day-to-day basis, to a defence of 
adopting an elusive stance, one which is neither credulously accepting of the 
inevitability and need for art, nor fashionably hostile to its continuing existence. 
It adds legitimacy to the decision to remain non-committed to sub-disciplines, 
genres and specialist communities. John Roberts talks of a ‘vast amount of 
artistic production that is temporal, discursive and post-object centred’ and he 
lists groups and individuals who are synonymous with this ‘“post-art” and 
“post-artist” shift’ (2015, p.25). While I accept these descriptions of the situation 
and, also, appreciate the value of the term post-conceptual artist, the failure of 
the death of art presumably also permits a readdressing of apparently outdated 
practices, mindsets and conceptual frameworks. It ought to be possible to 
reimagine the tacit aims or mentalities associated with Romanticism, modernist 
anti-systematic systematicity, post-modern cynicism or humanism. Likewise, 
with anachronistic (but peculiarly widespread) practices such as painting. With 
these ideas in mind, Michael Polanyi’s pseudo-religious notion of ‘indwelling’ 
(2009, p.17), which implies a meditative surrender of sorts to artefact, so that 
interpretive bases overlap, is of interest to me. Spectator/participants can get 
inside author/creators via artworks and vice versa. I would extend the thinking 
however to include any machine, design or ‘intelligence’ constructed by 
another. 
Having made the case for not getting too close to any ‘set’, it is 
nevertheless possible to describe how the work relates to genre and existing 
contemporary movements. Most certainly my work is of the relational variety 
but the antagonistic spirit Claire Bishop gives attention to, associated with 
artists such as Artur Żmijewski, Santiago Sierra, Christoph Schlingensief (2012a, 
Participation and Spectacle: Where Are We Now?, 2011), and groupings or 
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individuals mentioned in the dissertation such as Common Culture, Hunt and 
Darton, Azorro Group, Bank or Erica Scourti, has more bearing. Though 
practitioners such as Sarah Lucas and Martin Creed are referred to positively, I 
have gravitated towards a conclusion that the label ‘contemporary art’ too, is 
insufficient for describing my endeavours. Its most common proponents are 
operating according to standards which are intractably out of tune with the 
current period. Rather than straightforward ‘institutional critique’ I am content 
to accept the existence of art’s institutional frameworks but equally, I may 
simply ignore them (cf. infra, pp.153, 160, 165). The critical techniques 
employed by art against itself can be directed also at aspects of the world at 
large, which is presumably original in the sense that ‘knowledge of the way the 
critical categories of art production have been dispersed into nonartistic 
locations has barely been addressed in current theoretical writing’ (Roberts, 
2014, p.1741/6041). One strand of this, if taken to an extreme, would amount to 
a conscious art-activism but I have, in the writing, attempted to develop a 
distinct position which, without belittling the importance of political activity, 
defends an apparently uncommitted attitude. Post-conceptual art, on the other 
hand, is a broad term, and, as I have indicated, one which I am comfortable 
being aligned with. 
In addition, the discipline of photography is unavoidably relevant to my 
practice. This became obvious firstly when Contra-Invention was selected for a 
touring exhibition called From Here On (cf. infra, p.119) which placed me with a 
group of artists addressing how the emergence of ‘digital’ had undermined 
photography’s, only recently achieved, respectability. Contra-Invention (section 
2.3.1) marked a practical change in direction during the period of the PhD and 
has been followed by other work of this nature: projects entitled Missing You 
and Less (section 2.3.2). Amusingly the exhibition, which included only the 
utilitarian photographs appropriated from municipal parking contravention 
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systems, was also long-listed for the Deutsche Börse Photography Prize (cf. infra, 
p.119). Much of my work does relate to photography then in its current 
evolution which crosses with concepts of data, hacking, compression, 
surveillance, ‘sousveillance’, documentation and mediated communication. The 
social ontology of photography (Roberts, 2014); its traditionally understood 
veridical links; is pertinent. Photography’s uncomfortable violating 
characteristics recurrently place it outside established institutional norms. I was 
able to make a connection with past work by Sophie Calle (cf. infra, p.113), 
which is doubly interesting because though she is often described as a 
photographer, the term hardly does justice to her accomplishments. Critical 
reception of the Contra-Invention exhibition placed me in a camp with the likes 
of Pavel Maria Smejkal (2010) and Jenny Odell (2016) then, and in the same 
orbit as practitioners such as Mishka Henner (2016b) and Paul Soulellis (2016) 
who are strongly influenced by the ideas and activities of Kenneth Goldsmith 
(2016). A hastily produced catalogue for Contra-Invention, compiled using 
standard desktop tools and an online print-on-demand service, had been 
included in Martin Parr’s best photobooks list (cf. infra, p.119). I was invited to 
join ABC Artists’ Book Cooperative (cf. infra, p.153), originally set up by Joachim 
Schmid (LensCulture, 2016), which advocates the use of print-on-demand 
publishing as well as querying the status of photobook production. 
Simultaneously the thesis develops arguments about computational 
capitalism. The field of cybernetics has been influential and in fact the original 
intention was to make its relevance to art the subject of the PhD (covered in 
section 1.3). Use of cybernetics is still made throughout the writing in three 
ways. Firstly, cybernetics, the science of feedback, is a tool for evaluating my 
own work, secondly feedback loops are often consciously built into works and, 
thirdly, art is discussed as a system and, what’s more, a cybernetic system. 
Though I am not attempting to provide a rigorous description of cybernetics’ 
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own evolution, that history is implicit. The distinction between first and second 
order cybernetics is inherent to the discussion of Now Man for example. Now 
Man can be understood as a system of feedback loops but with the observer 
contained within it i.e. a second order cybernetic system (cf. infra, pp.81-82). 
Niklas Luhmann’s Art as a Social System (2000) has been a major influence as 
stated, and cybernetics can be seen as a subset of, or overlapping with, general 
system theory. In addition, a sceptical attitude towards cybernetics 
fundamentalism is maintained. The limitations of cybernetics, and by 
implication systems theory too, are discussed. Unpedantic applications are 
proposed; epistemological, rather than ontological usage is advocated. 
Cybernetics, when understood merely as a technology, tended to become either 
a source of anxiety or the opposite, a belief system or religion, and so it appears 
with AI nowadays. The attention given to AI and tangible new technologies 
hides a lack of critique for pre-existing codes, processes and procedures, which 
may have little to do with computing as it is normally understood, and this is a 
point developed in the dissertation, and drawn out in the conclusion. Though 
the work is not intended to be activistic then, a point which is reasserted in the 
bottom-up analysis in section 3.2.1 (see Factor 10), it can be construed as such 
after the event and thus trigger thinking and debate. Inferring that the digital 
network, social media and machine intelligence are incorrectly being treated as 
more legitimate causes for concern than the ‘bigger picture’ comprises a 
political statement. 
A point made frequently in the dissertation is that one can remain 
ignorant of the potential meanings and interpretations while producing art. 
And that is not to imbue such seemingly unthinking behaviour with mystique. 
In fact, the apparent paradox of splitting oneself in two intellectually is a 
primary definition of artificial stupidity. The question of conscious spectating is 
to a large degree separate from producing I argue. And what is the PhD writing 
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if not a protracted exercise in conscious spectating? Someone else might offer a 
different response to these artworks, which is not to suggest at all that they are 
somehow unresolved from the point of view of the art system. It has been 
possible in the writing for me to deliberate in section 2.1 about the problems 
with automobiles and technology underutilisation, in section 2.2 about Now 
Man as a work which questions the seductions of technological feedback loops 
and media control, about Rearing as a comment on industrial food processing 
and capitalist waste and Worn Outing as a challenge to high-street conventions, 
consumerist habits and dress codes. Contra-invention, Missing You and Less 
(described in section 2.3) play games with everyday procedural routines. In 
addition, the case is made that the decidedly modest nature of these 
provocations, by the standards of hacking, can have more import than shock 
tactics. The two works, resulting from the no-budget residency which helped to 
kick start the PhD development proper (as outlined in section 1.5), A Nod to 
Turing and Creed and A Nod to Gormley, were certainly not simply meant as 
appreciations of artists Martin Creed and Anthony Gormley. They might be 
considered examples of Arte Povera (Tate, 2017b), and are at least privately 
sarcastic about the comfortable authority exercised by, what is now, a quite 
corporate contemporary art scene. In two ways then, the foregrounding of 
matters political is almost inevitable. Firstly, new discoveries are made in the 
subsequent receipt of work as we have just outlined. Secondly, to completely 
ignore the ordinary facts of a politically loaded landscape, would be 
observationally specious, and, in fact, more dramatically political. The latter line 
of thinking was firstly expanded upon in reviewing of Glenn Ligon’s work in 
appendix A and is raised elsewhere in the thesis. 
‘Contributions to knowledge’ are summarised in the concluding section 
of chapter 4 but where and how do these ideas materialise in the writing, in its 
reflection on practice? It may be obvious to state that the conclusions drawn 
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were not available in advance of the writing but books, texts and papers are 
often written with pre-conceived outcomes in mind. Here, however, it was not a 
case of ‘writing up’ the PhD once the practice was complete: the writing took 
place simultaneously with, and in relation to, practice. License was taken to be 
discursive, particularly in chapter 2, as a means of discovering and teasing out 
the important arguments. This is not to suggest an inefficiency of purpose 
because allowing arguments to develop in a recurrent manner across the thesis 
gives a stronger sense of the chronology and how practice has informed 
thinking. 
The invention/discovery of term artificial stupidity, in reaction to the 
concept of artificial intelligence during the short residency in the artist-run 
project space, is described in section 1.4 and 1.5. The two primary uses artificial 
stupidity can be put to are first expressed in section 1.5. The term can mean 
mockery of AI or describe a kind of intelligent or pretend stupidity employed 
positively by artists, as we have said. The practice of painting, when seen as an 
unnecessary but deliberate form of limitation or as conscious luddite behaviour, 
is explored as one candidate for the definition artificial stupidity. Further 
interpretations are articulated elsewhere in the writing. In section 2.1 the act of 
collaboration with someone possessing expertise in a different discipline is 
characterised as artificial stupidity. Also in 2.1, the purposeful acceptance of 
errors and deliberately doing things ‘wrongly’ are included as examples. The 
absurdity of the game Now Man, discussed in section 2.2.1, and the usefulness 
of a clown’s ability to ‘act stupid’ are added to the mix. This ability to 
deliberately misunderstand can be adopted as a kind of productive stupidity 
when applied to everyday functional systems, and is cited as crucial to the later 
work described in section 2.3. In chapter 3, which firstly works with theories 
relevant to deciphering my artistic practices, other interpretations of the 
expression artificial stupidity are cited: its negative meaning as a reflection of 
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intellectual cowardice (cf. infra, p.134) is mentioned, a stupidity to being 
pedantic about representation or trying to create comprehensive empirical 
models is suggested (cf. infra, p.145). Similar points are made about the 
attempts to be pedantically categorical in section 3.2.1 and in appendix H: there 
is both a practicality and a madness to such exercises. Potential future use of the 
term as licence to deal differently (for artistic purposes it should be stressed) 
with political histories or emotionally loaded subject matter, is intimated in the 
first section of chapter 4. In order to synthesise conclusions three different 
meanings, for artificial stupidity, emanating from Ada Lovelace, Avital Ronell 
and John Roberts, are referred to in section 4.2. Lovelace, astonishingly 
considering she was writing in the early nineteenth century, was correctly 
concerned about the tendency to trivialise the future potential for machine 
intelligence. Ronell, amongst other things, uses the exact term, artificial 
stupidity, to deal with the social misuse of intelligence measurement4. Roberts 
emphasises the significance of a kind of false stupidity, characteristic of artistic 
behaviour: stupidity as a retort to power. His version is of the kind which is key 
to navigating duh? Art and Stupidity, an exhibition also examined in section 4.2. 
The three definitions tie in with those already discussed in the writing. And to 
illustrate the range of possible applications for the concatenation of the word 
‘artificial’ with the word ‘stupidity’ (i.e. not just those relevant to art and the 
themes of this thesis) appendix H comprises of a more expansive breakdown of 
definitions. The fact that artists often conduct themselves in ways which appear 
stupid from the outside, combined with the notion of art as social system, leads 
to a final important use of the term. Artificial stupidity, it is argued, is a 
characteristic of the art system’s behaviour (with respect to other functional 
                                                 
4 Her book Stupidity (Ronell, 2002) has been an important source. 
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systems). I reason that if the art system were presumed to have agency, it 
would be a court jester of sorts: it would benefit from acting stupid. 
In the closing paragraphs of section 4.2, it is also argued that technology 
cannot be truly intelligent, not least because it is emotion-less and therefore 
literally stupefied. The implication is that it would be reasonable, if not 
progressive, to adopt a position of superiority, and to ‘other’ AI instead of 
fearing it. The point about slower, pre-computing, bureaucratic systems, being 
equivalent to AI, which arises firstly in section 2.2.2, is returned to in chapter 4 
too. It is there that the proposition is made that critical attention ought to be 
given to the former kinds of procedures, codes and systems of work, as well as 
high speed computational processes. In concluding I also posit that less-
rigorous applications of systems theory are defensible, implying that there is a 
place for empirical, flexible or even playful uses. This thinking arises from 
experience in industry, from reading texts dealing with the subject of 
complexity, from writing in response to art works in section 2 and in the 
appendices, and lastly from engaging with theoretical frameworks in section 
3.1. In addition to these key arguments, secondary and perhaps localised, 
contributions to knowledge are underscored in sections 4.3 and 4.4. These, in 
turn, cross reference other sections of the thesis and practice work. 
I assert also that the art works themselves, treated mostly in chapter 2, 
and particularly those initiatives discussed in section 2.3, constitute a significant 
contribution to knowledge. Contextual and historical comparisons can be made, 
and are, but this is original work, and has been endorsed as such. The following 
is a list of the key works produced during the period of the PhD: 
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Type 
Activity 
Title Ye
ar
 
In
iti
at
ed
 
Work/Run 
Title Year Type 
Duration/ 
Items/Dimen
sions 
Live Rearing 2006 Rearing, The 
Phoenix, 
Brighton 
2010 Performance 
routine 
36min 
1 clown 
1 director 
12 doz. med. 
sized eggs 
    Rearing, 
Disruption II, 
Swansea 
2012 Performance 
routine 
1hr 4min 
1 performer 
12 doz. med. 
sized eggs 
   Rearing, 
Matt's 
Gallery, 
London 
2014 Performance 
routine 
1hr 4min 
1 performer 
12 doz. med. 
sized eggs 
   Rearing 
Vessels 
2006 Readymade/
Sculpture 
4 children’s 
potties, 
2 green, 
1 white, 
1 ochre, each 
28 x 25 x 17cm 
 Now Man 2007 Now Man, 
The Joinery, 
Dublin 
2010 Video 
Document 
DV PAL 1min 
23sec 
   Now Man, 
Friese-
Greene, 
Brighton 
2010 Performance 
game 
1hr 
1 performer 
Other players 
   Now Man, 
Friese-
Greene, 
Brighton 
2010 Video 
Document 
DV PAL 2min 
32sec 
   Now Man, 
Wandesford 
Quay, Cork 
2012 Performance 
game 
1hr 
1 clown 
Other players 
   Now Man, 
Wandesford 
Quay, Cork 
2012 Video 
Document 
DV PAL 3min 
   Now Man, 
Phizzfest, 
Dublin 
2012 Performance 
game 
1hr 
1 performer 
Other players 
   Now Man, 
Phizzfest, 
Dublin 
2012 Video 
Document 
DV PAL 3min 
   Now Man, 
Over and 
Out Gallery, 
Lincoln 
2012 Performance 
game 
30 min 
1 performer 
Other players 
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Type 
Activity 
Title Ye
ar
 
In
iti
at
ed
 
Work/Run 
Title Year Type 
Duration/ 
Items/Dimen
sions 
   Now Man, 
Over and 
Out Gallery, 
Lincoln 
2012 Video 
Document 
DV PAL, 
3min 
   Now Man, 
Puppet Talk 
Symposium 
2013 Performance 
game 
20min 
1 clown 
Academics 
 
 
 
  Now Man, 
Puppet Talk 
Symposium 
2013 Video 
Document 
DV PAL, 
1min 39sec 
   Now Man 
puppet 
2007 DV 
Camcorder 
and cabling 
 
13 x 8 x 8cm 
2m cabling 
and charger 
 Worn 
Outing 
2011 Trial run, 
Artists 
Masked 
Procession 
2011 Performance 
intervention 
1hr 
2 participants 
   Worn 
Outing, 
London 
2012 Performance 
intervention 
2hr 
1 director 
1 clown 
7 actors 
   Worn Outing 
Photo-outfits 
2012 Prints/Photo-
outfit 
7 A0 photo-
outfits, each 
made of two 
119 x 84cm, 4 
colour, 3 black 
& white 
Residency Occupant 
#6 
2012 A Nod to 
Turing and 
Creed 
2012 Simupoem/A
lgorithm 
Sinclair ZX81, 
17 x 18 x 4cm 
Analogue TV 
   A Nod to 
Gormley 
2012 Readymade/
Sculpture 
48 milk 
containers, 
each 25 x 9 x 
8cm and 
1 similar, 
filled to 
varying levels 
arranged 7 x 7 
Intervention/
Hack 
Contra-
Invention 
2008 Contra-
Invention 
Triptych 
2010 Prints 3 pairs of 180 
x 120cm 
digital inkjet 
prints on 
corrugated 
plastic 
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Type 
Activity 
Title Ye
ar
 
In
iti
at
ed
 
Work/Run 
Title Year Type 
Duration/ 
Items/Dimen
sions 
   Contra-
Invention 
Reflectogram
s & Portraits 
of the Artist 
2010 Prints 9 digital inkjet 
prints, each 22 
x 38cm 
   Contra-
Invention 
Catalogue 
2010 Print-on-
demand 
book 
Paperback, 84 
pages, 29.69 x 
20.98cm, full 
colour interior 
   Contra-
Invention, 
Torn Parking 
Fine 
2010 Readymade In frame, 32 x 
23 x 2cm 
   Contra-
Invention, 
Later Portrait 
of the Artist 
2012 Digital image Jpg, 640 x 480 
pixels 
 Missing 
You 
2012 Missing You 
Large Prints 
2013 Prints 7 digital inkjet 
prints on 
paper, each 
84.1 x 119cm,  
   Missing You 
Medium 
Prints 
2013 Prints 7 framed 
black & white 
photos, each 
41 x 29 x 2cm 
   Taking the 
Proverbial 
2013 Readymade/
Sculpture 
Plastic sledge, 
93 x 50 x 
17cm, urine, 
photo 38 x 
26.5cm 
   PODS 2013 Video 
slideshow 
DV PAL, 
3min 
   Piss-take 01 2014 Print Framed dried 
image from 
Taking the 
Proverbial, 53 
x 43 x 3cm 
   PODS 2014 Print-on-
demand 
book 
Hardcover (& 
dust-jacket), 
104 pages, 
22.86 x 
15.24cm, black 
& white 
interior 
   Delivering 2014 Video 
(Simupoem) 
HDV PAL, 
18sec loop 
24 
 
Type 
Activity 
Title Ye
ar
 
In
iti
at
ed
 
Work/Run 
Title Year Type 
Duration/ 
Items/Dimen
sions 
 Less 2014 Less 2014 Print-on-
demand 
book 
Paperback, 
112 pages, 
17.48 x 
10.8cm, black 
& white 
interior 
   Exchanging 2015 Video 
(Simupoem) 
HDV PAL, 
4min 15 sec 
loop 
   A0 Zero 
Receipt 
Posters 
2016 Print-on-
demand 
118.9 x 84.1cm 
print on paper 
   More Less 2016 Print-on-
demand 
book 
Paperback, 
116 pages, 
29.69cm x 
20.98cm, black 
& white 
interior 
   How to Buy 
Nothing 
2016 Video 
(Instructive) 
HDV PAL, 
1min 4sec 
Misc. One off 
Simupoems 
2004 Boring 2012 Video 
(Simupoem) 
DV PAL, 
3min 30sec 
loop 
   Busting 2016 Video 
(Simupoem) 
HDV PAL, 
3min loop 
 One off 
books 
 A Tribute to 
William 
Klein: 
Photography 
is not 
Permitted 
2012 Print-on-
demand 
book 
Paperback, 92 
pages, 26.04 x 
16.84cm, black 
& white 
interior 
 Delivering 
a Paper 
2016 Delivering a 
Paper, 
Impact 
Symposium 
2015 Performance 30min 
1 reader 
   Delivering a 
Paper, 
Bleeding 
Hearts Club 
2015 Performance 10min 
1 reader 
   Delivering a 
Paper, 
LowTechLab
London 
2016 Performance 10min 
1 reader 
   Delivering a 
Paper, Paper 
2015 Document 13 page A4 
academic 
paper 
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The remaining sections of this chapter give an account of how the thesis 
question arose through a combination of study and practice, as well as 
introducing key definitions and initiating arguments which reappear, and are 
developed further, in later chapters. 
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1.3. Cybernetics and art 
 
The original proposal for this PhD attempted to connect the 
transdisciplinary field of cybernetics and art. Given my experience in both 
spheres, thanks to more than a decade of employment using mathematical 
modelling and computer simulation, another decade as a practicing artist and 
qualifications in both engineering and fine art, something of value seemed 
liable to emerge. Much has been made, after all, of counterpoising and 
juxtaposing technology and art, philosophy and art, certain craft skills and art, 
so why not make use of the cybernetics philosophy? In addition, cybernetics, 
the science of feedback loops, which has its etymological origins in steering, 
navigation and the ‘art of governing’ (OED, 2015b), was one of the frames of 
reference in my MA dissertation about the relationship between comedy and 
contemporary art. 
The first significant computer art exhibition, Cybernetic Serendipity, took 
place at the ICA, London in 1968 (Reichardt, 1968). Revisiting the motivations 
for this seminal show would potentially reveal principles which had since been 
overlooked, or forgotten. For those who like to view history mechanically as a 
series of stages the year itself conceivably marks the switch from modernism to 
post-modernism. Computing was still a verb then; the emphasis was on 
processing power. Later weight would be given to data management and 
information storage capacity but these were mere requirements at first. The fact 
that the Central Processing Unit (CPU) in most machines, now lies idle most of 
the time, is overlooked but calculation power and perhaps the networking 
potential was precisely what excited people initially. Cybernetics was about the 
dynamic relationships, about action, and was in fact conceptually 
unsympathetic to the need to accrue information for the purposes of 
representation. Moreover, cybernetics was understood as a systems science and 
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philosophy of sorts and not associated only with computing and new 
technology. As time progressed fashionable usages of ‘cyber’ as prefix in new 
media contexts helped in bringing about looseness in meaning. The actual 
connection between the original cybernetics idea (concerned with ‘nature’ as 
much as computing and to the analogies between all systems) and the later 
conflated definition, ‘relating to (the culture of) computers, information 
technology, and virtual reality, or denoting futuristic concepts’ (OED, 2015a) is 
therefore tenuous. Caroline Bassett links the demise of ‘first wave’ cybernetics 
to post-modernism, deconstruction and to the critique of structuralism (2014, 
pp.63–72). Indeed structuralism, one theorist had previously declared, ‘quite 
simply is cybernetics’ (2014, p.62). More complex adaptations like ‘fuzzy 
cybernetics’ did emerge later (2014, p.98) and even in vilifying particular forms 
of cybernetics, leading theorists recognised it as having potential ‘to produce 
grounds for play’ (2014, p.72). Without dismissing the importance of arts and 
humanities engagement with new technology, nor ignoring the value of hefty 
compilations such as the Cybercultures Reader (Bell and Kennedy, 2007) and the 
validity of terms like cyberpunk, cyberbully, cybercommunity, cyberspace, 
cybersex and cybercrime, the fundamentals and elegance of the original 
cybernetics were undoubtedly diluted for a period of decades. 
A re-emergence of interest has been noticeable however and cybernetics 
remains fascinating both as a tool for experimentation by artists and designers, 
and as a theoretical framing device. Cybernetics seemed particularly helpful in 
evaluating some of my own activities and output. It would be interesting to 
apply the thinking to the work of other artists too regardless of their purposes 
or whether they were aware of the field at all5. 
                                                 
5 It is as reasonable to permit evaluations of artistic outputs which were not conceived of by the 
artist as it is to apply new theories to the past or to admit to unconscious motives for human 
behaviour. 
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The creation of the PhD proposal and preliminary research coincided 
with new writing on the subject. For example Andrew Pickering’s The 
Cybernetic Brain was published (2011). Sections of that book give attention to the 
significant influence cybernetics had on the artistic practices emerging in the 
1960s and ‘70s (2011, p.384). Douglas Hofstadter’s I am a Strange Loop, published 
in 2007, seemed pertinent. An article by Etan Ilfeld in MIT’s Leonardo journal 
dealt precisely with the subject of Contemporary Art and Cybernetics (2012). 
Events such as The Showroom in London’s Signal:Noise explored ‘the influence 
of cybernetics and information theory on contemporary cultural life by testing 
out its central idiom, “feedback”, through debates, performances, and events’ 
(2012). The momentum has continued: later Raven Row, another art space in 
London, organised an exhibition of Stephen Willats’ cybernetics-influenced 
artworks and produced a catalogue to coincide with it (Sainsbury, 2014a; b). 
As my research progressed it became obvious that cybernetics’ 
relationship to the arts was increasingly the subject of investigation. This 
discovery had the effect of simultaneously validating the initial hunch that the 
area was worthy of study and undermining my motivations for pursuing it. In 
fact, the title to Etan Ilfeld’s article was almost identical to the first research 
proposal heading adopted for this thesis. As it happens, and this surfaced in an 
interview conducted with Ilfeld in 2012, his emphases were different6, and 
besides the Leonardo article was one short piece of writing. Further inquiry 
uncovered other relevant texts including The Science of Art: the Cybernetics of 
Creative Communication by R. E. Mueller (1967). Could a more specific line of 
investigation be generated from the queries outlined in the original proposal? 
                                                 
6 Along with studying the influence of cybernetics, I am interested in a more radical examining 
of the state of art. 
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Subordinate issues and questions, which had surfaced during research and 
through practice, looked increasingly promising. 
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1.4. Intelligence and AI 
 
Much of the initial excitement centring on cybernetics arose from the 
connotations for understanding intelligence and the human mind. Grey 
Walter’s ‘tortoises’, rudimentary robots which he constructed in the early 1950s, 
were viewed as simple intelligent systems (Pickering, 2011, p.48). Many of the 
early devotees to this new science were situated in psychiatry, dedicated to 
understanding the brain in context, and that was their motivation for 
attempting to build intelligent machines (Pickering, 2011). 
As noted earlier, the ease with which cybernetics and computing were 
eventually associated is ironic because, as time progressed, questions of data 
storage took precedence over CPU power. It is however the action-oriented 
aspects which are the essence of cybernetics thinking. Pickering repeatedly 
emphasises the fundamental suspicion the pioneers of cybernetics had of 
modelling reality against the alternative: interacting with it. He argues that 
science can be seen not only as representational but as ‘a mode of performative 
engagement with the world’ (2011, p.19). Approaches to artificial intelligence 
(AI) which emphasised only the quantity and quality of information, such as 
‘expert systems’ (OED, 2015c), never fully lived up to expectations possibly 
because of this lack of appreciation for performativity7. Sadie Plant highlights 
the fact that ‘human experts often do not function at a cognitive level’ (1998, 
p.171). A less capturable and more complex scenario is also indicated by Edwin 
Hutchins when he states: ‘[h]umans create their cognitive powers by creating 
the environments in which they exercise those powers’ (1996, p.169). 
Presumably Margaret Boden, who drew on computational concepts to study 
                                                 
7 Blay Whitby does emphasise the practical benefits which were realised through creating 
expert systems by comparison with more flamboyant areas of AI research (c2003, pp.29–33). But 
the success is partly due of the former’s relative simplicity and the ambitions being so tangible.  
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creativity and ‘intuition’ (1992), was in a minority as computing spread because 
for most other researchers the drive to create intelligence looked more exotic 
than attempts to understand it. She was interested in the latter. AI, as a field, 
survived, transformed and expanded in different directions (Whitby, c2003, 
pp.66–69), but one could argue that the arrival  of digital computing and the 
rate of development led to a rush in the direction of simulation and 
representation. Consequently the kinds of elementary queries put by the likes of 
Grey Walter, Ross Ashby, Gregory Bateson, Stafford Beer and R. D. Laing, all 
early advocates of cybernetics theories (Pickering, 2011), were less likely. In 
other words, computing gave impetus to cybernetics experimentation initially 
but further technological progress undermined that interest. 
The links between cybernetics and study of the brain, intelligence and AI 
are being mentioned here to lay the basis for a more specific research question. 
The recognition that views, about what exactly intelligence is, vary 
dramatically, is pertinent to the direction of this inquiry too. Howard Gardner’s 
concept of Multiple Intelligences (2006), Edward De Bono’s thinking caps (2000), 
discussions about left brain and right brain modes of thinking (Mcgilchrist, 
2012), ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008) and Nigel Thrift’s term ‘intelligencings’ 
(2008, p.463), in this case the sheer variety of discussions on the subject, is 
evidence that defining intelligence remains an ever-open question. 
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1.5. Practice as research, ‘artificial stupidity’  
 
Before proceeding it should be stressed that the criticisms voiced about a 
particular work below are intended in a similar spirit to when academic or 
political differences are foregrounded. Arguments in these two spheres are not 
always conducted respectfully, true, but that is the ideal. Also another event or 
piece might have sufficed, so in that sense, the work reacted to, is a ‘straw man’. 
After deliberating it was decided to include the critique to avoid underplaying 
the importance of such sparring and so as not to ignore the passions aroused. 
An exhibition in 2012 organised to coincide with the centenary of Alan 
Turing’s birth (Lighthouse, 2012) devoted a proportion of its space to toy-like 
apparatuses which roughly mimicked what humans do. One work, My Robot 
Companion (Clark, 2012; Dumitriu, 2013), may have been presented differently 
in other situations – the exhibition toured – but at the original venue, 
Lighthouse (Lighthouse, 2016), it was difficult to see firstly how the vaguely 
interactive construction was original art-wise and secondly how it connected 
with very topical subjects as it purported to. Links with a seductive research 
area – i.e. the debate about latest developments in robot intelligence, the 
simulation of affect, artificial nannies and carers – do not guarantee that 
exceptional artworks or thought-provoking interventions will be produced. 
Bias was a factor no doubt because of my unease with representation, and with 
figuration in particular, but the outcomes appeared superficial and even banal 
despite the undeniably intriguing scientific, psychological and philosophical 
inquiries being conducted by collaborators (Adaptive Systems Research Group, 
2012). Impatiently I concluded that the creation did little more than the 
presence of a mannequin would by prompting questions about the human 
tendency to anthropomorphise. The emphasis was on how these artefacts 
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looked, their mechanical behaviour, so that to a child say, they might appear 
intelligent or alive in some way. 
It is true that increasingly ‘embodiment’ is seen as crucial in addressing 
the situated nature of human consciousness (Prinz, 2008). Also the cultural 
significance of technological embodiment has been discussed (Balsamo, 1995). 
Nothing about My Robot Companion however indicated awareness of these 
important trends. This negative standpoint, which was grounded in my 
knowledge of what engineering simulation could do (cf. supra, p.36, cf. infra, 
pp.51, 68 and appendix F) and with what artistic techniques could not, left me 
unenthusiastic about appearance-oriented representation. I felt an affinity for 
the aversion to representation common amongst modernist artists but also 
amongst many of the advocates of cybernetics (cf. supra, p.30). For the British 
cyberneticians, the brain ‘was not representational but performative’ (Pickering, 
2011, p.6). 
The question is complicated because ‘representation’ means different 
things to different people and issues of embodiment are surely tightly linked. 
Embodiment can refer to the physical matter housing a computational 
mechanism, in other words a platform, and that is different to the conception 
that the ‘body’ itself is the computational mechanism8. Interestingly, a letter to 
Ross Ashby reveals that Alan Turing saw no benefit to creating special robotic 
machines (Turing, 1946). He stressed that Ashby’s self-regulating ‘homeostats’9 
(Ashby, 2008b; a) could exist in a simulation. So it seems that Turing did not 
harbour worries about representing in the sense of creating a model of the 
                                                 
8 Perhaps this is what Stafford Beer was getting at in his peculiar poem written in 1964: 
‘Computers, the Irish Sea’ (Pickering, 2011, p.288) 
9 ‘The homeostat - a bulky and somewhat baroque machine built from military surplus parts - 
had a single purpose: to regain stability in response to perturbations in its environment’ (British 
Library, 2016). 
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electro-mechanical devices. It should be noted however that Turing’s view 
expressed here was the unorthodox one at that time. This was before it became 
commonplace to simulate systems on digital computers. Also holes can be 
picked in fundamentalist resistance to representational modelling (scientific or 
otherwise). Ashby’s devices, like Grey Walter’s tortoises, were more obviously 
physically embodied dynamic mechanisms, but, as the nickname for the latter 
suggests, open to being anthropomorphised. In addition, when one kind of 
body emulates another or adapts performatively to its environment 
cybernetically, then by default a model of what is outside is being created: is 
that not representation? Opposition to representation starts to become aporetic. 
Turing, in his lack of concern about simulating, would, most likely, have been 
uninterested in whether the material nature of a calculating-machine could 
influence outcomes. But the difference actually with the cybernetic approach, 
one which Pickering draws out, is to do with the relationship between ontology 
(put crudely: what there is) and epistemology (what is known about what there 
is). Referring to Stafford Beer and others, Pickering writes of ‘a vision of 
knowledge as part of performance rather than as an external controller of it’ 
(2011, p.25). Conventional science wants to know. If the equivalent of an 
algorithm can be presumed to exist within a system then, for the cyberneticists, 
it would not be necessary to describe that mechanism precisely. Engineers, 
coders and model-builders work from the opposite direction: they create a 
system which then comes to life and quite naturally they believe that they 
understand what it is they have built. Mostly science has seen its task as to get 
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inside the Black Box10. If orthodox intelligence has been associated with these 
latter kinds of knowing then, obversely, cybernetics sees the value of innocence. 
Another reason for my reaction to Intuition and Ingenuity (the title of the 
show at Lighthouse) is that propositions which challenge what constitutes 
intelligence or sentience, artificial or not, interest me. The variety of definitions 
of intelligence has already been mentioned (cf. supra, p.31). The fact that 
present-day search engines with their hidden algorithms, and tools for data and 
text mining already amount to impressive examples of AI (referred to as Good 
Old Fashioned AI or GOFAI (Pickering, 2011, pp.6, 62) in the field) can easily be 
overlooked. A broader conception of intelligence is inferred by Nigel Thrift. His 
notion of ‘intelligencings’ (cf. supra, p.31) implies temporal phenomena not 
situated concretely in something like a brain. At any rate applications already 
available online, across the network or installed on mobile devices, are all 
embodied, just not in human-shaped forms. There is a material basis to 
computing11. Intelligence might be something to notice in the world as much as 
create, to borrow what is surely the twentieth century’s most important art 
term: a ‘readymade’ (Tate, 2016a). The branch of a tree which springs back into 
position, when disturbed by a gust of wind is intelligence of a sort, a 
deceptively simple self-regulating system, in-tune with its environment, and 
capable of managing contingency. 
                                                 
10 Ross Ashby gave attention to the origins of Black Box theory in electrical engineering and its 
wide application (1956, pp.86–120). Andrew Pickering, building on Ashby’s writing (2011, 
pp.19–20), defines it thus: ‘A Black Box is something that does something, that one does 
something to, and that does something back—a partner in, as I would say, a dance of agency 
[(1995, p.21)]. Knowledge of its workings, on the other hand, is not intrinsic to the conception of 
a Black Box’ (2011, p.20). 
11 Film maker and theorist Hito Steyerl, amongst others, strives to remind us of the physicality 
of the digital (from 2m18s: Hito Steyerl interview at Picture This, 2011) but it is the whole 
architecture which must be considered, rather than her stress on the waste produced. The ever 
changing architecture of the network constitutes the body in which intelligence is situated. 
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At the same time as Intuition and Ingenuity I had been offered a no-
budget one-week residency in a nearby underground12 art space entitled 
Occupant (Pryde-Jarman, 2012c). Given my background and the feelings stirred 
up, it seemed fitting to use the opportunity to respond to the Turing show. The 
week of experimentation proved surprisingly fruitful in that it generated the 
eventual focus for this PhD. The residency, in fact, demonstrated precisely how 
art practice can be part of a research methodology. 
Though my concerns at first were based on ‘gut feeling’ it seemed 
legitimate to poke fun at the officially endorsed exhibition. Whether art is a 
proper realm at all for communicating something about a famous 
mathematician was one question on my mind. Could or should these two 
worlds be forced together? I considered this question based on past experience. 
Algorithmic simulation had been my professional ‘bread and butter’ for a 
period and along with realising the limitations and misunderstandings possible 
I became aware of the charms of these dynamic models. Simulation model 
building is a balancing act between necessary pedantry and the application of 
‘broad brush stroke’ assumptions. It was noticeable that though models were 
built for some predetermined purpose they also acquired a life of their own. 
Long before reading Jean Baudrillard (1994) I realised that simulations were 
significant systems in their own right. 
With some of these thoughts in mind the residency proceeded. Final 
pieces were produced and presented at the end, along with workbooks and 
notes on the key ideas which would inform my outlook from that point 
onwards. 
                                                 
12 The term underground has lost its edge but the space in question had been formed out of 
three rooms in a basement underneath another building (Pryde-Jarman, 2012a; b): it was 
literally so. 
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By coincidence, having regretted selling an old ZX81 computer on E-Bay 
a few years previously, I had managed to track down another which arrived  
 
Figure 01 Occupant residency setup, 2012 
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serendipitously just as the residency began (Figure 01). The primitive machine 
boasted 1K of memory, required an analogue television set as monitor, its 
programs were stored on cassette tapes, and the keyboard consisted of pressure 
pads (Terrell and Simpson, 1982). Nevertheless, the ZX81 was ground-breaking 
and popular in the early 1980s because it was robust (there were no moving 
parts), small (167 x 175 x 40mm and 350 grams) and relatively cheap (it cost 
about £70 then). I had bought one second-hand in 1982, from a fellow student, 
while studying chemical engineering. Though mainframe computers were 
available to us then, I was also interested in what could be done independently 
at home. The ZX81 permitted the testing of basic algorithms and iterative 
methods. 
Thirty years on I was curious about what might be possible given the 
extreme limitations of using such a machine. To compound the problem of the 
technology being outdated, the analogue television acquired as monitor did not 
work reliably. The equipment was faulty in other ways: it was not possible to 
record or save the contents of memory to cassette or emulator. Each time the 
ZX81 was powered off all the code was lost! Admittedly not much could be 
stored on a 1K machine anyway, ten to twenty lines of BASIC, so records of 
these displayed on screen were easily captured using phone camera (Figure 02). 
The realisation that a contemporary mobile device was vastly more powerful, 
and that the phone’s lowest camera resolution was far in access of the 0.003 
megapixel13 display possible with the ZX81, added a twist of irony. As someone 
                                                 
13 Though number of megapixels has become the norm as a digital camera metric it can also be 
applied to screens and other image display devices. I am fond of carrying out the simple 
calculations to make analogies and did so, for example, for silk images produced on Jacquard 
Looms during an artist intervention in Macclesfield, UK (O’Connell, 2014b). A typical laptop 
screen now would be equivalent to at least 1 megapixel. In ‘Graphics Mode’ the ZX81 gives 64 x 
48 = 3072 pixels or 0.003072 megapixels. 
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who had been an advocate of The Lowtech Manifesto14 (Wallbank, 1999) it was no 
more interesting to adopt a Luddite position than compete with latest industry 
breakthroughs. The attitude could be applied to exhibition and documentation 
too. Polished, high production-value assets are not always superior, nor 
essential practically. During the artist’s talk at the end of the residency the 
audience were requested to use their mobile devices to video the eventual 
animation produced. As well as orchestrating the documentation, in doing so 
more attention and increased interaction with the work was being demanded. 
So mixing old technologies with new and pushing unlikely elements together is 
not, for me, a cause for concern: quite the opposite. 
Reappropriating from Intuition and Ingenuity, the exact idea I was 
sceptical about, I went ahead with a plan to combine computing hardware, 
algorithmic techniques, and to be unapologetic about the relationship with art. 
Examples of contemporary art to work with were sought. 
Artist Martin Creed’s Work No. 1020 involving ballet dancers and 
performance, initially executed at Sadler’s Wells Theatre (Creed, 2009; 
Anderson, 2009), included a film projected on a large scale at the back of the 
stage. The film was described at a later exhibition thus: ‘an LED video screen 
shows a man's torso in profile. His penis grows erect, then droops, again and 
again, in an endlessly repeated performance of human engineering’ (Searle, 
2014). The piece would be used (and just how will be described in the pages 
which follow) but had not been consciously selected to suit the Turing 
centenary celebrations in 2012. The corporeal dimension inherent in Creed’s 
film might play off well against an otherwise dry technical backdrop. It is now 
well known however that chemical castration was imposed on Turing in the  
                                                 
14 I still am. In January 2016 I participated in an international Lowtech event in London 
(Marroquín, 2015). 
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Figure 02 A Nod to Turing and Creed, the code, 2012 
 
months prior to his premature end (Davies, 2009). His sexual orientation had 
been unacceptable then, probably even to himself. By chance rather than design 
presumably the film does draw attention to the matter of what images, and 
what acts, are tolerable and can be admitted to15. Any connections of this type 
were not worked out in advance: I was being ‘stupid’, contrasting ideas, 
individuals, their works and bits of equipment. The Lighthouse show suffered, 
in my opinion, from a lack of transgression. It was hoped that some of the 
impact of Creed’s piece would rub off. While not wanting to inflame for the 
                                                 
15 Even though Britain’s Mull of Kintyre test forbidding the depiction of erect penises is most 
likely an ‘urban legend’ (Armstrong, 2009) or (excuse the pun) fallacy, the perception that such 
bans exist says something about what is morally acceptable and what is not. 
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sake of it, the introduction of some element of danger, felt justified. It seemed 
reasonable to make associations between Turing’s ‘intuition and ingenuity’ and 
the artistically critical mind-set. 
I wondered about the practicality of simulating the sequence in Creed’s 
work using the 1K computer and rendering it out on the linked television 
screen. With the ZX81’s version of BASIC I wrote code which used the equation 
of a straight line, combined with a quadratic element (Figure 02) to introduce 
bend. The movement was then animated. A three-way tension was operating in 
my mind between the works at Lighthouse, Creed’s minimalist but precisely 
documented erection routine, and the impossibility of achieving photorealism 
on an old ZX81. The final work, entitled A Nod to Turing and Creed, plotted a line 
of asterisks, cleared them and then plotted them again at slightly different 
angles to simulate the effect depicted in Creed’s film. The curved line rotated 
upwards about a pivot point and then back down again repeatedly (Figure 03, 
p.42). By chance the rate of increase and decrease, which was a function of 
limited processing speed only, corresponded well with the durations in Creed’s 
original film. The fact of poor display quality, probably due to the 
incompatibility of the computer and the newer analogue television set in use, 
meant occasional blurring around the displayed asterisks. Serendipitously the 
points connected, as if interpolating, to create a more convincing impression. 
So, along with the code (the content), the particular qualities of the hardware in 
use (the form) influenced behaviour. 
Towards the end of the residency the import of having restricted myself 
in this extreme way became apparent. My Robot Companion was, I felt, ‘stupid’ 
but unwittingly and uncaringly so. It was not stupid enough. I reacted 
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antagonistically16. A Nod to Turing and Creed was calculatedly stupid or 
artificially stupid. This stumbled-across term ‘artificial stupidity’, which 
 
Figure 03 A Nod to Turing and Creed: screenshots (follow left to right, top to bottom), 2012 
 
                                                 
16 I did not concern myself greatly with promotion of the work to the Lighthouse exhibitors, but 
nor was the intention to be underhand. I communicated openly with participants there and 
even requested inclusion, if the Intuition and Ingenuity exhibition toured. 
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sounded firstly like a lampooning of AI, appeared both novel and linked with 
my interests in cybernetics, art, and in critiquing technology. Could the idea be 
unpacked and applied to what artists do? For good reason ‘stupid’ is an almost 
unacceptable term but could it be reappropriated? Perhaps prefixing with the 
word ‘artificial’ would be a means of reclaiming it because then the 
intentionality is underscored. 
Mentions of the idea of a knowing (or artificial) stupidity in the literature 
were found later (see chapter 4 & appendix H) but to begin its uses were 
explored without such awareness. The most obvious application was with 
respect to the faulty aspects of technology and the inevitable design glitches. In 
other words, at moments artificial intelligence might be better described as 
artificial stupidity. Experiences in industry had left me with many anecdotes. 
One project for a food processing company, for example, centred around a 
high-speed packing line, producing filled pancakes. Robotic arms had, at great 
expense, recently been introduced, to individually lift frozen pancakes from a 
conveyor belt and place them in boxes flowing along belts moving in the 
opposite direction. This was a complex task which had previously been carried 
out by human operators who were reassigned to other roles within the factory. 
Though the accuracy and speed at which the robots worked was astonishing to 
witness, there was a problem with the new system. The arms used suction to 
grab the chilled pancakes from the conveyor belt but, every so often, one of 
them would suck contents from a softer pancake into its mechanism. The 
number of units had been optimised so that when even one of the eight robots 
ground to a halt, processing capacity for those still running was not enough to 
pack the boxes. A proportion of the pancakes would escape the robotic arms, 
flow past, and be dumped onto the floor. It was as if the machines had acted in 
solidarity with the factory staff because the latter needed to be brought back to 
assist. Charlie Chaplin could not have authored the scenes that followed, with 
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operators negotiating their way around confused looking robots in order to 
prevent overspill. 
A second implementation of the term artificial stupidity could be to 
describe the common artistic practice of purposely limiting one’s own room for 
manoeuvre, as had been done by using redundant technology during Occupant. 
Limitation seems stupid but artists often employ it. The habit runs counter to 
one common cliché, namely that art is about uncontained and open-ended 
freedom of expression. Margaret Boden confronted this assumption in her 
seminal work on creativity with statements such as ‘to drop all current 
constraints and refrain from providing new ones is to invite not creativity, but 
confusion’ (1992, p.82) and ‘”Anything goes!” is not a good motto for the arts’ 
(1992, p.132). Paradoxically restrictions appear to increase the chance of creative 
breakthrough. Whilst the self-imposed constraint decided upon for the 
Occupant residency was to use one of the first-ever affordable home computers, 
a more frequent example is the practice of painting (in the very literal sense: 
through the application of paint mixtures onto support). The sheer numbers 
involved, and the widespread continuation of painting in art education, 
suggests that a minority see choice of Renaissance, or evenNeolithic, media as a 
problem. Some do recognise that their tools and materials add up to a 
convenient form of constraint. It was through such awareness that it was 
possible for abstraction to develop historically, and for painting to be self-
referential and ironizing on the history of painting. John Roberts comments on 
the impressionist’s valuing of "deliberate mistakes in execution and technique" 
(2011, p.211). Otherwise painting would simply be stupid and not knowingly 
so. If illustration is the objective, then there exist many more efficient and 
powerful methods, not least photography, and a plethora of software and 
hardware. If depiction is not the aim, then why fixate on paint: the world is full 
of other fascinating materials? 
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Arguments in support of the outwardly anachronistic activity can be 
listed though. A tradition and framework has been forged; painting can refer to 
previous painting as we have said; mutual understanding of the medium may 
be important. Sentiments along the lines of ‘painting is fun’ can be defended. 
Paint offers particular kinaesthetic, chemical and physical qualities. Its visceral 
nature and immediacy are seductive and peculiar, as are the contents of eggs 
employed in another work of mine Rearing (discussed in section 2.2.2). As it 
happens painting materials are evolving anyway: acrylic only became available 
in the 1940s. These media remain one means of image making. Then there is the 
art market which encourages continuity of a sort: the buying and selling of 
paintings has precedent. Painters are liable to, either furtively or openly, 
embrace commercial structures in order to sell work, reach audiences and 
continue functioning materially as artists. The business side is seen as 
problematic but Niklas Luhmann, for one, plays it down: ‘one should not 
overestimate the irritating effects of the market on the production of art. 
Precisely the demand for artistic originality prevents the artist from working 
with an eye to the market’ (2000, p.243). A wider conception of painting could 
include manipulation with digital tools. Ironic use of paint has been mentioned: 
its use could even be a provocative gesture against those who dismiss it. The 
term painting is often shorthand for a thought process or praxis as opposed to 
being actually medium-specific. Something should be added about the use of 
paint and other traditional approaches in art education. Their employment is a 
way of learning through enactment and re-enactment. An artist may claim no 
interest in, nor possess much fact-based knowledge of art history, say, but be 
tacitly informed thanks to practical experience with materials. 
Having said all this, a high proportion of what goes on must be driven 
by sentimentality, nostalgia and naivety. Hence the non-ironic existence of the 
‘Sunday painter’ stereotype, the proliferation of hobbyist courses and 
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traditional art materials outlets. Painting as artificial stupidity or intelligent 
limitation accounts for only a fraction of what goes on. The position argued in 
these sentences seesaws because the practice of painting can be judged stupid 
or deemed intelligent. Either side of the debate is possible to defend. In 
conclusion, it is curious though that something like oil painting on canvas is 
considered by many to be the most usual artistic device when it could just as 
easily count as the most eccentric. 
The way new gadgetry excites, and artists feel compelled to employ the 
latest technological breakthroughs, is an equal and opposite problem. 
Exhibitions which emphasise the capabilities of cutting edge tools often reflect a 
curious conservativism, a need to be linked to artistic tradition, which ignores 
the conceptual breakthroughs and more complex questions about what art 
might be. Uncovering the qualities of any medium can be revealing, including 
the noise and associated glitches. Whilst wary of the affection which grows too 
easily for precisely these characteristic faults17, I believe that worthwhile 
discoveries can result from maintaining an open-minded stance. ‘Manufactured 
or archival reproducibility of phenomena, including those sometimes 
spuriously overvalued as heritage, is at odds with serendipitous, accidental, or 
other crucially productive acts like inefficiency and forgetting’ says Sally-Jane 
Norman (2013, p.277). Misuse and stupid application opens up creative 
possibilities with any technology. And the same goes for interpretation: the 
defectiveness of art collective Blast Theory’s game Day of the Figurines had 
interested me more than its purported aims (O’Connell, 2007). 
                                                 
17 One thinks of the fashion for ‘shabby chic’ (OED, 2016d). The design principle and Eastern 
philosophy wabi-sabi gives legitimacy by suggesting that ‘[o]bjects and environments that 
embody naturalness, simplicity, and subtle imperfection achieve a deeper, more meaningful 
aesthetic’ (Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, p.256). 
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Apart from the chance occurrence of owning one, and being familiar 
with it from my youth, in selecting the ZX81 for the residency at Grey Area 
(Pryde-Jarman, 2012a), I was conscious of its untypicality as an artistic tool. 
Secondly questions about Alan Turing and the history of AI were at the fore 
and the machine provided a suitable playground for exploration. In using the 
antediluvian platform, questions were thrown up too about the evolution of 
computing. An efficiency in coding was enforced due to lack of processing 
power, storage capacity and computer memory. The limitations served as 
reminder that ‘computing’ is what computers are for; it is their ‘schwerpunkt’ 
as games designer Chris Crawford would put it (2003, pp.71–72). Processors 
were increasingly underutilised with the move to desktops and personal 
computers (cf. supra, p.26) whereas the CPUs of mainframes had been kept 
busy. In that sense the older machines were used more intelligently. Search 
engines now however orchestrate an impressive dance between networked 
storage and processing power. Mobile computing is changing the situation too 
because much of the work of device apps is carried out on servers, allowing 
economies of scale to be exploited again. It is curious to observe these swings of 
the pendulum in technology history. To compensate for the ZX81’s primitive 
keyboard a technique was invented which meant that when pressure-pad ‘L’ 
was pressed the Basic language command LET would appear on screen, when 
‘P’ was pressed the command PRINT appeared, and so on. This novel idea for 
speeding up the typing process disappeared when better desktop keyboards 
could be mass produced but it returned a few decades later, with mobile 
telephony, as ‘predictive text’. 
It is appropriate to refine the research methodology during the course of 
conducting research, instead of determining it in advance. Grounding reflection 
in practice in this way can vindicate the importance of the artist’s discourse 
with respect to others caught up in the ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki and Knorr 
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Cetina, 2000). Methods cannot always be written up prior to activity. Film 
director Andrew Kotting agreed with the appraisal of comedian Stuart Lee, 
whom he’d worked with (Swandown, 2012), when he said: ‘well all Kotting does 
is, he goes out into the landscape, he likes a journey, and then he reverse 
engineers meaning into it afterwards’ (Kotting and Jackson, 2015). Likewise the 
significance of the sequence of events described in the previous pages only 
became obvious subsequently. Niklas Luhmann’s writes that an artist ‘must, so 
to speak, let the emerging work show… what has been done and what can be 
done’ (2000, p.38) and John Roberts cites André Breton: “Illumination comes 
afterwards” (2011, p.236). In reaction to Wittgenstein’s proposal that ‘[w]hereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ (Biletzki and Matar, 2016), 
Michael Polanyi substantiated a belief that ‘we can know more than we can tell’ 
(2009, p.4). This admission of tacit knowledge is surely central to how artists 
operate. It may explain why artists can be deemed wise even though the 
content of what they know is not immediately made explicit. Artworks 
produced or critical actions taken are conceivably a step towards foregrounding 
that which has not yet been articulated. Luhmann points towards such 
possibilities (2000, pp.17–18). Speculatively it is the negotiation between two 
imagined poles of expressible and covert knowledge which leads to resolution 
of artistic outcome. 
Philosopher and music theorist Henk Borgdorff points out that ‘the 
borderline between artists and researchers is being blurred’ (2012, p.178) in an 
interview which discusses what ‘artistic research’ means (2012, pp.177–183). 
The Occupant residency fitted with his definition in stressing two key 
characteristics, namely that ‘artistic research takes place in and through the 
making of art’ and ‘the outcome of artistic research… partly at least, is art’ 
(2012, p.182). During the Occupant residency both a hypothesis (that the term 
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artificial stupidity would be useful to interrogate, especially in relation to art) 
and an art work, A Nod to Turing and Creed, were produced18. 
A threefold research methodology emerged then. Firstly, unapologetically 
playful approaches, characteristic of stages in artistic projects, were utilised to 
generate ideas. In this way art is primary research and equivalent to 
experimentation: it is a form of thinking. Secondly, conventional academic 
secondary research, the study of texts and writing was conducted alongside 
artistic production. Thirdly the works themselves were treated as raw materials 
or case studies to be written and talked about, with the benefit of insider 
knowledge, in order to develop arguments. Channels for discussion included 
conferences, symposia, exhibitions, artist talks, presentations, papers and the 
content of this thesis19. Figure 04 is a poster produced in 2012 for a research-
student event following initial brainstorming about where to take the research. 
It should be noted firstly that the artworks, which must be judged on their 
originality in the context of art, do not constitute the research but facilitate it. 
Secondly, in contrast to research which aims to build upon existing models of 
understanding, artistic investigation can undo contentment with knowledge, as 
a means to building it up again or discovering something new. In that sense art 
can be a kind of anti-research. Viktor Shklovsky’s specifying that ‘[t]he 
technique of art is to make objects 'unfamiliar', to make forms difficult, to 
increase the difficulty…’ (2003, p.280) can be interpreted in these terms too, and 
applied, not just to objects, but to sets of ideas. 
 
                                                 
18 Another work, A Nod to Gormley (O’Connell, 2014d), was also produced during the residency. 
19 As well as exhibiting and conducting art-oriented events (O’Connell, 2015b), materials were 
presented at many workshops and symposia (Chevalier, 2013a; b, 2014; O’Connell, 2014b; 
Grant, 2014; Hignell and Bright, 2015), and often at the Creative Critical Practice Research 
Group (CCPRG) convened at the University of Sussex (Chevalier, 2016). 
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Figure 04 Poster produced for research student event as overview of current ideas, 2012 
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1.6. Feedback and feedforward  
 
Before proceeding it is useful to define a number of key influencing 
cybernetic concepts and to connect these with the theme of intelligence. 
Cybernetics is the science of feedback loops. Less frequently referred to than 
feedback is the concept of ‘feedforward’. Both terms will appear when 
discussing individual works. Understanding of these concepts and cybernetic 
systems was gained initially from hands-on experience designing, tuning and 
simulating Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) logic (see footnote, appendix E, 
p.221) and PID control systems  (IADC Lexicon, 2015), for oil and gas platform 
operators. Other positions involved developing system dynamics (SD, cf. infra, 
pp.54-56) models to assist with strategic decision making and later I ran a 
course on computer games design20. In all of these arenas, and to some extent 
other areas of experience such as discrete event simulation (DES, cf. infra, p.68), 
feedback and cybernetics concepts feature. Texts associated with each define, or 
refer to, the importance of feedback (Harriott, 1964, pp.5–6; Luyben, 1973, 
pp.317–321; Vennix, 1996, pp.31–36; Crawford, 2003, p.174; Salen and 
Zimmerman, 2004, pp.213–227; Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, p.92) and 
occasionally feedforward (Harriott, 1964, p.6; Luyben, 1973, pp.431–451). Jimi 
Hendrix and groups such as The Jesus and Mary Chain had used feedback 
purposely and, while a student of art, the applicability to other performance 
practices notably stand-up comedy (footnote, appendix A, p.211) were looked 
into. I began to acquaint myself with some of the classic texts on cybernetics 
(Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1959; Pask, 1968; Wiener, 1954, 1965) and stumbled across 
experiments like Project Cybersyn (Transmediale08, 2008; Morozov, 2014). 
                                                 
20 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman devote a chapter of their book on game design 
fundamentals to cybernetics (2004, pp.219–233). 
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Rather than citing from the sources mentioned above I find it more 
incisive to demonstrate what feedback and feedforward are through an 
example I have often used. Think about taking a shower in unfamiliar 
accommodation. Increasingly showers are automated but, even there, a familiar 
challenge presents itself. Typically, the flowrate would be set first and then the 
water temperature adjusted by turning a dial. The process of arriving at a 
comfortable temperature involves a degree of trial and error. The dial is turned 
one way and, when the water becomes too hot, back again until a suitable 
setting is converged upon. The ease with which the optimum (or satisfactory) 
temperature is reached is a function of the particular plumbing, the lengths of 
piping, the heads of pressure and more. These structural parameters give the 
system its particular time delays, lags, ‘time constants’21 and sensitivity. The 
process of discovering the desired setting is known as feedback control. 
Feedback is firstly a means of learning about, or interacting effectively with, an 
incompletely understood external system. 
When the shower is used a second time the settings are reinscribed and 
with a few repeats memory alone can be relied upon. With time these actions 
become habit. Taking action based on what is known in advance is described as 
‘feedforward’ control. Feedforward is about formulaic behaviour but it offers 
speed. Disturbances can be reacted to immediately or even pre-empted. 
That is not the whole story: reality is more nuanced and complicated. A 
combination of feedback and feedforward is always essential in fact. If water is 
drawn from the same source through a tap being turned on or toiled flushed, 
then readjustments to the shower setting may be necessary. An element of 
                                                 
21 In control theory the concept of lag is different to time delay. A system might begin 
responding immediately to a step change in input but then gradually approach the final value. 
Useful definitions of concepts such as time constant and dead time and are provided by Jacques 
F. Smuts (2011). 
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feedback permits adaption to minor disturbances. As time goes on intelligence 
of the system is built up so that it becomes possible to respond to even 
multifaceted upsets, predominantly through the mechanism of feedforward. 
But in extreme cases, sensitive system dynamics, long ‘dead times’ or 
dysfunctional mechanisms can complicate the situation so that the temperature 
overshoots or undershoots. It might not be possible to control the system 
satisfactorily. Worse still, one’s own interactions could make matters worse. 
So feedforward is the praxis resulting from already accumulated 
knowledge whereas feedback is a mechanism for dealing with the (as yet) 
unknown. Feedback is empirical learning. It could be said that all feedforward 
is the result of historical feedback. Feedforward is the embodiment of feedback. 
The ability to interact using feedback is itself either learned or built-in and so 
could be labelled second order feedforward. In the tree branch example given 
earlier (cf. supra, p.35), the feedback mechanism is embodied in the properties 
of wood. 
Adult human beings, if portrayed in systems terms, function mostly 
through feedforward with corrections and adaption being provided by 
feedback. In fact, the user of an unknown shower would arrive armed already 
with knowledge from previous experience of similar apparatus. Already, at 
least three very different kinds of intelligence have been described here. 
Feedforward, feedback and the combining of both, correspond with human 
competencies of knowing, learning ability and mental agility across both, 
respectively. Historically education was connected with the first of these, the 
ability to accumulate, retain and use knowledge. Pickering, writing in 2011, 
asserts that: ‘[f]ormal education largely amounts to acquiring, manipulating, 
and being examined on representational knowledge’ (2011, p.13). Undoubtedly 
the world now, with its incorrigible demands for creativity, necessitates more of 
the feedback-type intelligence and mental dexterity. The existence of a Jisc 
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(formerly the Joint Information Systems Committee) paper, emphasising the 
benefits of feedforward as well as feedback for students (Ferrell and Gray, 
2013), shows that the former should not be dismissed outright though. 
Feedforward aligns with ideas of craft, the trades and skill. Feedback, together 
with this ability to draw upon knowledge, maps better onto the notion of art, 
especially conceptual and post-conceptual art. It does not take too much 
imagination to see how, in an environment where one type of intelligence is 
lauded, other types would be treated with suspicion, feared or deemed stupid. 
So in trying to define these cybernetics terms, arguments raised earlier (cf. 
supra, pp.31, 35) stemming from the difficulty in pinning down what 
intelligence is, are extended. 
Self-regulating mechanisms can be consciously constructed or found in 
natural systems. The scope appears almost infinite. The shower anecdote cannot 
do full justice to the intricacies of more complex formulations. Looping systems 
which link and overlap with others can be envisaged. Unusual dynamics and 
the potential for many kinds of instability exist. Consider the feedback 
commonly linked to audio circuitry (cf. supra, p.51), which is the result of a 
‘reinforcing loop’, also known as ‘positive feedback’, or ‘runaway’ (see 
appendix F, p.223). Much longer timescales are involved, for example, in 
climate change but the kinds of equilibrium, ‘dynamic equilibrium’22 and 
variability, noticeable there, are analogous with what happens in localised 
settings, at infinitesimal durations or even in electronic circuits. 
System dynamics (SD) is a field, inspired originally by Jay Wright 
Forrester (System Dynamics Society, 2016), in which cybernetics ideas are 
applied mainly to modelling industrial, business and economic systems. The 
                                                 
22 The term dynamic equilibrium means slightly different things in different fields such as 
chemistry (Lee, Wang and Wang, 2013), continuous and discrete event simulation (DES). It is 
mentioned also in appendix F when discussing Simple Harmonic Motion (SHL). 
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methodology for producing SD models involves determining which factors are 
important and linking those factors in a ‘causal loop’ diagram before dividing 
the system into ‘stocks’ and ‘flows’ and embedding data and equations 
(Radzicki and Taylor, 1997). From very simple building blocks the most 
complex simulations can be created. 
SD is mainly utilised for corporate modelling and a mind-set which, 
while revealing counterintuitive effects, does not purport to be fundamentally 
critical. The same applies with common applications of other computer 
simulation techniques (dynamic, continuous and discrete event simulation): 
questions of ideology, embodiment, ontology and epistemology would not 
usually be raised by the users of these tools, nor their clients. In addition, SD 
enthusiasts tend to overestimate what can be achieved with system theories and 
simulation, as exemplified by Forrester’s own, in retrospect astonishingly 
ambitious, attempts to model World Dynamics (1973). Voices such as Herbert A. 
Simon’s must have been in the minority, when, in the 1960s, he hinted at the 
need for the ‘development of a body of knowledge and technique for dealing 
with complexity’ (1962, p.482). Industrialists, business people and engineers 
purport to be uber-pragmatic but just as the structuralism which ‘owes a debt to 
cybernetics and information theory… was never as hygienic as its adherents 
thought it could be’ (Bassett, 2014, p.10), so it is with the tools they invent. The 
applications are nevertheless vast and though, ironically, the foremost demand 
for exact prognostic outputs is the one least likely to be satisfied, simulation can 
be valuable for visualising, foregrounding, understanding, training, to aid 
discussion and collective agreement, and reduce the likelihood of 
miscommunication and design errors. It is a pity that these, now very 
affordable, applications are almost monopolised by corporate interests. For 
artists, the concepts can be something to experiment with practically, as a 
means of subverting or framing understanding. In my case the science and 
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mathematics of feedback (appendix F, pp.222-245) was something to utilise in 
these ways. 
If feedback is about navigational intelligence and feedforward does not 
demand interaction, then culture might be defined in terms of the latter, as the 
entire body of accumulated knowledge which is stored and can be passed on. 
This conception of culture includes data, facts and information about the 
mechanism of interaction. Culture is stored on servers, in books or concretely in 
the shape of physical architecture, infrastructure and artefacts, as well as in 
human memory. Archiving can be conscious or incidental. Information about 
how to obtain information (the scientific method for example or pedagogical 
theories), call it meta-knowledge, forms part of the infrastructure, and 
presumably the structuring can cascade upwards in ‘object-oriented’ fashion. 
Feedforward fits with a more traditional notion of what intelligence is (simply 
information) and this has been the historical emphasis in education systems (cf. 
supra, p.53). Being able to retain and recite was considered impressive. The role 
of teachers was to tell pupils what to do. Being cultured amounted to 
possessing, and being able to act upon, this knowledge. 
Feedforward does not have to be about quantity of information, it should 
be added, but its inviolability. Cast iron is durable and solid but brittle, a 
material which, in cybernetics terms, corresponds to an extreme example of 
feedforward. Steel, on the other hand, is elastic to a degree, and so capable of 
better relating to its surroundings. 
Doubtless a difference with most animals is that we humans possess 
more ability to learn through feedback and to retain new information for 
feedforward purposes. Natalie Pollard, in an article exploring the relationship 
between rudeness and stupidity (2013, pp.83–103) presents the latter as the 
reverse of mental dexterity. For J.M. Coetzee, she states, stupidity ‘describes 
habituated, unchanging behaviours that privilege fixed ideas of the good and 
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the true, and which defensively cleaves to them when exposed to rival 
positions’ (Pollard, 2013, p.85). If, for Claire Colebrook, writing in another 
article in the same issue of Parallax journal, feedback is stupidity then it is ‘at 
once the death of thinking but also its life’ (2013, p.33). The cybernetics 
philosophy has to be about the tension between necessary ignorance and 
familiarity, corresponding to the extremes of feedback and feedforward 
respectively. 
Higher order cybernetic systems can be envisaged for which other 
systems are simply subsets. Idealised cybernetic models cannot address the 
noise and nonlinearity experienced in the real world, nor our ever-changing 
reading of what exists. The paradigm is useful nevertheless in framing 
understanding of many phenomena including the interventions and artworks 
described in the next chapter.  
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2. Interventions, art practice and works 
 
Work has been selected for discussion here on the basis of the weight it 
carries within the practice (in terms of time, effort and resources devoted) and 
secondly because of its relevance to the motifs of this thesis, i.e. contemporary 
and post-conceptual art, the science of feedback loops and a critiquing of 
intelligence, and intelligent systems. The writing in appendix A, a response to 
an installation by artist Glenn Ligon, tested the method employed here in facing 
my own work23. His Call and Response, an exhibition at London’s Camden Arts 
Centre (2014), called for a response in connection with the practices of interest 
to me. The installation, Live, pertained to familiar subject matter24 and employed 
comparable strategies25 to my own. Experiences working with contemporary 
grouping Common Culture (David Campbell and Mark Durden) are also drawn 
upon, when discussing Ligon’s piece in appendix A, just as work by Sophie 
Calle, a novel by Samuel Beckett (the latter dealt with in more depth in 
appendix I) and live art duo Hunt and Darton (Jenny Hunt and Holly Darton) 
are referred to in the chapter sections which follow. The nature of the writing is 
discursive. I review and speculate about the relationship with key themes. In 
the treatment, which, as has been said, includes relevant digression, the ground 
is laid for the structured breakdown and taxonomy of methods in chapter 3. 
The work is grouped under three headings for moving-image, directed 
performances and ‘hacks’. The simupoems, short looping films, which have 
been a consistent feature of my practice, are given attention in 2.1. One of these 
                                                 
23 Appendix B documents part of the research into Live too: professional stand-up comedian 
Stephen Carlin (Burgess, 2010) was interviewed about his experiences at the installation. 
24 Performance, feedback loops, humour and earnestness, upturning representation, the socio-
political, liveness, questions of life and death. 
25 Subtraction, appropriation, destructive methods and montage, alternative means of screening. 
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(Boring, 2012), which incorporates photographs captured while trapped in a 
nine-hour traffic jam, is focused upon. In section 2.2 live art is considered, 
beginning with Now Man, in which participants respond to the movements of a 
swinging camcorder (O’Connell, 2014e). Typically the same professional clown 
(IMDB, 2016; Bennett, 2016) was employed in the executing of performances but 
that evolved to include other players and also myself. Lastly, and most 
importantly, because this is work I intend to do more of, a series of interactions 
with the everyday technological landscape is discussed in section 2.3. One 
implication in mapping out this trajectory is that I have learnt from the clown, 
been an apprentice of sorts. I now play the fool, but as a means of creative 
unearthing. Parking contravention images are mistaken for art photography, 
beauty is found in courier company ‘point of delivery’ signatures, and 
supermarket self-checkout machines are used, but to buy nothing. This is not 
idiocy but artificial stupidity in that readymades are extracted, assets 
appropriated and procedures hacked: a) to produce original artworks and b) to 
point at the peculiarities in an all-encapsulating supply chain (IADC Lexicon, 
2013). 
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2.1. Films: the ‘simupoems’ and Boring (2012) 
 
For over a decade I have produced short moving-image pieces; looping 
films combining virtual '3D' models, physics-engine-inspired dynamic effects, 
mathematical principles and simulation techniques, incorporating imported 
imagery, captured sound or appropriated assets. These experimental films26, 
termed ‘simupoems’ (after Man Ray’s cinepoems but with the prefix simu 
instead for simulation), have many features in common with each other but do 
not consciously abide by the conventions associated with the medium of film. 
For me, they represent a new, be it localised, genre. Just as misuse is a factor in 
the investigative activity, it can be applicable in the production phase of work. 
Whether the functionality of these tools is shown off does not concern me. In 
fact, my drive is in the opposite direction (High level strategies list, point b, cf. 
infra, p.150). If 3D Modelling tools impress primarily because they automate the 
creation of classical perspective, then it is precisely that feature which may be 
switched off (Sheerin, 2014). Glitches in how the software works, including 
mistakes and oversights occurring during development, may be allowed to 
remain. 
In their not nesting comfortably within traditional arts/crafts categories 
the simupoems present a number of challenges. ‘Your work seems to come 
from nowhere’ I was once informed by an artist friend (see e-mail from Huw 
Bartlett, appendix G). In reality it has been neither an aim to create work which 
fits neatly within existing genres nor to evade easy classification. These films 
are not examples of ‘outsider art’ (Clarke and Clarke, 2013) either. Even when 
contextual linkages are not knowingly injected, conventions can be 
                                                 
26 The category experimental film is an anomaly because these films are not experiments. 
Nevertheless, the term is employed (sparingly) because it is a way of distinguishing from 
mainstream filmmaking, movie culture and so on. 
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unsuspectingly abided by, having been absorbed through social osmosis or 
similar. Polanyi’s defence of ‘tacit knowing’ (2009, pp.3–25) supports such a 
proposal. The simupoems could be said to borrow tacitly from the histories of 
experimental film, cine-poetry, photography, experimental music and sound 
art, modernist and abstract art, and are concomitant with ubiquitous features of 
the digital era namely: the slideshow, the ident and the screensaver. 
The challenge in positioning these works indicates a twofold general 
problem of classification. There is the difficulty of categorising a type of work 
and the fact that every instance, regardless of how it has been categorised, is 
unique. This issue is one which arises especially for artists because they are in 
the business of ‘creating’ (even when that means appropriating, selecting, 
distinguishing, intervening, reframing and being creatively uncreative). 
Alchemy was an ontological project given-up-on long ago or at least 
superseded by science, but artists hang onto it as an epistemological pursuit27. 
Before looking at a particular work (Boring, 2012) it is convenient to deviate and 
probe into a broader question here because it bears relevance to my practice 
and the themes of the thesis. To create useful taxonomies is ordinarily judged 
sensible. On the other hand, ‘[r]esistance is also needed to counter the 
indiscriminate application of terminologies or taxonomies to different 
phenomena: this tendency in the so-called creative industries’, Sally-Jane 
Norman says, ‘may correspond to hegemonic attempts to engulf art that 
otherwise hovers awkwardly beyond definitional reach’ (2013, p.285). 
Distinction, once it starts, i.e. the act of distinguishing, is inexorable, an example 
of reinforcing feedback (cf. supra, p.54). In Luhmann’s words ‘[o]nce a 
distinction is drawn, a sequence of operations is set in motion, as it were, 
                                                 
27 Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree (Tate and Manchester, 2002) is a prime example though 
he was not treating the question as one of epistemology versus ontology. 
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spontaneously’ (2000, p.31). Though every invented category must be 
inadequate in its description of the particular, complete refusal to recognise 
classes is impossible to countenance too. Conundrums mount up: ‘using a 
distinction to illustrate the lack of differentiation in the distinguished defies the 
distinction's functional purpose as difference’ (Luhmann, 2000, p.29). 
Philosophically Samuel Beckett was surely engaged with problems of this 
nature. The thought that describing is impossible coupled with the fact of doing 
it, or having to proceed anyway, is a key theme in his writing. ‘Even though 
everything seems inexpressible, there remains the need to express’, he said 
(Shainberg, 1987, p.103). It is no wonder that the title given to one key selected 
anthology (taken from Molloy) is: ‘I can’t go on, I will go on’ (Beckett and 
Seaver, 1992). The motivation for raising these points here is triggered by 
frustration about how to categorise the signature looping films, and indeed 
whether to categorise them. The problem of whether to consider the films works 
at all, whether to invent a genre and then to give each simupoem a title, is 
compounded by my discomfort with ‘making’ and commitment to 
appropriation, remixing, recycling, reusing and intervening. The simupoems 
however are largely ‘mashups’. They are fashioned firstly through forcing 
seemingly incompatible elements together and then worked upon so that no 
one component dominates in influence. As a kind of power-balance is 
approached other tensions within the work make themselves apparent. 
Through these manoeuvres - the addition and subtraction of elements and the 
accentuation and dampening of other effects - the overall connotative 
possibilities may be intensified. The hope is that new levels of poignancy, affect 
and meaning are revealed. 
I have allocated the simupoems the first position in this chapter because 
they represent a consistent and vital feature of my practice. These films are least 
easy to defend in a context which rates conceptual and post-conceptual 
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activities, interventions, antagonistic relational art, politics and hacktivism. 
David Beech, in an article reminding that ‘the aesthetic’ should not be conflated 
‘with the visual’ (2016, p.7) does propose that artworks can be divided, ‘into 
two categories: those that hold our attention and those that send us out into the 
world’ (2016, p.7). The accent with these films is towards the former whereas 
much of my other work conforms with the latter. Though integration of 
appropriated raw materials is often a key strategy, so too is the ‘making’ aspect. 
These are not examples of ‘readymade’ puritanism. The simupoems are 
designed to be looked at, listened to and experienced at the perceptual level 
and, in that sense, there is a harking back to modernist or pre-modernist ideals. 
It should be noted though, that even Duchamp’s Fountain had been inscribed 
with the much-debated name R. Mutt (Howarth and Mundi, 2015). Some 
embellishment was permissible. Complete rejection of earnest formalist 
thinking is not my aim anyway. It ought to be possible to defend the right for 
someone to write poetry instead of ‘finding’ it, Kenneth Goldsmith style 
(Assume No Readership, 2014). The tactic of retaining links with an era when 
formal considerations were of primary importance, whilst inventing new 
principles, can be a means of posing questions about the state of art in what 
John Roberts calls its ‘deflationary’ period (cf. infra, p.133). The bluish grey 
background selected for Boring made sense in that it distinguished, but also 
conflictingly linked, the film to the PowerPoint aesthetic and simultaneously 
acted as mute sky or ‘light at the end of the tunnel’. Practically the colour (see 
Figure 05, p.65) complimented the oranges and ochres dominating in the central 
rectangles. If traditional principles are observed or broken with, that is from a 
position of awareness: notice the poor composition and use of available screen 
space in A Nod to Turing and Creed (Figure 03, p.42). 
Boring took its title from the fact of having captured the photographic 
raw materials while trapped for many hours in a major traffic jam on London’s 
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orbital motorway (BBC, 2011). Three people had been badly hurt in the accident 
which caused the tailback highlighting one difference with other kinds of 
queues. Traffic jams often amount to an eerie aftershock of some original 
human trauma. Drivers may be bored by the experience but are also aware that 
the delay barely conceals the most widespread form of violence. Shortly after 
entering the tailback, which involved long periods of complete standstill 
followed by occasional slow movements forward, the power in my phone 
handset expired. I had, in the months before, been discussing responding to a 
music composition/sound narrative by composer Stace Constantinou, called 
Trainofthoughts (2015b), through the creation of a moving-image piece. As a 
result, there was a CD version in the car. Furthermore, I happened to have a 
DSLR camera with me. The delay (which I was not to know would last nine 
hours) provided ample opportunity to listen to the thirty-minute composition. 
During one of the periods of sporadic traffic movement, the camera was placed 
on the dashboard, facing forward, so that the lens looked through the 
windscreen, and the shutter release activated at every transition or cut in 
Constantinou’s music. The game was invented only to alleviate the boredom 
and in the belief that any links between the resulting photographs and the 
sound track would be arbitrary. I am sceptical about the presumption of 
meaning when a pattern from one source is imposed upon another. The 
Fibonacci Sequence is relied upon as if it represents some universally 
employable aesthetic system for example (Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, 
p.94). Regardless of whether Constantinou’s stated interest in applying number 
theory and mathematical patterns to his musical arrangements (2015a) can be 
justified, it felt appropriate to devise a system. At the very least the activity did 
increase attention to the structure of the composition. In order to simplify the 
process all of the images were captured at the same settings: a longish exposure 
time of 1/25th sec, a narrow aperture of f22 and a lens angle of 17mm. It was 
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dusk so the slower shutter speed helped achieve satisfactory exposure levels, at 
the expense of increased motion-blur. On reflection the longer exposure times 
meant that the resulting images embodied something of the true dynamics of 
the situation. 
 
 
Figure 05 Boring still, 2012 
 
The event resulted in a series of photographs which could be classified as 
low quality or high depending on the criteria of interest. They were printed out, 
and different ways of displaying them experimented with. My thoughts 
connected ideas about traffic congestion, images of cars, a project called Contra-
Invention in progress at that time (discussed in section 2.3.1), and the 
relationship between moving image and stills photography. Filming the 
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physical prints from above as I dropped them was a possibility. The fall could 
be controlled by cutting a hole in each image and using a vertical shaft of some 
sort as guide. Obliterating part of the images would satisfy further my general 
desire to undermine the meaningfulness of representative images. If 
associations would be made with the slide-show aesthetic then so be it, but 
original ways of sequencing the images were being investigated. Eventually the 
idea of a physical setup was abandoned and 3D modelling software with a 
physics engine made use of instead. Digital versions of the images containing 
virtual holes could be dropped down an invisible cylinder (Figure 05). This 
permitted control over the process and the filming. Other unusual options 
could be opened up: perspective was simply switched off (cf. supra, p.60), 
something which is not conceivable in the real world or with a camera. It was 
interesting to undermine normal expectations with such software too and 
embrace certain glitches and bugs. Continued experimentation resulted in the 
simupoem Boring. 
The promise to Stace Constantinou had been fulfilled and, in not linking 
the film to his audio track, it would be possible for the works to be presented 
either together or separately if desired. This was something we had discussed in 
advance. The strategy for collaborating was inspired by a series of prints Patrick 
Caulfield had produced in response to the poems of Jules Laforgue (Caulfield 
and O’Brien, 1995). Caulfield’s pictures were not illustrations of the poems, nor 
had the poems been created in the knowledge that a visual artist would 
respond to them in the future. Constantinou and I discussed the collaboration at 
a conference later (Grant, 2014) and in doing so unearthed another construal of 
artificial stupidity. In the interests of efficiency, one can choose to remain 
ignorant about a particular discipline but nevertheless leverage the knowledge 
of others through collaboration. 
67 
 
Boring was completed for a joint exposition with Stace Constantinou in 
May 2012 (The Horse Hospital, 2016). The venue offered to us, built in the 
eighteenth century, turned out to be particularly apt, as foregrounded in a 
review by Mark Sheerin: ‘The two works combine in a dryly amusing way at 
the Horse Hospital, itself once a pit stop for London cabbies. A place for 
breakdowns and delays’ (2012). Constantinou’s narrative piece incorporated 
many inferences to commuting on London Underground’s Northern Line. If not 
noticing these obvious connections until they were pointed out in the review, is 
an example of stupidity then there were further examples. Amazingly I had not 
consciously picked up on the blatant pun, and multiple meanings, of the title, 
Boring, until it was pointed out during a screening. There are a few ways of 
viewing these kinds of oversights. The phenomenon is very relevant to one of 
the themes of this thesis: how alternative (easily derided) modes of thinking, are 
common to artistic practice. The reasons for not seeing the obvious at first could 
be attributed to slow-thinking or laziness but another reading is that a lack of 
concern was somehow intended. If a person benefits from trusting in what their 
unconscious provided once, then the fear of handing over power again is 
reduced. Risk-taking involves following hunches and impulses and having the 
nerve to look stupid. Counterintuitive approaches bring results just as a good 
joke can materialise when not trying to be funny. Sister Corita Kent and John 
Cage’s advice to art students is decades old now but remains an indication of 
how different the mentality encouraged amongst artists is, compared with 
normal concepts of research. Rule six states that ‘Nothing is a mistake. There’s 
no win and no fail, there’s only make’, and rule eight advises: ‘[d]on’t try to 
create and analyse [sic] at the same time. They’re different processes’ (Kent and 
Steward, 2008, p.46). A common artistic strategy is to escape one’s own 
analytical tendencies. 
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The interest in a traffic jam should be no surprise because during the 
1990s, for a living, the creation of discrete event simulation (DES, cf. supra, 
p.51) models was my specialism. DES is a statistical technique which allows 
models of traffic flow systems of any type to be constructed for the purposes of 
experimentation, answering ‘what ifs’ and improving design, without having to 
resort to complex queuing theory mathematics. Such models demonstrate the 
emergent properties and occasionally chaotic nature of processes of this type, in 
which widgets, products, entities or people, may all flow through systems of 
interlinked operations and buffers. Simulation generally allows a slowing down 
and/or speeding up of time to give new insights. Industrial engineers pay close 
attention to queues and their significance. I grew to understand the causes of 
backlogs and the effects of buffering. Delays and hold-ups themselves seem 
stupid, are frustrating but are also necessary. Just-in-Time (JIT) or Kanban 
manufacturing (Institute for Manufacturing, 2016) transformed many areas of 
industry eradicating the need to hold stock but there still exist trade-offs - 
between factors such as the desire for flexibility, resource utilisation, storage 
capacity and queuing time. These engineering tools I’ve occasionally revisited, 
but with experimental and critical intentions in mind. DES was not employed in 
developing Boring but my interest in the not-so-glamorous subject of queuing, 
stems from that period of industrial employment. To create Boring another kind 
of modelling, a physics engine (cf. supra, p.66), was used. The Newtonian 
principles, calculus (given attention in appendix F), and numerical methods for 
solving the equations are familiar too. In addition to deliberately subverting the 
functionality of the tools in use, occasional errors in the rendering and 
computation were noticeable. These faults are intriguing in their not being 
foreseen and secondly in the way they interrupt algorithmic perfection. At 
about forty seconds an unexpected spinning motion occurs (Boring, 2012) for 
example. In the interest of abiding by the early modernist and Bauhaus 
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principle of ‘truth to materials’ this disturbance in the calculated dynamics was 
allowed to remain. 
DE simulations rarely give an impression of what it is actually like to 
wait in line. If James Joyce saw mistakes as ‘portals of discovery’28 then the 
queue is a physical place individuals are ported to. Returning to the significance 
of being in a particular one, touched upon already (cf. supra, p.64), during the 
nine-hour period amongst thousands of unprepared travellers, all kinds of 
complaints, minor crises and emergencies were observed. People became 
hungry, tired; they needed to relieve themselves, and occasionally vulnerable 
individuals had to be assisted out. Along with the negative impacts of such 
delays, are there benefits in being forced to halt? Long ago (1977) Ted Nelson 
prophesised a new world marked by a change from ‘the “waiting operator” to 
the “impatient user”’ (Huhtamo, 1999, p.106). The former order of experience 
has become increasingly unlikely. Queues were recognised as a ‘captive 
audience’ and exploited for marketing and service announcements, and then 
fixed screens were superseded by mobile devices and smartphones. The 
backlog of 2011 offered a rare opportunity: it was neither easy nor safe to access 
mobile devices because of the prospect of sporadic movements forward. Also 
given the duration, batteries ran low: mine had cut out early on, as stated. In a 
world where people are ‘always on’ and tethered to technologies (Turkle, 2008), 
this traffic jam imposed a contemplative state. A combination of the effects of 
being incarcerated, and a desire to be productive with whatever remained live 
(a DSLR and the car’s CD player), resulted in the raw material for Boring. 
Drawing guru Betty Edwards writes, ‘that driving on the freeway probably 
                                                 
28 The famous quote, taken from Ulysses, is ‘quite different to the usual adage about learning 
from mistakes’ (appendix A, p.205) 
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induces a slightly different subjective state that is similar to the drawing state 
[i.e. right-brain mode]’ (1993, p.5)29. The stops and mini-dramas en-route  
 
 
Figure 06 Installation shot Boring, Wandesford Quay Gallery, Cork, Ireland, 2012 
                                                 
29 Could the seductiveness of such experiences partly explain why a seemingly irrational (and 
stupid) form of transport has become so widespread? 
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pepper the musical score of normal driving with other temporal, and narrative-
oriented, effects. 
As well as permitting a misreading of the traffic jam as opportunity and 
conjuring up a scheme for capturing photographs based on a musical 
composition, and accepting errors in the production phase (cf. supra, p.68), 
another instance of artificial stupidity surfaced at the exhibition stage. In The 
Horse Hospital and later at other events the film was screened concurrently on 
different devices: projectors, screens, and a mobile handset (Figure 06), located 
around the space. The unconventional approach to presentation was not 
detrimental and, in fact, complemented Constantinou’s soundscape, which 
naturally penetrated the volume in its entirety. It was a way of presenting 
visual material as if it were audio. 
In this instance the film had been produced without a soundtrack (cf. 
supra, p.66) but silence is a feature of many of the simupoems. Apart from 
linking with Cageist history (MoMA, 2013) and the points made about Glenn 
Ligon’s installation (appendix A, pp.198, 202, 204) there is a doubly derogatory 
connotation in that ‘dumb’, an archaic term for those who could not speak, 
remains slang for stupid. One of the origins of the word stupid is connected 
with temporary speechlessness, ‘[h]aving one's faculties deadened or dulled; in 
a state of stupor, stupefied, stunned; esp. hyperbolically, stunned with surprise, 
grief’ (OED, 2015f). Silence is double edged though, because it can just as easily 
be linked to intelligence as ignorance: speaking too much and speaking before 
thinking are also seen as indicators of lack of intelligence. Sharing of 
information freely is not always prized. Intelligence, in its connection with 
espionage entails secrecy, which puts severe limits on communication. In 
addition, there are associations between intelligence and the silence required for 
listening. But silence can be controversial and advised against. John Roberts 
gives the subject attention, with reference to contemporary avant-garde 
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activities, and points out that both Stalinism and early Catholicism saw silence 
as a threat (2015, pp.184–185). When film editing is taught, students are advised 
that a sound-track, at the very least ‘white noise’, should always be included. I 
often break this rule. 
In a final nod to stupidity, somewhat cheekily, groups of unwitting 
passers-by, clearly participating in a corporate team building ‘treasure hunt’ 
exercise, were encouraged to enter the exhibition space on the off-chance that 
they might find clues. The result was a particularly attentive audience at points 
during the showing. Whether this kind of pranksterism amounted to artificial 
or real stupidity, on our part or theirs, is a matter for debate. 
In the past the ideas for simupoems came from simply paying heed to 
everyday time-based patterns, simplifying and attempting to model them. 
Simulation was never intended to be meticulous, nor were the end results 
representations, but modelling reality could be a stage in the process. 
Observations were made of a tyre swinging from a tree and inebriated late-
evening travellers attempting to balance on London Underground (appendix F, 
p.227). Molecular movements were modelled using the principle of Brownian 
Motion (OED, 2016c). Mathematical techniques were used (cf. supra, p.68) and 
basic routines written to solve these, or purpose built physics engines resorted 
to. Recognition that the simupoems possessed certain musical qualities led to 
collaboration with percussionists. I was, at first, wilfully opposed to a narrative-
oriented means of dealing with time. The relationship between a ‘timeless order 
and the time order’ illustrated by Bohm and Peat using the example of a 
flowing stream interested me: movement ‘can be studied by following an object 
that floats along it, in a time process… [but] it is also possible to consider the 
entire stream all at once’ (2000, p.195). It was hoped that these films would 
capture and/or engender similar effects. Now the processes and interventions 
which occupy me, described in section 2.3, address the timeline but on a 
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grander scale. The flows of information and materials through circuitous 
industrial systems are exploited instead.  
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2.2. Performance and live art 
 
2.2.1. Now Man (2006-2013) 
 
 
Figure 07 Now Man at Permanent Gallery, Brighton, 2008 
 
In addition to availing of 3D modelling, simulation techniques and soft 
digital tools in the past decade, moving-image work of other sorts has been 
produced. Now Man, (O’Connell, 2015a), a performance game invented in 
response to an offer to be part of a small group exhibition (Pryde-Jarman, 2007), 
was one source of such footage. In preparing for that show I began playing with 
the dark-comedy idea of ‘hanging’ the professional clown (IMDB, 2016) I 
usually worked with. One result from these experiments, An Attempt at an 
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Autobiography, looked like an impossible or daft suicide attempt (Figure 08). A 
toilet chain was looped around the neck of the participant - initially the clown – 
and passed up through a pulley attached to the ceiling30, then back down again 
to be held by the same individual. 
 
 
Figure 08 An Attempt at an Autobiography, Grey Area Gallery, Brighton, 2007 
 
On a wall nearby was displayed a copy of ‘Ernest Withers' iconic photo I Am A 
Man depicting a garbage collectors' strike in Memphis in 1968’ (Panoptican 
Gallery, 2016)31. Other experiments included my asking the performer to move 
along trajectories of curved lines on the wall with a plan to sequence the 
captured still images into a stop-frame animation. It occurred to me that the 
process could be inverted by instead hanging the camera or camcorder. 
Eventually a routine was settled upon, in which the clown would react to the 
movements of a swinging camera suspended from the ceiling. The LCD display 
screen on the camcorder was turned forward and the performer instructed to 
                                                 
30 Comparisons could be made with scenes from an early Buster Keaton film (Convict 13, 1920)  
31 Interestingly I discovered later that Glenn Ligon (discussed in appendix A) had responded to 
the same photograph and placard slogan, ‘I am a man’, in a work of his. 
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attempt to remain within frame (Figure 07). The performer was, in effect, 
tethered to the screen, which, in turn, was attached to the ceiling. The aim, at 
first, was simply to collect the camera’s video footage recorded from when the 
camera was launched to when it eventually settled. Since then Now Man32, or 
variations of it, has been run as a live event in many locations (O’Connell, 
2014e). 
A run typically lasts between two and four minutes. In the early stages 
the task is almost impossible because the camcorder rotates and swings wildly. 
Next when the movement slows it becomes easier to predict which direction the 
lens will point. The improvement is counteracted though by the fact that the 
actor is becoming tired from the exertions. Finally, the camera slows almost, but 
never completely, to a halt. In this last period the performer is still expected to 
remain sensitive to the subtle effects and oscillations and to avoid contravening 
the rectangular border. Eventually a decision is taken to arrest the process and 
stop the camera. 
 In Now Man technology is deliberately misused. A ‘pointless’ process 
has been invented which is different to implying that no precision was 
involved, nor care taken, in developing the work. The motives can be 
understood better if a distinction between ‘aesthetic and non-aesthetic reason’33 
is acknowledged. Clear directions evolved during the experimental phase, the 
technique of hanging and spinning needed to be learned and understood. In 
accordance with my interest in ‘expediency’ and ‘truth to materials’, as well as 
misuse, the camera is suspended on its own power cable. The particular 
                                                 
32 The title Now Man was decided upon before recognising it as a pun on Bruce Nauman. The 
connection seemed highly appropriate, given the nature of past performance and video work of 
his, such as Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a Square in 1969 (MoMA, 
2016) and Clown Torture from 1987 (Art Institute Chicago, 2016). 
33 John Roberts often employs the distinction (2015, p.71; Livingston, 2012). 
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qualities of the electrical cable affect the dynamics and consequently impact on 
the recording. The performer’s freedom to ‘show-off’ is severely limited due to 
the challenges of the game. In being prevented from demonstrating prowess the 
clown too is misused. The original desire to work with performers (in 2005) 
stemmed from an unease with depicting. I chose to employ a real person but 
therein lay a contradiction because an actor by definition is ‘in character’34. That 
is why situations were designed which would limit the performer’s ability to 
perform. The fact that a comedic actor was being employed increased the 
potential for undermining of the workings. Idiocy is connected with honesty, 
and cunning distrusted (appendix H, p.240) as Avital Ronell highlights (2002, 
p.304) in elaborating on ‘the case against’ the former (2002, pp.294–310). Jokes 
puncture usual expectations but arguably only expose a layer of deceit. Finally, 
the high-energy actions appear inappropriate in the confined spaces and 
galleries in which the performance was usually orchestrated, amounting to 
another kind of misunderstanding of functionality. 
It turns out that the invented routine is accidentally utilitarian in at least 
one respect. As a method of documentation the approach would be ‘stupid’ but 
the footage, despite its primary characteristic of motion-blur, does give a sense 
of the material qualities of the space. When viewing records afterwards, 
temporary pauses are noticeable which correspond to the stop-start dynamics 
of the camera, as the flex winds and then coils up again, and also due to the 
irregular pendulum cycle. Special attention is given to what is being depicted at 
these moments of clarity precisely because of their rarity. Documentation of the 
space is expressed also through the acoustic record, captured as the actor 
                                                 
34 The peculiarity of the ease with which people are seduced by performance conventions is 
highlighted in the discussion with Stephen Carlin, appendix B (p.212). 
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gallops around and abruptly changes direction in tandem with the swinging 
camera. The nature of the room can be heard. 
 Already the apparent absurdity of the game fits with some credible 
definitions of the invented notion, artificial stupidity. Deliberate irresponsibility 
was a factor in the use of equipment and in the directives given but, if one 
chooses to, worth can be found in the resulting footage. It makes no sense to call 
the actions stupid from the standpoint of aesthetic reason. Items of meaning 
and artistic relevance have been created, a series of experimental films and a 
live art event, produced. 
Artificial stupidity can also be employed as a description of the ability to 
act stupid, either for entertainment purposes, with artistic intent, or for other 
reasons. Experiments were carried out involving player-participants other than 
the performer of choice. The clown is ‘better’ at the game and not only because 
he has gained experience through repeated runs over a period of years. It is 
noticeable that trying to outwit the camera and pre-empt its movements, 
especially in the frantic initial stages of each run, does not improve the chances 
of achieving the objective (remaining in frame). Non-actors sometimes begin by 
finding smart solutions – such as simply standing still - but it is the aptitude for 
chasing the camera naively, in the manner of a dog pursuing a passing car, 
which reaps rewards. The clown simply obeys orders and does not give up 
easily. Though the, ostensibly intelligent, refusal to move as an initial tactic is 
perfectly rational, it is not in the spirit of the game; the clown would never be so 
wilfully uncooperative. This raises questions again about what exactly it means 
to be intelligent. Now Man provides further evidence of a historical suspicion 
that idiocy is not always what it seems. ‘Being a fool is being stupid, whereas 
playing the fool can be a demanding exercise of intelligence’, says Daniel 
Dennett et al (2011, p.15). Acting of all sorts, particularly acting the fool, permits 
an individual to convincingly opt out of operating calculatedly. Diderot was 
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first to foreground the paradox of actors being able of trick themselves (1883). 
The history of inclusion of jesters, fools and buffoons in drama, literature and as 
live performers in court, at carnival and the circus is confirmation of societal 
valuing of such devices. It is not convenient here to explore all the reasons for 
its existence and usages but Simon Critchley highlights a political dimension 
when he states: ‘[t]he higher the slavery, the more exquisite the buffoonery’ 
(2002, p.82). Mikhail Bakhtin makes many references to the instances of 
permissible foolishness, buffoonery and jesting in the medieval period (1984, 
pp.60–143). The fool is a recurring character for Shakespeare and the 
phenomenon is certainly not confined to The West as the existence of the 
Kyogen tradition proves. 
Now Man can also be viewed as symbolising the idiocy of human 
deference to media, technology, as well as to vanity and the rules of others. This 
is pertinent especially in the age of new media, with a very literal deflation in 
the costs of equipment and resources available to many. In fact, Now Man’s 
careless use of a camcorder, in keeping with the Lowtech attitude (cf. supra, 
p.38), is also an indication of how disposable the hardware has become. The 
sheer quantity of forms masks the pernicious qualities of new technologies, 
including their capacity to dupe, which results in a probable ‘dumbing down’. 
Sadie Plant infers this with respect to software: ‘even relatively simple 
programs can fool the unsuspecting humans with whom it [the host machine] 
interacts’ (1998, p.90). During runs of Now Man, participants other than the 
clown (when they do get into the spirit of the game), because it is physically 
demanding and fast-paced, lose their self-consciousness and are unsuspectingly 
seduced into role. The effect is to complicate Marshall McLuhan’s defining of a 
‘hot medium [as one which] allows of less participation than a cool one, as a 
lecture makes for less participation than a seminar, and a book for less than 
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dialogue’35. Gaming indicates that McLuhan’s model is challengeable. Could 
hot not change to cool during a process, dependent on how readers, players or 
participants interact? Gaming of any sort only superficially permits more 
degrees of freedom and because of the strict confines probably ought to be 
characterised as hot media. Now Man, in that it is highly interactive is hot, but 
hot pretending to be cool. Most, even those who wittily resist to begin with, are 
spellbound by the inert kit, the camera/pendulum bob, except for the clown, 
who at least knows that he is acting. 
Now Man’s camcorder can be imagined as prey of a sort, being chased by 
the performer, as if simulating the protean strategies present in nature. 
According to evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller, ‘concealment, 
deception and randomness… [are] three defences an animal might use against 
having its actions predicted’ (2000, p.403). The third of these, ‘random’ 
behaviour, is important for avoiding capture and also used by predators in the 
wild. Rabbits, when being chased, run in a random or zigzag fashion instead of 
taking the most direct route to their burrows. Zebra stripes create visual 
confusion for hunters. Soldiers adopt this tactic when trying to escape sniper 
fire. Aborigines did ‘wild dances to mesmerize the kangaroos they hunted’ 
(2000, p.398) and Miller goes on to describe a malevolent ‘mad dog strategy’ 
deployed by despots to intimidate subjects (2000, pp.403–404). These predator 
versus prey examples demonstrate also that control of outcome does not always 
belong to the former and that the hunted party should not necessarily be judged 
inferior. Clichés such as the ‘cunning fox’ mask a more complicated state of 
affairs. It takes a special kind of intelligence to evade capture36. Miller argues 
                                                 
35 A definition of ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ media is given in Appendix I (p.243), while analysing Samuel 
Beckett’s minimalist novel. 
36 Now the metaphor could be extended to include avoiding capture by camera or attempts at 
obfuscation online. 
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that such random behaviour may underlie the human capacity for creativity 
(2000, p.404). 
A comment at a symposium on puppetry in 2013, after the game had 
been presented, is pertinent here. Presenter Nenagh Watson challenged the 
default presumption that the clown corresponded to ‘puppet’ proposing 
instead that the camera fulfilled this role (see e-mail from her, appendix G). In 
fact, my relationship with the camera had included anthropomorphising it. So it 
is possible to switch conceptions of who, or what, is playing which role in these 
scenarios, as opposed to assuming a straightforward hegemonic structure. At 
least three characters are involved in Now Man: the performer, the camera and I. 
All three have agency. Any one could be reckoned dominant or submissive and 
the situation is unfixed. If attributing agency to the swinging camera grates, 
then a mathematical account may help. The spinning device, hanging via its 
own stiff cable, possesses some of the characteristics of the ‘double pendulum’ 
which, theory and modelling shows, goes chaotic intermittently during its 
cycles (MIT, 2016). Margaret Boden referred to this too in The Creative Mind: ‘a 
pendulum mounted on another pendulum would normally be regarded as a 
very simple system, but under certain initial conditions its behaviour is [what 
she calls] B-unpredictable, or 'chaotic'‘ (1992, p.235). Emergent phenomena are 
very noticeable in practice, during runs of Now Man. The camera shoots off in 
unexpected directions occasionally, appearing to possess a life of its own.  
Feedback loop arrangements are very tangibly present in Now Man and 
so cybernetics is blatantly applicable in discussing the work. Firstly, the 
swinging camera’s movements are pendulum-like as has been said. Simple 
Periodic Motion, the sine-wave pattern connected with the idealised pendulum, 
is also a special case of the dynamics associated with feedback loop calculus 
(Figure 31, appendix F, p.225). The performer’s attempting to look at the live 
reflected image on screen is another very palpable example of feedback. The 
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intense bond between technology and human participant, the overshooting and 
occasional failure to interlock, are exactly what would be expected in cybernetic 
systems. The scheme fits with Paul Carter’s suggestion of a ‘cybernetic kind of 
theatre…, any kind of performance that materializes the actuality of the 
performance’ (2014, p.1). Systems are wrapped around each other 
concentrically. A third level in the arrangement of nested loops is the 
relationship between director/creator and performer/device. My interference, 
instructions and actions amount to an overarching control loop. 
There is something ridiculous, once described by the performer, 
interviewed after a run of the game, about working so hard to get in frame and 
when, finally it becomes possible, having nothing to say. ‘Very Beckettian’ he 
added. Recordings had also been made of another adaptation in which the 
performer was instructed to attempt to escape being captured on camera while 
being followed (No Man, 2008)37. 
These arrangements say something critical about our relationship to a 
mediated self, touched upon already (cf. supra, p.79). They challenge the 
conventional wisdom which suggests that feedback (in the most general sense) 
is always a good thing. The existence of aphorisms such as ‘know thyself’ and 
Socrates stating that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ (Crane, 2016) are 
proof of how embedded the importance of self-reflection is in Western culture. 
Now self-reflection is recommended in education, in workplaces, and for 
mental health reasons. Feedback has become an almost compulsory feature of 
consumerism. The arena of Quality Assurance takes the concept up an order by 
advocating the evaluation of systems of evaluation. It is difficult to argue 
against the benefits, but are there not dangers? Narcissism, attention-seeking 
                                                 
37 This scheme, I noticed later, bears significant resemblance to the scenario in Beckett’s film 
with Buster Keaton (Film, 1966). 
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and similar are considered faults. Giving feedback is certainly time consuming. 
The wrong kind of feedback or too much feedback can destabilise a cybernetic 
system (once again consider Figure 31, appendix F, p.225). Even Grey Walter’s 
electromechanical tortoises (Pickering, 2011, pp.41–54) went into crisis on 
occasion: ‘flickering, twittering and jigging’ (2011, p.43). Should we worry 
about an ‘online feedback form’ which ‘[a]t the end… conducts a survey about 
whether the first survey was satisfactory’ (O’Connell, 2011)? Is it advisable that 
a person suffering from an eating disorder weigh themselves? The informal 
term ‘loopy’, as in to go ‘loopy’ or to be ‘loopy’ embodies tacit understanding 
perhaps of this association between excessive self-analysis and dysfunction, 
‘craziness, insanity’ (OED, 2015e). The problem is perhaps not so much about 
reflection as how reflections are interpreted. Andrew Pickering, is critical of 
‘command and control’ culture (The Showroom, 2013). He advocates feedback 
loop type interaction, talks of the ’dance of agency’ as a route to ‘decentred 
performative becomings’, and so, must have been referring to the problem of 
interpreting representations, when he railed against reflection in introducing a 
discussion at The Showroom, London: 
 
We seem to be compelled to leap into a hall of mirrors and talk about 
distorted reflections, rather than the thing itself. And the mirrors here are 
sciences, philosophies, religion, art forms, politics, whatever… It's like 
we are dazzled by these mirrors... this metaphor cries out for the sound 
of breaking glass. Smash a few mirrors… [that is not the moral though] 
The mirrors will never go away. We just need to recognise the mirrors 
for what they are and resist the temptation to be continually diving into 
them, like Alice in Wonderland. If we could resist that temptation (and 
art, I think, should be able to help us do it), maybe we could build a 
different world (The Showroom, 2013). 
 
 
Another piece of received wisdom suggests that more communication is 
always better. Edwin Hutchins confronts the fallacy squarely (1996, p.xvii). His 
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Cognition in the Wild reflects on the complexities of communication in groups 
and highlights the problem of ‘confirmation bias’ which can in fact be avoided 
by reducing the capacity for conversation; ‘by breaking up continuous high-
bandwidth communication’ (1996, p.262). 
In Now Man the camcorder and performer are intensely connected so that 
the players seem almost hypnotised. Fear of close contact with things or others 
would appear superstitious but maybe it has some logical basis. Flann O’Brien’s 
fiction inadvertently draws attention to such anxieties. His fictional idiot/savant 
‘de Selby, a physicist, ballistician, philosopher and psychologist’ (Shephard, 
2007, p.8) may have obsessed over the significance of atoms being exchanged 
between bicycles and humans38 but psychologists and therapists frequently deal 
with real problems of attachment and transference. Osmosis of any sort leads to 
a merging; it is an entropic process. The possibility of cloning or perfect 
duplication is a source of angst (Baudrillard, 1994, p.95). Bodies connected 
through feedback mimic each other and begin to represent each other 39. One 
could say that the performer becomes a model of Now Man’s spinning 
camcorder: the camera sucks intelligence from him or her. 
  
                                                 
38 ‘[P]eople who spent most of their natural lives riding iron bicycles… get their personalities 
mixed up with the personalities of their bicycle as a result of the interchanging of the atoms of 
each of them and you would be surprised at the number of people in these parts who are nearly 
half people and half bicycles’ (O’Brien, 2007, p.88) and ‘when a man lets things go so far that he 
is more than half a bicycle, you will not see him so much because he spends a lot of his time 
leaning with one elbow on walls or standing propped by one foot at kerbstones’ (O’Brien, 2007, 
pp.89–90). 
39 If the bodies and devices in communication with each other are to be seen in system terms, 
then surely Luhmann’s point, about systems being unable to influence each other (2000, p.3), is 
contradicted. The problem is dealt with later (cf. infra, pp.134-135). Here the suggestion is that a 
kind of merging can take place when two systems bond via intense or high bandwidth 
feedback. 
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2.2.2. Rearing (2006-2014) 
 
Before my practice evolved to its current position performance pieces 
were invented which, at first sight, had nothing to do with computerisation or 
technology. I am interested, however, in an important analogy. Written 
procedures which existed long before computing, and those existing essentially 
outside it now, are, in many ways, similar to computer code. Indeed, terms such 
as procedure, instruction, routine and script are used interchangeably with 
words like program and code. Fears about AI are increasingly voiced (Cellan-
Jones, 2014; Future of Life Institute, 2015, Director of The Future of Humanity 
Institute - Nick Bostrom) but does the problem not predate computing? What 
started, for reasons of convenience, easily becomes oppressive. The coding, 
being referred to, includes methods, processes and bureaucracy. The definition 
could be stretched to include law, etiquette, convention, tradition, ritual, or the 
rules of combat, banking and employment regulations. That is not to dismiss 
the necessity, usefulness and role of codification404142 but its artificiality can be 
forgotten. Invented systems develop auras. People are stupefied by the 
procedures instead of recognising the potential for the latter to become ‘stupid’. 
These points will be returned to in the concluding chapter 4, and elsewhere in 
the thesis (cf. infra, p.107). It is valid to interpret certain performances I 
                                                 
40 One could digress and explore further. Scripting describes not only operating system level 
computer coding but actors read from scripts, scripture dictates moral behaviour for some, 
‘script’ apparently is slang for prescription in drugs and alcohol treatment. 
41 See Margaret Boden’s discussion on ‘[s]cripts and frames’(1992, pp.97–99) which at one point 
draws upon Jean-Paul Sartre’s use of the term ‘bad faith’ to describe a waiter unthinkingly 
working in role. She reminds us that ‘we could not dispense with scripts entirely’ (1992, p.98). 
42 At the opening event to Going Digital, the doctoral programme run by CHASE partnership 
(Lawrence and Black, 2013) I posed the question of too much bureaucracy to speaker Professor 
Edward Higgs, a former archivist and government advisor. Interestingly he defended the need 
for the right kinds of administrative procedure, suggesting that with increased digitisation there 
was too little of this (see e-mail from Edward J Higgs, appendix G).  
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engineered in a similar vein to the work of others such as Pil and Galia Kollectiv 
(Kollectiv and Kollectiv, 2009): as parodying the authority of ‘real life’ routines. 
One such performative routine Rearing, involving eggs, children’s potties 
and a clown (O’Connell, 2006), like Now Man, firstly appears senseless. As with 
Now Man, that is not to say that the action was not meticulously designed or 
does not function on some self-contained level. 
 
 
Figure 09 Rearing at Matt’s Gallery, London, 2014. Photo: Daniel Pryde-Jarman 
 
In runs of Rearing three pots are placed on the ground parallel to the 
performer (the clown) lying alongside behind them. The performer’s left hand 
is able to reach all three potties. From left to right, when facing the scene, the 
pots are green, white and ochre in colour respectively. At the beginning the first 
pot, the green one, is loaded with approximately eighteen eggs. Then, when 
given the go-ahead, the clown takes an egg from the first potty, breaks it on the 
edge of the second, discharges the contents into that, and places the partially 
reassembled shell in the third. When the first potty is empty it is replaced with a 
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waiting green one filled with eggs. In other words, two of these green 
containers are needed so that one can be filled while the other is in use. The 
sequence continues thus until a total of twelve dozen eggs have been processed 
through the system. As time passes the second potty begins to overflow so that 
raw egg pours onto the floor and also shells pile up and topple out of the third 
container. 
 
Table 01 Timing calculations for Rearing 
 
Initially the routine was executed by the usual professional clown, with me 
directing (Rearing at Whitechapel Art Gallery, 2006). During performances I 
would pre-fill and supply newly loaded green pots and feed the process. 
Increasingly though Rearing has been executed alone (see Figure 09, p.86 and 
Figure 12, p.96), ostensibly due to ‘cutbacks’, a reflection of the austere times we 
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live in. Figure 10 (p.90) is a flow chart outlining the sequence for such a solo 
run, including the intended timings. Table 01 summarises duration calculations 
for both solo performances and when director and clown participate. If carried 
out by one person the process typically takes just over an hour and with two 
people, about thirty-five minutes. Note that when executed alone, the 
performer fills a new green pot, brings it to the process and swaps it with the 
empty one, which is removed from the scene before egg-processing can 
recommence. Though inefficient from an imagined Taylorism (Mayhew, 2009) 
standpoint, the decision makes sense in the context of the world created here. 
The extra journeys are a waste of time but for a durational piece of live art, that 
may be of no consequence or even desirable. We are not dealing here with 
aesthetic reason. Formal considerations and the implications of how the scene 
looks take precedence43. The maintaining of three potties at the scene plays a 
basic semiotic role too: it communicates that the usual concerns are not 
paramount. The temporary loss of one container would distract focus, and 
increase chances of unwanted readings. 
Other than wasting time, the most glaring characteristic of the process is 
that it wastes food. The use of eggs was controversial when the activity was 
about to be performed during an event at a well-known anarchist bookshop, 
venue and vegan restaurant, in 2007 (Doogan, 2007). In the end the organisers 
permitted the run to go ahead on the basis that it is possible to read Rearing as a 
critique of overproduction and the food supply chain, and by implication the 
dubious ways in which poultry are treated. 
It is not my conscious aspiration to make work which functions as 
activism, nor edifying commentary (see Table 02, Factor 10), but it would take 
                                                 
43 Retaining connection with modernist, and possibly even romantic concerns, was already 
defended (cf. supra, p.63). 
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special effort to ignore a world around in which waste is the ordinary thing. As 
discussed with respect to Glenn Ligon’s work (appendix A, pp.199-201), 
evading the real backdrop would be the odd thing to do and likely produce 
outcomes which are even more loaded with denotation. Rearing is undeniably 
redolent of the everyday contradictions observable in industry. Despite terms 
such as efficiency and productivity being frequently bandied about and 
‘optimal utilisation of resources’ being a priority for industrial engineers, there 
remains much inherent downtime and overproduction in the world at large44. 
Production is no longer only concentrated in factories and mills. ‘A reversal of 
the historical process is apparent now. With the advent of computing and the 
network technology is once again distributed, used at home, in other locations 
and even while travelling’ (O’Connell, 2014b). Digressing briefly to help 
counter concerns about the decadence of wasting eggs in Rearing: the curiously 
unnoticed fact of our time is the egregious underutilisation of its two dominant 
machines. ‘[T]he typical UK car is parked 96.5% [sic] of the time’ (Barter, 2013) 
and though computer manufacture is hugely environmentally costly (Hirsch, 
2004) CPUs lie idle or underused most of the time45 (cf. supra, pp.26, 47). 
Consider food. In the United States alone ‘an astonishing 40 percent [sic] of the 
food bought is thrown away’ according to Levitt and Dubner (2014, p.67). That 
is a figure from the consumption end of the supply chain but at the point of 
production the situation can be even worse. Anti-food waste organisation 
Feedback, ‘reveals that on average a staggering 44.5% [sic] of food grown 
within Kenya’s horticultural export industry is rejected before it has left the 
                                                 
44 The basis for this statement is professional experience: I worked with industrial engineers for 
a period and later my specialism was supply chain simulation. 
45 The existence of initiatives to promote ‘grid computing’ (Brown, 2009) are evidence of this 
significant unused capacity. 
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country’ (Neilson, 2015). From an ethical perspective then, the cost, and use of, 
twelve dozen eggs is a trivial matter: Rearing is harmless by the standards of  
 
Figure 10 Timings/flow diagram for Rearing for Matts Gallery performance, London, 2014 
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much artistic activity and certainly in comparison with other functional and 
social systems, the extravagances normal in business practice, and in the 
pursuit of leisure. 
The food waste in Rearing worries observers, event organisers and the 
performer most frequently worked with, though not to the extent that they 
would ban it or refuse to act in it. Rearing, when not executed in a gallery or 
formal art space, becomes an intervention into its surroundings, one which 
inevitably grates in other ways, but it would appear that just enough has been 
done to make it tolerable. The tension resulting from this degree of moral 
dilemma is in line with my desire to prod and tinker with rather than incite. 
Performativity of the more excessive variety has become almost a formula. 
Viennese Actionism, if repeated now, would lack its original potency. The 
periodic re-embracing of punk means that it has, for the most part, become an 
instrumentalised version of its former self, exemplified in a review of Jennifer 
Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad (2012):  
 
The characters are hip and young and would fit in with the tattooed 
masses pushing baby strollers on their way to a farmer’s market in 
Brooklyn. The cover of the paperback borrows the trailing style of punk 
rock photography so ubiquitous in the pages of Flipside [a US fanzine 
produced from 1977-2000] and repackages in the colors [sic] and design 
of contemporary iPod advertisements (Carswell, 2015, p.5) 
 
Arguably the destructive power and nihilistic mindset which at first appeared 
so genuinely liberating can be made to fit with neo-liberal or even neo-con 
agendas. The typically right-wing phenomenon of the ‘shock-jock’ and perhaps 
even US presidential hopeful Donald Trump’s outbursts (at the time of writing) 
can be linked contrarily to what was once an essential and deeply ironic 
rebellious attitude. Luhmann’s view that art ‘seeks a different kind of 
relationship between perception and communication - one that is irritating and 
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defies normality’ (2000, p.23) suggests a need to disregard, not only anodyne 
interjections, but, in a context where extravagant gesture has been the norm, 
bold ones too. 
At any rate the lighter touch may reveal more about how psychologies 
and systems interact and provide satisfaction of another sort. Digressing 
further: it is possible to analogise with PID control system (cf. supra, p.51) 
tuning in chemical plants, where the introduction of smaller disturbances is 
advised in order to achieve the best results. An article in Chemical Engineering 
Progress recommends introducing step changes to ‘output by a small 
percentage. The size of the output step should be large enough to allow you to 
observe the process variable response (above any noise that may be present), 
yet small enough to minimise process upsets’ (Tim Olsen and Norman Ito, 2013, 
p.44). Likewise ‘dither’, which has its origins in the discovery that mechanical 
devices sometimes work more accurately when subjected to small amounts of 
vibration, is frequently applied in audio-visual post production. 
Meaning, in the socio-political sense, was not a primary aim in the 
design of Rearing but, permitted to remain, partly as a ploy to mock the almost 
compulsory requirement to embed concepts into artworks46. There are nods to 
art history: egg-tempera painting pre-dates the invention of oils, and to 
nationalist politics in that the potty colours available happened to be analogous 
with the Irish tricolour. There are obvious associations between eggs and 
fertility and the work was given a title intended to keep imagined analysts 
busy. Is the routine about societal or family failure and abusive upbringing for 
                                                 
46 Lawrence Preece, the course leader for a Fine Art MA I completed, was fond of inferring that 
meaning had become decoration. To say that ‘meaning is decoration’ is easily read as 
provocative given the low status of ‘decoration’ during late modernism but Preece would 
simultaneously address the significance of ideas by posing the rhetorical question: ‘all art is 
conceptual, isn’t it?’  
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example? The answer to these questions is a confident ‘no’ but without denying 
the inference that both destructive and constructive pattern passing is 
inevitable. The inclination to tap into the spirit and irony of Philip Larkin’s This 
be the Verse47 is not being avoided. Rearing is ritualistic: repetitive, meditative, 
yet potentially disgusting or, alternatively, evocative of religious ceremony and 
sacrifice. The use of a professional clown simultaneously undermines any 
portentous tragic sentiment. 
By stressing the superficiality of any meaning in Rearing, the hope is that 
attention can be given to what remains: the abstract and formal qualities, the 
dynamics, visual effects and properties of materials. The non-Newtonian flow 
and ways in which vessels hold their mixtures or fail to do so are observable. 
Rearing is firstly a repetitive process in which loops are nested within loops, 
where ellipsoidal forms are moved around and positioned in radial and linear 
arrangements, where what goes in at one end comes out the other, just as 
feeding, excretion and childbirth are bound together in equally meaningless 
biological routines and literal feedback loops. For Gustave Flaubert apparently 
‘the word [stupid] does not so much pose the question of voluntariness, 
consciousness, or intelligence, but [precisely] of repetition’ (Colebrook, 2013, 
p.50)… Even as this paragraph proceeds the inclination to imbue the work with 
previously unthought-of meanings is difficult to resist. The significance of 
repetition, looping, and its connection to the cycles of life and definitions of 
intelligence, creeps in. 
In Appendix I, this question, of being able or unable, to cast off 
connotative and denotative engagement with a work, is explored with reference 
to Samuel Beckett’s Imagination Dead Imagine (Beckett and Seaver, 1992, pp.551–
                                                 
47 The poem which begins with ‘They fuck you up, your mum and dad…’ (1974, p.30) is 
rhythmed by the inevitability of negative intergenerational repetition but appears tongue-in-
cheek too. 
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554). A situation is described in the 1100word novel which could be simulated 
via film or through creating a theatre performance. And the inclination to create 
other renderings is tempting given the descriptive exactness of much of the text. 
In fact, Brian Finney included a diagram in his treatment of the work (1971, 
p.66) and animated versions can be found online. To render the scenario in 
another form however, while feasible, surely misses the point. It is unlikely that 
Beckett - given his dedication to equivalence of form and content - was only 
writing ‘about’ something. 
The problem being underlined here was discussed elsewhere with 
respect to cybernetics ideals (cf. supra, p.34) and Now Man (cf. supra, p.83). 
Meaning and substance cannot be disentangled. The tension between these 
adds to the otherworldliness evoked in Beckett’s text for sure. The conundrum 
of having to admit to duality or triality in such constructions appears to be what 
he was getting at, and likewise, Valie Export in her querying of live art’s 
professed fundamental objectives (Appendix I, p.244). Deliberately limiting 
both satisfactory analytical and imaginative treatment, as Imagination Dead 
Imagine does and Rearing seeks to do, is no guarantee of what witnesses or 
participants will experience. The struggle to position a work is undoubtedly 
connected with the current state of knowledge. In the light of these 
epistemological questions, a comment by Beckett seems apt in attempting to 
define what an art work can be: 
 
when the object is perceived as particular and unique and not merely the 
member of a family, when it appears independent of any general notion 
and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the 
light of ignorance, then and then only may it be a source of enchantment 
(cited in Abbott and Beckett, 1970, p.38). 
 
This chapter section on Rearing is a suitable location to explicate another 
common feature of my practice. Inclusion of performers and bringing in of  
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Figure 11 Taking the Proverbial at Hundred Years Gallery, London, 2014 
 
organic materials was firstly intended as corporeal antidote to the presence of 
digital artefacts and factory-produced objects. The work of artist Paul 
McCarthy, as described in The Mirror Stage (Cameron, 2000), has been a source  
of inspiration. Instead of shattering harmony, as McCarthy does, I prefer to 
poke at it though and questions of identity are seldom ruminated upon. It 
appeared contrived at first to look for linkages between my work and pre-
Renaissance practices, but I have become increasingly interested in the 
significance of the carnivalesque. Mingling something of the grotesque, food, 
excreta and associated utensils into anti-rituals such as You May not Drink From 
the Holy Cup (O’Connell, 2014d), Rearing, and when exhibiting, at the very least 
complicates the common aspiration for sterile minimalist environments. Just as 
medieval laughter was ‘directed not at one part only, but at the whole’ (Bakhtin, 
1984, p.88) the implicit criticism here is a generalised one, given the ubiquity of 
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a clean aesthetic. The use of bodily fluids by artists is not new. Only in the 1980s 
was it discovered that Duchamp’s Paysage fautif, created in 1946, contained his 
own semen (Powell, 2010). Though she always juxtaposed references to bodily 
drives with stable sculptural forms, lately much attention is being given to the 
messier dimension in Sarah Lucas’ work, including her use of eggs (Lucas and 
Riley, 2015, pp.38–64). Perhaps the fascination with paint, discussed in chapter 
1 (cf. supra, pp.44-46), is linked (actually and metaphorically) to the 
significances being addressed here. 
In inventing rituals, that is not only, nor always, to attack established 
customs and formalities. The situation was more complicated historically too: 
evidence of this is that inverted medieval religious ceremonies and anti-feasts, 
despite their outward subversiveness, were simultaneously sanctioned by 
power (Bakhtin, 1984, pp.74–75, 77, 78, 81, 83). The Paris School of Theology, in  
 
 
Figure 12 Rearing at Disruption2, Swansea, 2012. Photo: Joshua Uvieghara 
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1444, defended the long-standing Feast of Fools which, says Bakhtin, included, 
‘grotesque degradation of various church rituals… gluttony and drunken orgies 
on the altar table, indecent gestures and disrobing’ (1984, pp.74–75), by pointing 
out that, ‘foolishness and folly… are… ‘man's second nature’’ (1984, p.75). In 
the Middle Ages, ‘[t]he very material bodily lower stratum of the grotesque 
image (food, wine, the genital force, the organs of the body) bears a deeply 
positive character’ (1984, p.62). I will argue in chapter 4 that artists today benefit 
from the echoes of such beliefs and consent giving. I do not want to overstate 
the degree to which the scenarios engineered are equivalent. My works are not 
linked with spiritual beliefs, nor rites of passage, but section 2.3 will describe 
everyday routines, found in the world, as if they held similar significance. 
Alternative modes of exchange can be divined from the merely transactional. 
Canetti suggests that for ‘feast crowds’, ‘[n]othing and no-one threatens and 
there is nothing to flee from; for the time being, life and pleasure are secure’ 
(1973, p.62). Security was offered in the crowd. In the absence of feasts and feast 
crowds, comparable, if fleeting, opportunities may be on offer. As a substitute I 
enter the crowd – and thanks to technological proximity the crowd is now 
everywhere - and upturn the mini-rituals associated with purchasing groceries 
(cf. infra, p.128), issuing and receiving parking fines (cf. infra, pp.115-127), 
delivering packages by courier (cf. infra, p.127) and so on. When displaying 
work obtained from exercises such as these, forcible reminders of our fleshier 
biology are occasionally provided too. A print was submerged in a urine-filled 
plastic sledge (Figure 11, p.95) for instance (Greslé, 2014). Photographs have 
been ‘displayed’ by throwing them across the floor. These actions run in the 
opposite direction to the much talked about ‘expansion of information 
technologies into the body’ (Bassett, 2014, p.70) and, ‘the increasingly intimate 
connection between embodied users and the information systems in which they 
are embedded’ (2014, p.71).  
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2.2.3. Worn Outing (2011-2012) 
 
Worn Outing was a performative intervention, envisaged and developed 
in 2011, and executed in March 2012  (O’Connell, 2012). This, along with the 
other performative actions discussed in section 2.2, laid the basis for the kind of 
work done now (section 2.3), and there are no plans to run it again. The concept 
was simply to wear photographs of other peoples’ clothes as if they were 
garments. Quality images of outfits are not difficult to find online but the 
challenge of capturing what people wore as they walked about appeared liable 
to be more fruitful, even if the reasons why were not clear at first. 
The involving of real people concurred with my stated interest, ‘in the 
mediation of human relationships through technology, the curious dynamics, 
feedback loops and ritualistic aspects…’ (O’Connell, 2015b). It seems obvious to 
point out that cameras and photography are media but, a McLuhanesque stance 
(2001), would include the clothes people wear and the photo-outfits eventually 
created for Worn Outing. All of these elements act as both barriers and conduits 
to information flow. Added to these layers is the fact of the performers being 
directed. Acting, the adoption of a role and playing a ‘character’, is itself an act 
of translation and can be thought of as mediation. Karen Barad disapproves of 
‘[t]he notion of mediation [which she says] has for too long stood in the way of 
a more thoroughgoing accounting of the empirical world’ (2003, p.823). 
Ascribing performative agency to the intermediary strata in the manner of 
Barad (2003), Latour (2005) and proponents of cybernetics like Andrew 
Pickering (2003, p.807), does not contradict my use of the term ‘mediation’ 
though, because I am not necessarily seeing media as something inert. In my 
conception another human being in role could constitute medium. Or objects 
might be perceived of as communicating with each other via people. 
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Raw material was gathered then, in and around shopping centres, by 
capturing photos of individuals, from the front and from behind 
simultaneously. The technique eventually adopted was to use two cameras and 
try to synchronise the process. One person would walk adjacent to the chosen 
subject and give an agreed signal, indicating to two photographers, positioned 
on either side of the subject, when to release shutters. A more elegant and 
precise solution would have been to set up a pair of tripods and employ remote 
triggering but this would have offered less flexibility. For convenience my 
children were involved, and (with permission) their friends. Integrating my day 
to day activities, in this case parenting, with artistic practice instead of 
compartmentalising in a fundamentalist way is not just a matter of convenience 
(see Table 02, Factor 31). As it happened their participation brought with it 
plusses, other than them enjoying the experience, being fed pizza, and learning 
something about camera use. Subjects were less intimidated and, also, the 
naturally lower point-of-view centred them in the composition. Critic Jack 
Hutchinson, during a formal feedback discussion in 2011 (Murton, 2013), 
suggested that these factors are subtly present in the final photographs: a 
child’s perspective gives the resulting images an uncanny feel. 
Problems comparable with those faced by street photographers in the 
past were encountered. Regardless of the legal situation (which does permit 
photography in public places in the UK) there exist other ethical and conceptual 
questions, about voyeurism for instance. I did not want to expose individuals in 
the way that street photography does. As if influenced by Google Street View’s 
method of protecting identity, faces were cut from the resulting images. Also 
sections from different images were montaged together to create final photo-
outfits. The original wearers would not be traceable. In addition, stripping 
away the identity markings, and turning the process of capturing photographs 
into a game of sorts, generates questions about authorial rights. 
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Figure 13 Worn Outing, London, 2012 
 
Through continued experimentation, a final design was produced, an 
outfit consisting of two linked A0 sheets, one for the front, and the other for the 
back. Each A0 image combined a top body cut from one source with legs taken 
from another. After a trial run involving two outfits (Slide 7 O’Connell, 2012), 
enough copies were made to dress seven participants for the eventual 
procession. The actors were asked to imagine themselves as sheep being herded 
by an eighth participant, ‘my clown’, who would play the role of stock dog and 
go-between, responding to directions given by me. Participants were instructed 
not to smile but to assume deadpan expressions. The nature of the photo-outfits 
was such that participants would need to use their hands to hold the two A0 
sheets together most of the time, an unexpected built-in restriction (and 
example of self-regulating mechanism). These limitations of the participants’ 
freedoms were compounded by the brisk pace adopted. The seven actors, 
clown and two photographers walked from Warren Street Underground station 
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in London, through Fitzrovia, down Oxford Street (Figure 13), ending up in the 
Cork Street area, a distance of about 1.5 miles, visiting shops, public houses and 
an art exhibition on route. 
The concept of ‘turbulence’ is given dramaturgical meaning by Paul 
Carter (2014; Freie Universität Berlin, 2014). Movement of human traffic, on less 
congested and busier paths, is analogous, respectively, to the laminar and 
turbulent flow patterns associated with fluid flow in channels. And the actors, 
in voluntarily ‘dumbing down’ to some degree mimic inert subdivisions of 
liquid, or particles, being forced through conduits and pipelines. Their presence 
in the mix highlighted the kind of ignorance inherent in ‘going with the flow’, 
‘following the crowd’ or even going shopping. Seven, all wearing the same 
image, was enough to stand out but too few to constitute a ‘flash mob’ say. A 
more likely evocation was with the pack of playing cards from the fictional 
world of Alice in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865). The nature of the worn image, in 
that it lacked any readable text or obvious communicative content, and the 
material qualities of the paper, meant distinction from both sandwich-board 
wearers and the common kinds of urban signage. Design had been aimed at 
reducing differences between the performance and the urban visual landscape 
it passed through, but not to the extent of going unnoticed. 
Originally actor participants were sought from the least exotic and 
apparently dominant demographic: older middle-aged men. The run was to be 
carried out during London Fashion Week, or if funding allowed, the Paris, 
Milan or New York counterparts. A troop of stereotypically fashionless older 
males clad in montaged images, cross-dressed48 so to speak, would mingle with 
                                                 
48 In naming the intervention Worn Outing, no allusion was intended to the practice of ‘outing’ 
by press or gay-rights groups. In hindsight, however, the connection may be weakly pertinent. 
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the glitterati. For practical reasons these plans were abandoned but there were 
other justifications too. I did not want to push the work into prankster territory. 
Secondly, transvestite tendencies, noticeable in digital form when working on 
projects in Second Life (SL)49, though considered transgressive and even  
 
 
Figure 14 Avatar Mocksim Zapotocky, Second Life, 2008 
 
progressive50, in that gender typecasting is being undermined, can be read also 
as mockery. Thirdly, surrendering to the real situation, namely a lack of 
                                                 
The work is not about sexual-orientation, nor its concealment, but perhaps poses questions 
about gender and category stability generally. 
49 It’s not been possible to substantiate the claim but an attendee at the ‘blended reality’ event, 
Feed Lack Loop (O’Connell, 2014d) stated that seventy per cent of Second Life users were male 
while seventy per cent of the constructed avatars were female. 
50 ‘Men in women’s clothing… [are] both making fun of and celebrating women (as one should)’ 
according to a poster by artist Karl Holmqvist (Sismógrafo, 2016). 
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response to the call for older participants, and accepting the seven willing 
actors, was in tune with the principle of ‘truth to materials’ which I am fond of. 
The presence of the clown, a middle-aged everyman of sorts, adequately stood-
in for the initially sought-after demographic. 
Participants were instructed to wear their usual casual clothing 
underneath, and not don performance garb. Their choices should not compete 
with the photo-outfits. A proposition that actors wear nothing, except the paper 
costumes, was dismissed but not for prudish reasons. In fact, nudity might tie 
in conceptually: photography had, in a sense, stripped the original wearers of 
their clothing. To take this course would have complicated the situation 
however and turned something uncanny51 into a spectacle. I wanted the former 
effect. During the 2012 run, frequently, onlookers who had not at first noticed 
took a second glance. Comments overheard such as ‘they’re having a day out 
from the mental home’ and ‘this must be some sort of protest’ (see e-mail from 
Joanna Parker, appendix G) reflected the desperation to categorise and/or 
ridicule. It disturbed the manager in one lingerie store (Figure 15). On two 
occasions the group were asked to leave a shop they had entered. The seven 
characters, wearing duplicate A0 images, depicting parts of an outfit and body, 
clashed with the customary fashion shots on display in clothing retailers. Rather 
than uncanny the walking images appeared grotesque at times. The situation 
felt analogous with the experience investigating Second Life (SL), during an 
online residency in 2007/08 (cf. supra, p.102). An avatar I had created by 
extending all of the design parameters to their maximums, so that ‘he’ was as 
                                                 
51 I was interested in the almost mathematical principle ‘uncanny valley’ defined as follows: 
‘anthropomorphic forms are appealing when they are dissimilar or identical to humans, but 
unappealing when they are very similar to humans… a reference to the large valley or dip in 
the now classic graph presented by Masahiro Mori in 1970’ (Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, 
pp.242–243). 
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tall and wide as possible with a huge nose, enormous feet, and sporting a 
double denim outfit, was often asked to leave virtual events. Mocksim 
Zapotocky (Figure 14) was not welcome in SL, with its shopping-mall 
architectural aesthetic and fetish-club dress code. 
 
 
Figure 15 Worn Outing, London, 2012 
 
There may be other reasons why the performers were ejected. It is true 
that the Worn Outing avatars were not going to purchase anything. There had 
been recent terrorist alerts in London and, during the year before, wide-scale 
rioting and looting. Anything unusual would be viewed with suspicion. The 
comment by an onlooker inferring that the activity might be a protest is also 
worth noting, though it’d have been an obscure demonstration, like Daniel 
Buren’s 1975 Seven Ballets in Manhattan (Whitechapel Gallery, 2015), lacking the 
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customary slogans, demands and the political clarity52. In the spirit of avoiding 
confrontation, we simply obeyed the demands to leave, and moved on. 
 
 
Figure 16 Worn Outing, London, 2012 
 
Later, coaxed by the clown, still in herding dog mode, the troupe entered 
an exhibition of work by iconic photographer Eve Arnold, who had died in the 
months before. The journey was being documented using two DSLRs. In the 
small commercial gallery then, photographs were being captured of actors 
wearing photographs, but also observing photographs. Feedback loops 
abounded. The celebrity subject-matter of Arnold’s work contrasted starkly 
with the image-wrapped actors and gave the impression of sneering back. 
Having spent enough time in the gallery, and without being requested to leave 
                                                 
52 Russian collective Chto Delat’s Angry Sandwich People or In Praise of Dialectics (Vilensky, 2006), 
bore similarities in look, but was linked explicitly with notions of protest and political ideology. 
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on this occasion, the procession continued. Expulsion from a commercial art 
outlet would have appeared censorious. The proprietor accepted the 
juxtapositions and appreciated, no doubt, the unexpected increased in footfall 
the commotion had caused. The outing ended a little later on the steps of 
another commercial gallery, the kind of contemporary, moneyed art space, 
typical of London’s Cork Street. The venue itself was closed (Figure 16) so 
operations ceased and the performers were paid. 
A factor in the organisation of Worn Outing was impatience with systems 
of endorsement and the need to wait for offers from galleries, arts organisations 
and other bodies. In the same spirit, later in 2014, a high-top van was used as 
projection and display space (Good, 2014; O’Connell, 2014a). Lowtech and DIY 
approaches have always been of interest (cf. supra, pp.39, 79). Hunt and Darton’s 
Pop-up Café (Hunt and Darton, 2015) was envisioned as a project which, 
likewise, would avoid the usually drawn-out and frequently disappointing 
process of having to negotiate with, and impress local organisations, cultural 
bureaucracies and even the ‘bottom-up’ artist-run spaces and groupings. Jenny 
Hunt and Holly Darton take their practice on tour with the aim of engaging 
people not normally aligned to metropolitan or provincial art scenes. But their 
position is not only an antagonism with galleries: work like theirs demands 
embedding in an everyday situation. 
The café shares some of the characteristics of Worn Outing, in that 
differences with what is commonplace go unnoticed at first. In attempting to 
determine what their action is, it is useful to identify what it is not. Hunt and 
Darton’s Café is not political in the Brechtian sense. It is hardly an example of 
Forum Theatre (Boal, 2008). No message is being overtly communicated but a 
visit does highlight the peculiarity of common routines, everyday rituals and 
the associated objects. The relationship with visitors is not Artaudian or hostile 
in the manner of Jean- Jacques Lebel’s work (Bishop, 2012a, pp.99–100). For this 
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to be so, ‘audience’ would be designated enemy. The café atmosphere appears 
convivial if confused. It is as if each side misunderstands the other; customers 
inhabit a different system to those serving. Hunt and Darton’s clownishness 
separates them from artist Rirkrit Tiravanija’s earnest cooking and serving of 
food (Tiravanija, 2016). The functioning of the café, and concomitant 
performative digressions, are far too structured, systematised and self-
contained to be regarded as an example of Nichola Bourriaud’s relational art 
(1998; Bishop, 2004). Claire Bishop is famously critical of the fashion for ‘open-
endedness’ (2004, pp.53, 60, 68–69, 72) ‘over aesthetic resolution [which she 
asserts] is often ultimately to enhance the status of the curator, who gains credit 
for stage-managing the overall laboratory experience’ (2004, p.53). Of course the 
prospects for surprise are not ruled out in any interactive situation, and 
definitions vary as to what it means to say ‘a performance is scripted or 
improvised, since “open-endedness” is based on cultural expectations’ 
(Norman, 2015, p.348), but Hunt and Darton’s use of a catering industry style 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides armour against it going free-
form. In addition, such a document supports the navigating of geographies 
outside of galleries and usual art world settings. If the café were described as a 
system then, around the edges, carefully honed interchanges function 
cybernetically. 
The invention of procedures is a reminder of how, given the ubiquity of 
‘customer facing’ roles in workplaces, people are expected to ‘perform’53 and 
follow scripts. The café project serves to highlight the strangeness or eeriness of 
seemingly unquestioning robotic behaviour54. So in that sense the activity is 
political but the SOP’s overt function is to provide a solution to the boundary 
                                                 
53 Pay can even be ‘performance related.’ 
54 This phenomenon was highlighted already (cf. supra, p.85), is referred to in the appendix D 
interview (p.219), and will be raised again in the concluding chapter 4. 
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problem by codifying relations at the interface i.e. between the artists and 
others. In addition, data collection of the kind required by funding bodies is 
integrated neatly into the duo’s processes (see Figure 17). As John Roberts puts 
it (not necessarily pejoratively) about practice which ‘openly defies the 
mediations of Art’: ‘this work, for all its refusal to define itself as art (or solely 
as art), is always invariably being recalled to the ‘art world’, so to speak, in 
order to make its meanings visible’ (2015, p.71). 
 
 
Figure 17 Hunt and Darton’s Pop-up Café ‘footfall’ data collection, 2012. Photo: Jenny Hunt. 
 
Codifying and rule-making was important for Worn Outing too. E-mail 
exchanges took place in advance. On the morning of the run in 2012 
instructions were given to participants verbally. The fact of paying the actors, as 
opposed to finding volunteers, apart from being ethical, also served to clarify 
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that Worn Outing was not an equal collaboration. Temporary hegemony was 
built-in. No service was being provided by Worn Outing, interaction was of a 
very different variety to Hunt and Darton’s Café and consequently no weighty 
manual was necessary. A second reason for minimising the scripting was my 
uneasiness with bureaucracy. Documentation of any sort, whether to program 
or to record action, constitutes representation, and, as stated, I sympathise with 
the cybernetician’s ‘suspicion of representational knowledge’ (Pickering, 2011, 
p.271). 
Questions of representation were at the fore in Worn Outing. Real 
participants adopting personas as instructed, dressed in collaged photographs 
of other people, were led by a clown, who was himself in role. Flat pictures 
covering three dimensional bodies, even though the technique of production 
was rudimentary, brought the virtual bodies to life. As it happens, glossy A0 
paper sheets do function weakly as clothing, alluding to the ‘built-in 
obsolescence’ of modern manufactured garments and the importance to 
consumers of semiotic features. 
Worn Outing has been discussed primarily in terms of performance and 
its existence as a piece of live art. Is it possible to attempt to deal with the 
particular duplicated photo-outfit and elude referential meanings? 
Quadrilateral garment shapes occupy perhaps two thirds of the height of both 
the front and back rectangles; a pair of denim-clad legs from another 
photograph has been pasted-in below those. The legs, cropped because they 
will be completed by the wearer’s legs, are taken from a skinnier character and 
have been collaged-in rudimentarily so as to be in keeping with the style of the 
upper components. Images of a subject’s outfit, both front and back, had been 
cut around quickly via ‘magnetic lasso’ to create the two images eventually 
used. The top edges of the rectangles correspond approximately with the neck 
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line, because editing took place in the knowledge that actor participants would 
be lending their real limbs and heads to the montages later. 
It is difficult to say more. As highlighted in discussing Rearing (cf. supra, 
p.93) and Beckett’s Imagination Dead Imagine (Appendix I) it is not easy to 
confine treatment to formal considerations alone. The Worn Outing prints need 
to be understood in the context of the ‘bigger picture’, which includes the final 
intervention in London, but also the background story. 
Inevitably, given the kind of outfit the original subject was wearing, in 
which faux-lace made up a proportion of the back area, and, because her 
uncovered arm crossed in front, bare skin is visible in the images (Figure 18). It 
seemed unnecessary to cut all these elements out and remove the strap from 
another bag that rested on her shoulder. In the spirit of the approach, perfect 
editing would not have been something to fixate upon. The resulting 
combination of flesh and outfit was intentional. In a bizarre retort to the original 
designers of the skimpy dress, the wearer’s bra-strap is completely visible 
through the lace too. In addition, the outfit was not the correct size for her body 
and so the material had stretched. The dress was not new either. Its original 
whiteness had faded and a tear was noticeable on the top right of the back. The 
unquestionable femaleness was not reduced by this evidence of wear and body 
size, a reminder that the unique ways in which men and women ‘put on’ 
weight can emphasise their gender. In another world fat might be considered 
enhancement, fashionable, an inside-out cosmetic surgery equivalent. If 
assumptions linking body type and clothing to ‘social class’ or the presumption 
of poverty, a lack of culture, poor education or worse, low intelligence, are 
made, alternative readings are being overlooked. This is not to romanticise the 
figure in discussion but does her ‘look’ not embody rebellion? Is the image not 
transgressive in its non-compliance with cosmopolitan diktats and therefore 
erotically charged? The attention being given here constitutes a kind of 
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voyeurism and ‘male gaze’, but it is also interesting to note how slightly 
distorted ordinariness can disrupt. In retrospect, the ‘quick and dirty’ capturing 
and editing methods employed had matched the original character’s under-the-
radar, but still insubordinate, stance. 
 
Figure 18 Worn Outing photo-outfit, 2012 
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2.3. Hacks: poetic misuse of the supply chain55 
 
By the 1990s it had become unimpressive to point out that ‘art’ could be 
produced using computers too. The suggestion that hardware and software 
amounted to an additional tool in the box like a set of brushes or musical 
instrument revealed naivety on two fronts. Firstly, new media and the 
emerging network represented not just a change in degree but one in kind. 
Secondly, the fact that a self-critiquing and at times self-destructive ‘art 
system’56 had evolved during the twentieth century was overlooked. In this 
undermining of itself in fact, art had voluntarily embraced, if not predicted, 
what would become inevitable across many arenas with the emergence of 
computing. 
Nowadays a well-informed, questioning and truly interdisciplinary class 
of practitioners exists. ‘We are all computer people now’ pointed out Sherry 
Turkle (2004, p.B26) and there is no escaping the influence of computerisation 
on the, already highly challenged, concept of art. Claire Bishop asserted that 
‘the digital revolution opens up a new dematerialized, deauthored, and 
unmarketable reality of collective culture’ which potentially ‘signals the 
impending obsolescence of visual art itself’ (2012b, p.441). The need to embrace 
the gist of what Bishop is saying feels compulsory though the end of art, like 
many other ‘end of’s, never seems to quite arrive. Given this lingering on of 
something which should apparently have disappeared I have become interested 
in the possibility of finding poetic meaning amidst the technological flux. 
Operating in this way amounts to something odd, a defence of the singular in a 
world which expects networking, collaboration, teamwork and generous 
                                                 
55 An earlier footnote (cf. supra, p.9) already highlighted that section 2.3 is an adapted version of 
a paper delivered at the 30th conference of Computers and the History of Art (O’Connell, 2015c) 
56 As Niklas Luhmann would describe it (2000) 
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participation. Kenneth Goldsmith’s radical usages of the new situation, his 
extreme appropriation, combined with a refusal to throw the art baby out with 
the bathwater, appears in tune with the spirit being referred to (2011).  
 
Figure 19 From Sophie Calle’s The Shadow, 1981. Courtesy of Paula Cooper Gallery, NY 
 
The projects I do now and am interested in have precedents, although an 
incredibly rich new source of raw material has become available which changes 
the situation. Embedded within the highly networked techno-industrial 
infrastructure are assets, artefacts, data and experiences which call to be 
extracted and played with. In recent years, I have engaged in three 
interventions which, in retrospect, have something in common with Sophie 
Calle’s early work. Her The Shadow, 1981 (Figure 19) for example, in which an 
unwitting detective was hired to follow her and then report back with notes 
and photographs (Calle and Auster, 2007, pp.101–112), was a decade or two 
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ahead of its time. It is no longer necessary to hire a specialist to play these kinds 
of games. The ubiquity of surveillance and feedback loops is such that even 
material which has been incidentally recorded is superior to what Calle’s 
human detective produced. What follows is a description of the first of these 
three initiatives and an attempt to consider its implications, along with briefer 
references to two more recent interventions. 
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2.3.1. Contra-Invention (2009-2012)  
 
Photography has had a relationship with traffic-law enforcement 
systems for some time. Speed cameras have been a common feature for 
decades: in the 1990s automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) was rolled 
out across the UK, and now cameras and intelligent systems police London’s 
congestion zone without even requiring human intervention. An 
 
Figure 20 Parking Civil Enforcement Officers (CEOs) in action, 2010 
 
incident in the mid-noughties, when an acquaintance to whom I had loaned my 
car, was captured by bus-lane enforcement camera, highlighted the fact that this 
kind of sophisticated surveillance was increasingly in use. Apart from the 
unpleasant fact of a fine having to be paid and a degree of schadenfreude being 
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inevitable the episode did make me wonder. Why should this story and the 
resulting documentation be of interest? The small black and white photograph, 
which arrived by post in the weeks after the incident, depicting my Volkswagen 
Polo in blatant contravention, driving along a London bus lane, was certainly a 
source of entertainment. The reasons the image triggered laughter were not 
obvious. I was not aware of the offence until the letter was opened so perhaps 
the surprise acted as a punch-line of sorts. The comedy value was amplified by 
anthropomorphic connotations, the thought that a camera had of its own accord 
shown interest in my modest vehicle, or sent a holiday snap from the car’s day 
out in London. Despite its cleverness artificial intelligence always seems funny 
or stupid to begin with. 
Moving forward in time, in 2010 I created an exhibition of photographs 
selected from hundreds of images obtained from Brighton and Hove City 
Council’s parking contravention system (O’Connell, 2013b; c; Sheerin, 2011). 
Three ‘night shots’ from this collection, representing the same incident of poor 
parking, had appeared commendable on aesthetic grounds, rich according to 
concepts of interest to me and useful in that, at a stretch, analogies could be 
made with Renaissance painting or other aspects of art history. Initially for 
practical reasons the three images were dissected vertically and the results 
printed on six 1.2m x 1.8m sheets of corrugated plastic (Figure 21), so that each 
pair corresponded roughly to the size of the car in question (a Ford Ka). The 
painterly qualities of these low resolution jpegs became particularly apparent 
when they were enlarged. Secondly, the darkness does not just obscure but 
provides contrast with other highlights in the image and creates challenge 
fitting with my desire to inject interactivity but of the less blatant variety. Bird 
dropping, on the bonnet of the car, stands out, arguably functioning as 
‘punctum’, in Roland Barthes’ famous usage (1993). Characters in the 
background are rendered more interesting not less, in being so concealed so 
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that the image entices the viewer. While unusual subject matter and methods, 
were being worked with, the associations with the night-shot tradition in art 
photography and other clichés of composition were not something I wished to 
avoid. Certain modernist principles were being abided by such as ‘truth to 
materials’, the desire to expose the workings and to undermine illusion. 
Though easily mistaken for tongue-in-cheek, formal considerations were a 
primary concern in creating this work and in setting up the exhibition. The 
perceived elitism of the ‘white cube’ was not shunned either: the results could 
simply have been posted online, but were not. It has become unfashionable to 
defend art for its own sake but Contra-Invention permitted a simultaneous play 
with tradition along with highlighting both process and factors of conceptual 
interest. 
 
Figure 21 Contra-Invention at Friese-Greene Gallery, Brighton, 2010 
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Brighton had led the way with the use of cameras by Traffic Wardens 
(correctly termed Civil Enforcement Officers, abbreviated to CEOs as if to 
emphasise their status). Though it is close to the busy port of Shoreham and 
had recently achieved ‘city status’, Brighton and Hove lacks key characteristics 
of a typical industrial city. It is an amalgamation of a number of urban areas 
running along the coast; there never was a big polluted river nor many factories 
and warehouses. The place is seen as a playground of sorts in fact and a 
location for entertainment (no pejorative intended). The parking fine system 
with its uniformed staff, technologies and processes (Figure 20, p.115) 
compensates for this unconscious deficiency and also confounds the other 
association of Brighton with the libertarian mind-set. Certainly the scale and 
intensity of parking enforcement in the city has often been referred to. The 
suggestion was, and still is, frequently made that the primary aims are not 
traffic-related at all but to generate revenue and on this front, for example, 
according to a 2013 report, only ‘Brighton and Hove and Cornwall councils 
broke into a top 10 dominated by London authorities’ (Association, 2013). So in 
the interest of sidestepping the visual stereotypes usually associated with the 
city but also with a view to honest observation of the curiously overlooked set 
of activities it seemed reasonable, L. S. Lowry style, to seek inspiration precisely 
in this industry. 
I had speculated as to how easy it would be to obtain the ‘contravention 
images’ which CEOs collect as part of their duties. One possibility was to 
intentionally park badly in order to access the photographs afterwards but that 
would have meant hiring a car, paying fines on top and been preventatively 
slow. Doubtless when one wants a fine, the wardens are nowhere to be found. 
The ethical implications and possible legal ones of such an approach were not 
challenges I wanted face. Then I chanced upon a ticket, discarded in anger most 
likely because it was torn in half (Figure 23, p.122). It turned out that by 
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entering just two items of information from the found fine, the car registration 
mark and a Penalty Charge Notice (PCN) number, onto the council’s online 
payment system, the contravention images could be accessed, viewed and even 
downloaded in jpeg format! The next eureka moment was in realising that of 
 
Figure 22 Contra-Invention at Arts Santa Mònica, Barcelona, 2013. Photo: Pavel Maria Smejkal 
 
course the PCN number was visible on the tickets because in Brighton (unlike 
elsewhere) the outer packaging was composed of transparent film57. It would be 
possible to simply record the registration and PCN number from ticketed cars 
                                                 
57 Since then the system in Brighton has changed. At the time of writing the fines are sealed in 
opaque packaging as had previously been the case in most boroughs. In addition a warning 
against tampering is printed on front. Presumably the change in Brighton was influenced by the 
publicity Contra-Invention received. Local newspapers reported on it (Elliott, 2010a; b), the 
catalogue was included in Martin Parr’s Best Book List (Photo-eye, 2010), the exhibition toured 
Europe (Figure 22) as part of a prominent group show called From Here On (Chéroux et al., 2011; 
Fontcuberta, 2013; O’Hagan, 2013) and it was nominated for the Deutsche Börse Photography 
Prize, 2012. 
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on passing without dubious interference. And what better device to record this 
information with than mobile phone camera and/or built-in voice recorder? It 
would be possible to mimic the wardens and go about capturing contravention 
images and data. 
So in more ways than one the activity was photography-related. Contra-
Invention was meta-photography but also a comment on the contemporary 
situation in which cameras are employed for surveillance, and secondly, the 
phenomenon of ‘sousveillance’, which is increasingly discussed. The use of 
camera as defence-weapon and means of monitoring power is less often 
referred to, nor is the more complex point that mechanisms, employed by 
bureaucracies, feedback on themselves occasionally, exposing and even limiting 
the very authority which is purportedly in control58. Contra-Invention 
represented partial engagement with these concerns, albeit acted out in the 
realm of not so glamorous, municipal policing. Edward Snowden or WikiLeaks 
type spectacle this was not. Rather than over-emphasise the confrontational, the 
aim here was to remain below the radar politically. Instead the CEOs and their 
procedures were treated lightly and intentionally misunderstood, not least as a 
means of bypassing the usual complaint-filled anecdotes which surround 
parking law enforcement. The investigation, if it can be called that, revealed a 
more complex set of behaviours than the common crude portrayals. However, I 
wanted to believe that these discoveries and amateur anthropology represented 
a secondary feature of the project. Little attempt was being made to be 
comprehensive or scientific. The process dynamics, relationships, procedures, 
                                                 
58 Apocalyptic fears of a one-directional Orwellian scenario unfolding have been undermined 
somewhat by the spread of hand-held devices. The ubiquity of recording technology means 
monitoring back of the state is possible via ‘citizen journalism’ but even incidental footage acts 
as a check on hegemonic excess. The case of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 was an early 
example. Ian Tomlinson in London 2009 and pro-democracy protestor Ken Tsang in Hong Kong 
2014 are two other illustrations of this point. 
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communications were of interest at the time because it was thought that these 
factors would somehow work their way visibly into the resulting photographs. 
The emphasis on photography turned out to be convenient because in the 
process of accumulating material I realised that the increasingly globally-
significant Brighton Photo Biennial was approaching. Not only that but the key 
theme in 2010 would be vernacular photography. Historically controversial 
photographer Martin Parr would be curating and giving the ‘found image’ 
special status. The idea that a show of this work could be presented during the 
Biennial, so that it would be intentionally considered as critical or conceptual 
photography, became increasingly appealing. At this point further links with 
photography were actively sought. On inspection it was discovered that the 
EXIF information and metadata often embedded in digital images had not been 
stripped off the downloaded jpegs. Each image contained information about 
camera type, shutter speed, aperture and lens angle the wardens had used: the 
kinds of records classic photography-geeks are keenly interested in. Secondly, it 
was discovered that the three-digit code visible on the fronts of issued fines 
coincided with the figure on CEOs’ shoulder straps. In other words, if desired, 
photographers could be matched with their photographs. It was enough, 
instead of choosing such an obsessive route, to indicate that this cross-
referencing was possible by presenting the data as part of the exhibition. 
The photography link does not prevent other kinds of framing or musing 
on the significance of these actions. As well as being credited as the inventor of 
photography, Nicéphore Niépce created the first internal combustion engine. 
The tool which would allow far away scenes to be viewed without having to 
move, originated from the same brain that revolutionised transportation. A 
similar contrary development can be noticed in recent history. The advent of 
the internet appeared to coincide with the arrival of low cost airlines. Just as 
travel became more unnecessary the cost of it dropped dramatically. Cars and 
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cameras have a long and multifaceted relationship which continues today but 
in the form of a tense stand-off. Or seeing that motorcars were status symbols 
and still are to a point, at least our CEOs are paying attention and respectful of 
that vanity. 
 
Figure 23 Torn parking fine, Contra-Invention, Friese-Greene Gallery, Brighton, 2010 
 
Another way of thinking about the process is through the lens of media 
theory. A line of communication exists between CEO and driver, mediated 
through the car itself, an online system, the law, various procedures and 
cameras. Even though the two key human players rarely meet they are joined in 
a feedforward/feedback loop. When they do actually come into physical contact 
a familiar performance unfolds. The stage has been set. Driver and warden have 
clear roles. Verbal abuse, expressions of indignation and outrage are the trained 
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responses. The system includes other mini-rituals. In issuing tickets strict 
guidelines are followed. A CEO waits for five minutes, puts on his or her 
official cap, generates the documentation using a specialised device, places that 
ticket behind the wiper so that it is visible, and then moves around the vehicle 
capturing six, eight or more images as evidence, before removing the cap and 
moving on. 
The aporia of being able to ‘intentionally misunderstand’ is one 
interpretation of the term I’ve coined, artificial stupidity, and represents an 
important dimension to the theme in this thesis. The downside of intelligence is 
being explored because of my hunch that being able to dip into these states and 
‘dumb down’ might well reap rewards. By adopting an innocent or stupid 
mindset, just as the comedic actor does when exercising that peculiar ability to 
‘fool themselves’ on stage (cf. supra, p.78), new breakthroughs and discoveries 
are made. Of course a person needs to be able to revert back so as to be able to 
recognise the worth of these. 
The photography references and usages increased as the project 
progressed. Just as CEOs made records of offending vehicles, they could be 
captured in the act of issuing fines, on my mobile device (a Nokia 6500c and 
then Nokia 6700c-1). Also I began deliberately manoeuvring my way into their 
field of view in an attempt to appear in their photographs. The phone handset 
played a part in these ruses. It was better to appear to be in conversation, 
making a call, distracted and not loitering. And the knack of capturing CEOs in 
action while the device was held to my ear in pretend-dialogue amounted to 
another new craft skill, comparable with the methods used by street-
photographers in the past, not wanting to be noticed by their subjects. The 
process of waiting for images to appear online, which took a day or so from 
point of capture, was evocative of when one had to wait for a film to be 
developed. A degree of trepidation and excitement was inevitable. Had the 
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attempt to get into frame succeeded? Would the images even be available? 
(When fines were paid quickly then access was denied so there was always the 
possibility of disappointment.) 
Further adventures followed and more discoveries were made. Officers 
sometimes captured themselves in reflection. One of the resulting images 
(Figure 24) was particularly revealing in this respect, and later used by 
conceptual photographer Joan Fontcuberta with students as part of ‘a class 
about what [he] calls ‘reflectograms’ (selfies taken in front of a mirroring 
surface)’ (see e-mail from him, appendix G). 
 
 
Figure 24 Contra-Invention ‘reflectogram’, 2010 
 
The way teams of CEOs work together became apparent, many incidents and 
potential confrontations were witnessed and documented but most of it never 
found its way into the final exhibition. In the end the catalogue containing 
images I had captured on my phone-camera, of traffic wardens in action, was 
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withdrawn, not because of any quality problems but to avoid distracting from 
the key materials of interest. The images of them did not fit with a desire to 
avoid voyeurism and objectifying, and it would have played too simple an 
entertainment game in emphasising the conflictual. 
The images were found in compressed jpeg format, at low resolution by 
comparison with the standards of professional photography; the pixelation and 
compression artefacts59 became more noticeable when enlarged, automatic 
camera settings meant that less than ideal combinations of shutter speed and 
aperture were in use but despite all these faults and others, far more 
information than necessary for the job in hand was being captured by the 
wardens. The contravention images still represent what Marshall McLuhan 
would have described as hot media (cf. supra, p.80). Contradictions are 
apparent in this combination of poor quality which nevertheless exceeds 
requirements. Compression algorithms – and jpeg is being used as shorthand 
here - were introduced as a temporary measure in the 1990s. Compressed 
photography is looked down upon as a poor relation in the world of images. 
The palpable hostility of many visitors in the first few days of the Contra-
Invention exhibition reflected that disdain (and it was amusing to see the 
situation change once its status had been conferred). These formats and 
approaches have not only survived but are the norm60. As it happens 
compression is a sophisticated and efficient set of mechanisms which permits 
image quality to be retained despite dramatic reduction in file size. Jpeg was 
precisely what the new landscape, the digital network, required. The impact is 
                                                 
59 ‘artefacts’, the term of choice used to describe the fuzzy edges and blurriness which is 
characteristic of ‘lossy compression’, is interesting here considering the points made later in the 
paragraph. 
60 In his provocative first published essay Lev Manovich pointed out that ‘lossy compression’ 
was becoming the norm as far back as the mid-nineties (1995)  
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analogous to the Renaissance innovation of painting on canvas which permitted 
pictures to be rolled up and made mobile. Artists could work in studios and 
escape the restrictions of fresco. The fact of mounting the Contra-Invention large 
prints on lightweight support, normally used for commercial signage purposes, 
and leaning them against the gallery walls instead of hanging them, was also a 
reference to this idea of mobility. In an essay which was, with permission, 
included in the Contra-Invention exhibition catalogue, Hito Steyerl waxed lyrical 
about the worth of ‘poor images’ (2009). In the old world ‘resolution was 
fetishised as if its lack amounted to castration of the author’; poor images on the 
other hand are ‘heavily compressed and travel quickly. They lose matter and 
gain speed.’ Steyerl likens the proliferation of imagery online to a proletariat, a 
potentially underestimated revolutionary class. Painting pre-empts this 
development in other ways too; Matisse more than once repeated Delacroix’s 
adage that ‘exactitude is not truth’. The Impressionists’ use of dabs and dashes 
was proof that there were less pedantic ways to connect with original 
experience. So in selecting three night-shots from the hundreds of mundane 
contravention images and blowing them up to the actual size of the car depicted 
an attempt was being made to engage with these factors relating to art history 
and aesthetics. It is not necessarily ridiculous, nor inflammatory, to 
hypothesise, as I did during artist talks, that ‘Caravaggio would have been 
impressed’ with these corrugated-plastic-mounted monuments to the jpeg. 
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2.3.2. Missing You (2013-2014) and Less (2014-2015) 
 
 
Figure 25 PODS (point of delivery signatures) Norwich 2013 - Photo: Tony George 
 
Since Contra-Invention other ways of gently hacking the supply chain 
have been uncovered. Arts Council England was happy to support an initiative 
which used the familiar point of delivery signatures (PODS) required by 
couriers when they hand over packages to receivers. I discovered that, not only 
was it possible to track the movement of one’s own package, but that 
afterwards a low resolution jpeg version of the final signature was stored online 
(Figure 28, p.172) and what is more all of the files remained available long after 
the physical exchange. Surprisingly, by simply inventing consignment 
numbers, it was easy to access others’ information including their point of 
delivery signatures! The exhibition of this work was called Missing You (Greslé, 
2014), a reference to the Sorry We Missed You cards left by couriers when 
delivery (frequently) fails, included large prints of signatures, moving-image 
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pieces (Figure 25 shows signatures being back projected onto a window) and a 
book of these signatures (O’Connell, 2014f). POD happens also to be the 
abbreviation for my chosen technique and channel of publication: ‘print-on-
demand’. 
 
 
Figure 26 A0 print of a receipt obtained from buying nothing, 2016. Photo: Mel Ede 
 
More recently I discovered that it is possible to use the increasingly 
ubiquitous supermarket self-checkout machines to buy nothing. During two 
periods, hundreds of receipts were collected as evidence of these non-
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transactions, and compiled into books entitled Less (O’Connell, 2014c) and More 
Less (O’Connell, 2016a). A0 poster versions of the receipts have been distributed 
(Figure 26). Sound recordings of the encounters with the friendly technology - 
shoppers are thanked regardless of whether a purchase is made – were 
interrogated and combined with visual material to create another simupoem 
(Exchanging, 2015). In addition instructions on how to interact and obtain zero 
transaction receipts have been shared (How to buy nothing, 2016). 
My attention to the bodily and the pinpointing of genuine human 
interaction amidst the artificiality has been stated (cf. supra, pp.93, 98). While 
pathos may be the first upshot of acquiescing to consumerist morality and to 
transactional relationships, the heated clashes between traffic wardens and car 
owners, the images I captured of those wardens or they, unwittingly, of me, 
and the collection of couriers’ point of delivery signatures, plus the records of 
exchanges with staff while buying nothing in supermarkets, still correspond to 
instances of real connection between individuals. 
Final work of two types emerges from these clownish research projects. 
Firstly, artefacts which do justice to the nature of the readymade data are 
presented. By enlarging or using suitable support, for example, the qualities of 
the original digital or visual material are only amplified. Secondly, an attempt is 
made to move away from the origins but not to the extent of losing touch 
completely. I continue to produce short looping films. As highlighted in section 
2.1 they employ contemporary 3D modelling, simulation and 3D scanning 
techniques and combine influences from collections of objects, data and ideas 
being worked with. Though unusual or incorrect use of the software is still 
important in the final development phase, these films are less obviously 
connected with the intelligence or wit of the original process. They are more 
abstract and distinct from hacktivism, consciously polemical or ‘post-art art’ (cf. 
infra, p.134). In fact, the simupoems, notwithstanding use of cutting-edge tools 
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and concepts, arguably hark back to a time before the ‘end of art’. An ambition 
in creating them is to achieve unexpected shifts in understanding or to prompt 
an aesthetic experience (Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin, 2004). The 
outcomes ought to embody the process and in that sense the art ‘speaks for 
itself’61, which does not in any way prevent other kinds of evaluation and 
reflection. 
  
                                                 
61 A somewhat hackneyed phrase but an important one, which can be handled critically (Danto, 
Horowitz and Huhn, 1998, p.19). 
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3. ‘Unweaving the rainbow'62 
 
3.1. Art theories of relevance 
 
The process of discovering the relationship between mental models of 
importance for me and practical actions taken is an iterative one. Through 
reflection on my activities, interventions and works produced, the conceptions 
and paradigms of relevance begin to reveal themselves. Before listing the 
strategies what are these theories currently? Many concepts of interest have 
been discussed in chapters 1 and 2, and are considered in appendices A and L. 
These mainly concerned themselves with what an artwork can be. Bakhtin, 
Beckett and Bishop’s thinking featured but what other philosophies and ideas 
may be useful in looking at the whole system of art? 
One way to begin is by asking the apparently unanswerable question: 
‘what is art?’ Whether they admit it or not, whether they are clearly conscious 
of it or not every artist must, on some level, be aware of what they mean by art. 
‘The artist should know what, and why, things happen in his pictures’ 
proclaimed Kazimir Malevich in 1915 (1988, p.129), the year he exhibited his 
first Black Square. ‘Wittgenstein's philosophy’ states Niklas Luhmann, ‘denies 
only the possibility for a definition that corresponds to the 'essence' of art’ 
(2000, p.244). Luhmann exploits this loophole by proposing a theory which ‘no 
longer raises issues of essence or of the consensus of all observers but instead 
leaves the decision of what counts as art to the art system itself’ (2000, p.244). 
According to Luhmann’s system theory, art ‘evolved’ and, therefore, is 
an example of ‘the paradoxical probability of the improbable’ (2000, p.214). Put 
                                                 
62 From Richard Dawkins’ book in defence of scientific inquiry (2000). The origins of the phrase 
are John Keats’ 1818 narrative poem Lamia. 
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brusquely this would mean that art is an unlikely accident which happens to 
have survived. Controversially then the arena and associated practices would 
not amount to something vital but simply possible. The future would not be 
guaranteed either but for now there exists an ‘art system’. Such assertions 
naturally disappoint those who can only imagine cave painters as the heroic 
Picassos of their day rather than the first producers of PowerPoint slides63. The 
fact that history is regularly ‘retro-fitted’ in the light of later developments does 
not make the preceding era any less real though.  
Theories of stages are dangerous on two fronts. Firstly, they may 
mechanically limit the seeing of commonality between different periods. 
Secondly, tenuous ownership is asserted at a later stage over previous practices. 
Occasionally a movement will be described by those participating in it but 
backdated period-naming is the norm. Renaissance artists were not to know 
they would appear in Vasari’s Lives (1897), a key reference for later scholars. 
Bruno Latour’s We have Never been Modern (1993) critiques modernism’s 
separating of nature from society but in doing so also undermines the habit of 
lumping practices together according to era. Presumably certain human 
propensities find avenues into action given the right conditions and regardless 
of the nomenclature applied. The significance of medieval carnival, for 
example, is discussed in section 2.2.2 and elsewhere in the thesis. However, 
chronological modelling, the idea of narrative, the acceptance of cause and 
effect and the assigning of terms to movements, are unavoidable too, and very 
                                                 
63 Werner Herzog’s compelling statements about the ‘oldest known pictorial creations of 
humanity’ at the Chauvet caves, Southern France – e.g. ‘The artist painted this bison with eight 
legs, suggesting movement: [it is] almost a form of proto-cinema’ (Cave of Forgotten Dreams, 
2011) - exclude mundane readings. Distinct dots are visible on the images and there are piles of 
stones beneath. Could the depictions not have served purposes of planning before a hunt; been 
used in group discussions to allocate tasks; or provided something for children to practice on; 
as well as helping prepare psychologically and fulfilling ‘spiritual’ needs? 
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human. When Luhmann states that, ‘[a]rt mobilised… a memory of its own to 
orient itself in its own history’ (2000, p.233), that is not to trivialise the earlier 
endeavours then. Evolutionary theory does not deny the individual and social 
varieties of creative engagement that went before; nor the aesthetic principles at 
play; nor the spiritual and philosophical construals allied with historical 
practices. Our specialists in the caves may well have stood back astonished at 
the surplus of effects produced, felt themselves to be ‘playing god’, or 
considered the more profound implications of their drawings. 
In terms of a future for art, the lack of guarantee implicit in this accident-
of-history hypothesis can be overstated too. Joseph Beuys in his famous 
insinuation that ‘everyone is an artist’ (1993, p.22) did encourage the idea of art 
being somehow immanent. He could not, as many presume, only have meant to 
belittle the specialist thinking and knowledge involved, nor to deny the 
importance of art schools say. Otherwise Beuys would not have devoted much 
of his life to art education. What about art’s longevity? ‘Autopoiesis’  
(Luhmann, 2000, pp.49–50), as a feature of evolved systems, means that they not 
only maintain themselves but also reproduce (appendix A, p.203). Seen through 
system theory spectacles then, art would not so humbly vacate the scene. Nigel 
Thrift’s phrase ‘remembering forwards’ (2008, p.98) seems apt here. If the art 
system appeared through chance then it was surely an accident waiting to 
happen, born sufficiently robust to survive into its future. Avant-garde 
willingness to be self-destructive and denying of art’s place in the past century 
is too easily taken at face value perhaps. Self-deprecating behaviour in 
individuals after all often indicates the opposite, confidence. Radical self-
destructive statements are potentially a kind of show, or test, of strength. John 
Roberts argues that art’s ‘ironization, belittlement, adulteration’ is inspired by 
the ‘deflationary logic’ triggered by 1917, the year which brought with it both 
the Russian Revolution and Duchamp’s Fountain (2015, pp.66–67). What we 
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have now he describes as ‘post-art art’ (John Roberts NCCA Recording, 2014) but 
even these practices are ‘recalled to the ‘art world’’ (cf. supra, p.108). 
Irrespective of how transformations are accounted for, it would appear that sets 
of practices are linked, but dialectically so, to pasts which extolled other sets of 
practices, and that the process continues. Autopoiesis for art as a system 
permits one ideal to be deservedly killed off as new forms are born. 
If one chooses to, it is possible to see value in artistic practice from a 
basic survivalist perspective. Such an approach ignores the now-accepted 
complexities of evolutionary theory which describes not just natural selection 
but many forms of ‘artificial selection’ and ‘sexual selection’ (Miller, 2000). 
Thinking on ‘adaptationism’ (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991, pp.185–206) 
also challenges a one dimensional viewing of evolution. Nevertheless art can be 
imagined as a means of resisting the normalising influences Max Horkheimer 
wrote about in his post-war Critique of Instrumental Reason (2012). Sophisticated 
questioning practices of a certain variety presumably help inoculate a society 
against surface expressions of freedom, or individualism masked by a ‘pseudo-
individualism’ (Adorno and Bernstein, 1991). Tangibly also, the generating of 
alternative viewpoints and approval of unorthodox behaviours is in line with 
the imperative that, for the good of humanity, diversity be prioritised. In fact 
stupidity, for Adorno, according to David Jenemann, is defined as precisely the 
opposite of critical or creative thinking, as ‘a failure of courage in the face of 
thought’s suppression’ (2013, p.36). Adorno ‘recognizes that stupidity can be as 
actively cultivated as intelligence’ (Jenemann, 2013, p.35), which, in the parlance 
of this thesis, represents another instance of artificial stupidity, but in this case 
an ominous one. 
According to Luhmann ‘functional systems are incapable of directly 
influencing one another… [but at] the same time, their coexistence increases 
their mutual irritability’ (2000, p.4). This sense of irritability, mentioned so 
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frequently by Luhmann64 is not meant as a negative. From a cybernetics 
viewpoint the tensions and upsets between systems and their environments, 
and with other systems, are exactly what feedback loops arbitrate. Cybernetic 
systems are capable of coping with, let us say adjacent, systems and they learn 
through this rubbing up against them. Such adaptation surely contradicts 
Luhmann’s argument about systems not influencing each other though. The 
problem was raised in a previous footnote (cf. supra, p.84). A way out of the 
dilemma is to presume that Luhmann is referring to high level functional 
systems like the art system, the economy, science and law (all four of which he 
had written books about). His point must be that these exist as if in different 
planes, almost unaware of each other. ‘[T]he art system organized itself on the 
basis of communication’ Luhmann states (2000, p.80), meaning that the lowest 
order building blocks are not whole human beings. People could experience 
different realms. It should not be controversial to state, as Martin Kippenberger 
did, that, ‘[y]ou can’t cause anything by art’ (1998, p.76), partly because art is 
not dealing with conventional reason or straightforward communication. 
Kippenberger’s point also reflects the degree to which art is self-governing; by 
‘anything’ he surely means anything outside itself. An alternate means of 
coping with the quandary is to note that Luhmann speaks of ‘direct’ influence 
but the relationships between cybernetic systems are subtle and elastic. This 
situation brings to mind Karen Barad’s ‘intra-actions [between bodies which] 
are constraining but not determining…. intra-activity is neither a matter of strict 
determinism nor unconstrained freedom’ (2003, p.826). 
Questions about ‘art’s [presumed] benevolence’ are rarely posed. As 
David Beech and John Roberts point out, ‘there is a tendency to treat art as 
                                                 
64 Niklas Luhmann's Art as a Social System contains thirty-seven instances of 'irritate' and its 
derivatives. 
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inestimably worthy, noble or even as being among the greatest preoccupations 
of humanity, rather than a series of ruminations or troublespots’ (2002, p.14). 
Analogising with psychoanalysis, value may materialise contradictorily and 
through resisting the urge to problem-solve. In The Necessity of Errors (2011), 
Roberts draws out such points, making comparisons between the nature of 
error in psychoanalytical, political and artistic practice. He states that ‘”error” in 
psychoanalysis is always testimony to other causal chains’ (2011, p.25). This 
sounds like Joyce’s mistakes as ‘portals of discovery’ (cf. supra, p.69) and 
represents a far more nuanced proposal than the overused recommendation 
that we learn from our mistakes. The notion of art as panacea or as serving 
some social function is debatable then. 
For practical purposes, in an open attempt to escape the precincts of 
commitment to belief, I am sympathetic to the thought of art being unnecessary 
(in its relationships with other functional systems). That is not to rule out the 
potential for unlikely and even measurable benefits (appendix A, p.205); nor is 
it to outlaw the possibility of art’s overlapping with other spheres such as 
politics, commerce, academia, the entertainment industry or museum-culture. 
When art performs for others it may appear ‘stupid’ (cf. infra, p.175) but by 
participating in these arenas the considered nature of that stupidity can be 
distilled out. 
Institutional theory (Danto, 1964; Dickie, 1969, 1974) gives weight to an 
extended art world to the degree of that being what defines it. In trying to 
determine my position I have attempted to acknowledge the various forces at 
play and simultaneously extricate what an artist can be. Sally-Jane Norman’s 
remarks (cf. supra, p.61) about the ‘so-called creative industries’ and 
‘hegemonic attempts to engulf art that otherwise hovers awkwardly beyond 
definitional reach’ are relatable to this discussion too. In my quickly sketched 
out Venn diagram (Figure 27), all the boundaries need to be interpreted with 
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caution. The actual character defined as artist could also be critic, academic, 
activist, collector, curator or gallerist. The system is not simply equal to the sum 
of its (human) parts. Paradoxically it has been fashionable to deny the existence 
 
 
Figure 27 The Art World, 2015 
 
of the category ‘artist’ while complaining about its opposite: extreme dilution of 
the term. Perhaps the difficulty delineating explains why, ‘[t]he low rate of 
participation in art is astonishing. Only a fraction of the population participates 
in art’ (Luhmann, 2000, p.242). In addition Luhmann gives attention to an 
increasing autonomy of roles stating that in the past ‘writing and art were much 
closer together than they are today’ (2000, p.17). In other words while an 
overlapping of disciplines is discernible, so is the contrary process of 
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divergence. Roberts, in a recent talk at the ICA in London (Santos-Pedro, 2015), 
suggested that one of the few privileges accorded to artists now is permission to 
be ‘adisciplinary’, to almost lazily delve into arenas in which they have little or 
no expertise. Regardless of the contemporary flux and kinds of role-play 
possible though, the existence of art and artists (linked to the critical and avant-
garde trajectories) can still be acknowledged. 
Luhmann’s point (cf. supra, p.45) is that the need for one functional 
system to submit to another is overstressed. He plays down the likelihood of 
indisputable acquiescence in the face of commerce, but political power too can 
be overestimated in this regard. Roberts denounces the blunt suggestion that 
Abstract Expressionism’s prominence was only due to the CIA’s Hidden Hands 
(1996a). I concur with these sentiments, as Figure 27 perhaps illustrates. In place 
of economic, political, technological or any other kind of determinism, I see 
tense relationships, involving feedback loops and alternative framings in a 
situation which is dynamic, but where it is still possible to make distinctions 
and judgements. 
Norbert Wiener’s writings in the 1940s recommended theories of 
cybernetics as an antidote to entropy as defined by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. Cybernetics was an attempt ‘to hold back nature’s tendency 
toward disorder by adjusting its parts to various purposive ends’ (1954, 
p.285/2765). In Sadie Plant’s words, he was ‘undermining distinctions between 
human, animal, and machine’, and, ‘challenging orthodox conceptions of life’ 
(1998, p.160). Though such talk seems familiar now, it was pioneering then.65 
                                                 
65 Is there a contradiction in Wiener’s description of the situation as an encounter between 
equilibrium and disorder? The likely result of losing this battle against entropy, he says, would 
be ‘a drab uniformity out of which we can expect only minor and insignificant local 
fluctuations’ (Wiener, 1954, p.330/2765). So this slide towards apparent ‘chaos’ (1954, 
p.108/2765, 1202/2765, 1210/2765, 1369/2765) ends up with what could equally be described as 
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The positive alternative Wiener suggested (if cybernetic thinking were put into 
action) amounts to order too but of another kind: equilibrium. Gordon Pask 
pointed out that ‘[u]nity is not uniformity, but is coherence and diversity 
admixed in collusion’ (Frazer, 1995, p.7). The concept of ‘integration’ perhaps, 
which consists of linked but differentiated elements, is a useful way of 
describing the ideals implied. Integration means not uniformity but a kind of 
harmony or dynamic equilibrium (cf. supra, p.54). As in the case of a choir, 
individual singers do not strive to be identical. The differences do matter, but 
members are tuned-into each other. What have these arguments got to do with 
art or my practice? Firstly, the problem of categorising emerges frequently in 
this thesis. What to call the simupoems and questions of genre have been 
ongoing bugbears. Whether to accept art as a distinct arena at all is in question. 
When dealing with the key theme there are obstacles to defining what 
intelligence is. System theory in action (including cybernetics) could amount to 
a defence against a kind of information or language entropy because the special 
feature of systems is that they are both distinct from each other and fuzzy at the 
boundaries. In addition, systems change over time and reproduce. Systems are 
less fundamentally separated from each other than objects, things or words. 
Barad - in stating that ‘[b]odies are not objects with inherent boundaries and 
properties; they are material-discursive phenomena’ (2003, p.826) and in her 
repeated use of the term ‘agential intra-action’ (cf. supra, p.135) - is alluding to 
similar formations. In conceiving of art itself as a system and works of art as 
sub-systems in communication networks, certain conundrums and difficulties 
about the autonomy and independence (versus context and relationships with 
the wider environment) diminish. What is more, the thinking is flexible enough 
                                                 
the ultimate in order; complete homogeneity; a sort of white noise. ‘Chaos’ must either be a 
misnomer or shorthand for what he terms ‘de-differentiation’ (1954, p.95). 
140 
 
to account for artefacts, and artists, playing roles which extend beyond their 
perceived cultural remit such as guarding against instrumentalisation, offering 
new terminologies, interpretations and intelligent remixings of knowledge. The 
struggle against creeping entropic disorder highlighted by Wiener can be 
treated as a quasi-epistemological issue. If the opposing forces are recognised as 
‘distinction-making’ versus ‘distinction dilution’, then artistic action 
demonstrably and concurrently undercuts existing understanding and invents 
new categories. 
Returning to the question of art’s usefulness (or lack of it) in relation to 
human survival, brief mention was made earlier (cf. supra, p.134) of the 
alternatives to ‘natural selection’ espoused by evolutionary psychology (Miller, 
2000). Sadie Plant too highlights this, stating that natural selection is ‘certainly 
not the only factor in the evolutionary game’ (1998, p.224). Though seemingly 
guilty at times of falling foul of his own insistence that a person’s conditioning 
should not get in the way of evidence-based objectivity, Geoffrey Miller’s The 
Mating Mind (2000) is intriguing. His representing of Darwin’s second theory 
has important implications for systems thinkers. The potential for ‘sexual 
selection’ (Miller, 2000)66, ‘cultural selection’ (Changizi, 2011b; a) and other 
evolutionary schemes - which do not fit easily with the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
cliché - indicates in fact exactly how new systems, with their own evolutionary 
trajectories, can be spawned from older ones. ‘Unnecessary’ characteristics (the 
peacock’s feathers being a classic example) evolve during the periods in history 
when there are no serious threats to basic survival and reproduction. The 
human brain and our capacity for elaborate language use, Miller argues, are just 
                                                 
66 Geoffrey Miller goes as far as to say that ‘[w]ithout sexual selection, evolution seems limited 
to the very small, the transient, the parasitic, the bacterial, and the brainless.’ (2000, p.176). 
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such examples of excess67. ‘We do not have to pretend that everything 
interesting and enjoyable about human behaviour is a side-effect of some 
utilitarian survival ability or general learning capacity…. [t]he human mind and 
the peacock's tail may serve similar biological functions’ he says (2000, p.3). 
Later Miller indicates that seemingly extraneous characteristics can function as 
indicators of general gene quality (2000, pp.104–106) but that is not the same as 
believing that every trait must serve a blatant survivalist purpose. The proposal 
that art too is a chance occurrence, unconnected with survival in the 
evolutionary sense, does not demean it. What constitutes a ‘need’ anyway can 
change to take into account cultural transformations and paradigm shifts. Once 
evolved could the brain not be reckoned crucial or exploitable for purposes 
which again relate back to survival, but to survival of a different order? 
Cultural activity grows into a requisite. Also it is easy to see how, differences 
that were at first unnecessary (namely superior cognitive capacity, 
consciousness and foresight) could take the species into a domain beyond 
potential biological traps. The invention of birth control is an example of 
something which disturbs the usual animal ‘instinct’, in this case to procreate, 
but may be vital for our longer term survival within a complex ecosystem. 
Alternatively, and negatively, one could see these excess characteristics 
as parasitical growths which emerge dialectically to operate as if separate 
species - systems with evolutionary trajectories of their own. These are 
hypothetical framings of the situation but intuitively the thought of two species 
in one, not quite unlatched, goes a way to explaining why questions of ‘mind 
                                                 
67 Echoing Miller’s ideas (2000), Mark Changzi in Harnessed: How Language and Music 
Mimicked Nature and Transformed Ape to Man (2011b) ‘make[s] the case that language is a 
technology, not part of our nature at all... Instead, language is a result of cultural selection, a 
kind of evolutionary process capable of ‘design’ that occurs at lightning speed’ (Changizi, 
2011a). 
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and body’ fascinate. Extrapolating further, the desire to create AI can be 
interpreted as a quest to find alternative spaces, alternative bodies in fact, for 
our minds. Books, libraries, artefacts and all sorts of other media already acted 
in this way to some degree. Culture now might be defined as the sum-total of 
this exteriorisation of memory (cf. supra p.56). It is not uncommon for 
embodiments of information to be attributed agency. David J Chalmers and 
Andy Clarke put it plainly: ‘[w]ithin the lifetime of an organism, too, individual 
learning may have moulded the brain in ways that rely on cognitive extensions 
that surrounded us as we learned’ (1998, p.12). In other words, the delving 
outwards feeds back in a way which dilutes the importance of the body and its 
fleshy brain. (It is not so much the difference between the physicality of the 
brain and the rest of the body that is of interest here, though that is notable.) 
Intelligence feels not to belong to a body. The inquiry here posits a tentative 
defence of the Cartesian split. Our animal bodies with biological brain can feel 
like the least suitable place for a mind; hence the yearning for distraction and 
escapism. In this model human intelligence is a curse: no wonder people would 
want to ‘dumb down’ or make themselves stupid. For Avital Ronell in fact 
‘idiocy has something to do with the nearly existential fact of being stuck with a 
body’ (2002, p.180). 
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3.2. Analysis paralysis 
 
This section is an attempt to categorise my strategies and methods of 
working from the ‘bottom up’. Distilling out what these approaches, heuristics, 
techniques, processes, themes, intentions, desired outcomes, stratagems, and 
even why media were chosen, for the most part, becomes apparent after work 
has been resolved, but are occasionally anticipated in advance. My conduct, the 
understanding of that, and my notions of what it is to be an artist have been 
informed by periods as a student, by increased familiarity with art history and 
theory, but, firstly through practical engagement. Discussions, artist talks (cf. 
supra, p.49) and interviews have fed the process. Points from the interview in 
appendix D find their way into the lists produced in this section for instance. 
The analysis is not conducted with a view to changing or ‘improving’ the art. It 
is difficult to imagine however that the discovery of patterns of behaviour 
would not impact on the nature and direction of my practice. So the process of 
intense self-reflection is analogous to how art is created, in that having no 
definable objective does not rule out the possibility of making game-changing 
breakthroughs. Moreover, recognition of the nature of what one has got, in this 
case artworks, can be interpreted as change. Reorganising understanding 
already modifies the work. 
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3.2.1. Workaday themes, methods, principles and intentions 
 
Before considering what is happening at the higher level, a concerted 
effort has been made to discover and list day-to-day factors of importance. 
Table 02 is an attempt to capture and quantify the connectivity between these 
factors: The table also illustrates whether each factor is a thematic influence, 
practical method, overriding principle, desired effect, or more than one of these 
four. Each factor is summarily described in the index on the sheets which follow 
the table. 
This exercise was carried out in the belief that the list cannot be 
exhaustive. Nevertheless, the table and index do constitute an earnest 
endeavour to be as openly demystifying as possible. Table 02 was the basis for 
slicing the work up in other ways. The lists contained in sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.5 
constitute four other means of describing my output and activities as an artist 
during the past decade. 
In places the Table 02 index is cross-referenced with chapter 2 writing 
but precise explanation of all the linkages seemed laborious and not useful in 
providing extra illumination. Certain of the index descriptions go into more 
depth because of the factor’s importance or frequent applicability to my 
practice. Other factors are presented merely as observations. Not all receive 
significant attention elsewhere in the thesis.  
Since we are interested in artificiality, especially in connection with 
intelligence, it is worth noting that in biological systems of taxonomy ‘artificial’ 
can mean: 
 
[d]esignating a classification scheme based on characteristics selected 
primarily for pragmatic reasons, to enable identification and 
categorization of the things classified, rather than for any 
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correspondence to natural affinities or essential characteristics; relating 
to such a system (OED, 2016a). 
 
The inventory of techniques, strategies and methods is not arbitrary but 
alternatives could be conceived to replace it. Separate factors have not been 
included for the question of illusion, avoidance of self-expression, profanity, my 
critical interest in book production and print-on-demand, and questions of 
voyeurism and surveillance, though some of these are dealt with under other 
headings. Secondly, though a point of diminishing returns has been reached, it 
is clear that such a list could ‘go on forever’. If a perfect description (or again, 
representation) will never be possible, and if another structure might just as 
well do, is the attempt to be thorough here not another exercise in artificial 
stupidity? Similar arguments hold for the examination carried out in appendix 
H. There is a madness in not recognising the limitations of rigour when dealing 
with what Stafford Beer called ‘exceedingly complex systems’ (Pickering, 2011, 
pp.23–24). The effort put into detailed self-scrutinising here is, anecdotally at 
least, very untypical of what artists do, perhaps because most know better than 
to be so obsessively diagnostic. 
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TABLE 02 (A3) INSERT HERE  
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TABLE 02 (A3) INDEX PAGE 1 of 3 INSERT HERE 
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TABLE 02 (A3) INDEX PAGE 2 of 3 INSERT HERE  
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TABLE 02 (A3) INDEX PAGE 3 of 3 INSERT HERE 
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3.2.2. High level strategies 
 
 Four categories account for my practices at, what might be called, the 
strategic level namely: 
 
a) Investigation of everyday functional processes, systems and tools, 
the techno-industrial infrastructure so as to locate anomalies and make 
alternative interpretations. 
b) Intervention, misuse and misunderstanding of functional 
processes, systems and tools. 
c) Invention of new ‘pointless’ processes, systems and rituals 
utilising everyday found materials, and inspired by experience or 
activities witnessed. 
d) The presentation and use of appropriated data and materials, i.e. 
contemporary readymades. 
 
These types overlap. Tinkering and misuse can reveal faults in a system. The 
invention of an outwardly absurd process can, as well as mocking 
systematisation, reveal truths, uncover ‘bugs’ or lead to unwelcome discoveries 
about purposeful processes. These investigations and interventions, on their 
own, satisfy my experimental curiosity and have attracted attention, critical and 
otherwise, especially when a degree of mischief or wit was involved. The 
strategies are employed as means of distraction, to escape aesthetic platitude 
and in the hope of surprising myself. Selected findings, items of data, imagery, 
records and objects are either presented as readymades or become raw material 
for simupoems or similar constructions. These two categories of outcome, for 
me, do constitute ‘works of art’. 
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Others might not be so interested in the ‘supply chain’ but given my 
experience in industry it seems reasonable to bring this knowledge to the table 
as craft skill. Traffic jams, queues, ordering systems, call centres, online parcel 
tracking tools, supermarket transactions and parked cars lack exoticism 
perhaps but, for me, these processes are revealing and make legitimate subject 
matter. Ron Mueck’s knowledge of model-making, gained while working in 
television production, led directly to the uncanny creations he was later 
celebrated for. It is easy to see how Mueck’s output suited the Saatchi aesthetic 
because it was spectacle-oriented, but less immediately impacting kinds of 
model-making exist - and in my opinion these are no less interesting. My 
professional experience creating computer simulations which used 
mathematical principles, calculus, physics and queuing theory dealt with the 
dynamics of processes and the often invisible workings. Art, if it means 
anything, thrives precisely on the possibility of idiosyncratic experiences being 
anchored in the singular. 
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3.2.3. Process stages 
 
My working method is described next in terms of step-by-step thinking. 
Already in the writing, concerns about theories of stages have been raised (cf. 
supra, p.132). The sequence 1 to 6 below would rarely be carried out in strict 
succession, the process is more often iterative. 
 
1) Collection of ideas, objects, data, equations, recordings and 
images during my day-to-day activities: working, parenting, socialising, 
travelling, waiting, attending events, leisure activity, political activity, 
exhibition visits, presentations and so on. 
2) Investigation or interaction with specific constituents of the 
techno-industrial infrastructure, also involving collection of found 
materials and gathering documentation. 
3) Compilation and sequencing of accumulated materials from 
stages 1 and/or 2 into diaries, workbooks, digitally and by other means. 
4) Selection and editing of material from these interventions and 
collections. 
5) Production of final work of two types68 (cf. supra, p.129, 
mentioned in 3.2.2 above and Table 02, Factor 39): 
Type 1) Works which do justice to the nature of the found 
materials, amplifying the characteristics of interest but without 
overly embellishing. Concretely outcomes include selected objects, 
                                                 
68 Increasingly the instructions and explanatory material are being treated as ‘works’ too (Table 
02, Factor 38 & cf. infra, p.159) 
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printed images, information compiled into self-published books69 
or made available online or for exhibition. Documentation or 
instructional videos may be considered outcomes too. 
Type 2) Works which retain their ties with original found 
material and appropriation procedures but are consciously 
abstracted. The most frequent category of work here is the looping 
films, the simupoems, produced using 3D modelling and 
simulation techniques (discussed many times but extensively in 
section 2.1). Other outcomes include performances, object 
arrangements and usages of recordings inspired through 
collection or simply documenting the process. 
6) Exhibition, presentation, event and publication. No diktat 
preventing works of different types being exhibited together is abided 
by. The tensions and linkages between mutually exclusive entities, 
shown simultaneously, adds texture and can emphasise the authority of 
individual works. 
 
Work is eventually presented in suitable ways, but flagrantly as art or 
fine art, instead of research outcome or for activist purposes (Table 02, factors 
10 and 45 are relevant). Allusions are made to modernist principles, formal 
considerations; attention is paid to factors such as composition, colour, 
structure, sometimes by deliberately breaking the associated rules or inventing 
criteria (cf. supra, p.63 and Table 02, Factor 45). An eye is kept on conceptual 
relevance too. I am conscious of the deflationary logic (cf. supra, p.133), the self-
destructive compulsions in art, and ‘institutional critique’ (Tate, 2016a). If this 
                                                 
69 In 2014 I was invited by appropriationist artist  Mishka Henner, and later joined, ABC 
(Henner, 2016a) which advocates the use of print-on-demand approaches as well as querying 
the status of publishing and book production. 
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playing of the art game needs justification, then part of the rationale lies in the 
fact of certain privileges and freedoms being afforded to artists. John Roberts’ 
comment in section 3.1 (cf. supra, p.138) suggests open-ended investigations 
can be conducted without the same requirement for academic rigour. Perhaps 
wider ethical leeway is granted to artists too70. ‘Artistic license’ is a commonly 
used phrase. Though it usually means risk relative to the norms within The 
Arts, Arts Council England allows for, and, at times, encourages ‘artistic risk’ 
(Gardner, 2008). The other side of this equation is an expectation that the 
complexities of tradition are somehow respected. For artist-activists, 
amenability to convention would not necessarily be made explicit but the 
degree to which formal considerations and the rules of presentation can be 
challenged is often implicitly understood. Individuals are ‘recalled to the “art 
world”’ as Roberts puts it (cf. supra, pp.108, 134). Similar thinking explains why 
it was possible, in the era of happenings and new kinds of avant-garde 
performance, for Samuel Beckett, though he was also interested in media such 
as film and radio, to continue to write conventional stage productions. Even 
Dadaism was aware of what went before it. Now, ‘in keeping postmodernism’s 
rejection of its ideological pre-eminence, the very notion of innovation or 
invention is debatable’ (Norman, 2013, p.276). Curiously, after the trauma of 
modernist and post-modernist attacks, implosions and breakdowns, facets of 
the established cultural infrastructure can be more easily accepted. That is not 
to defend conformance. Kenneth Goldsmith’s asserting that creativity has 
become boring (2000) is itself creative. In fact, there is an irony in Goldsmith’s 
                                                 
70 Paramilitary Michael Stone’s claiming that his intrusion, with explosives, at Northern 
Ireland’s Stormont parliament was ‘performance art’ (BBC, 2006) is further evidence that wider 
– though not unlimited - scope is allowed to artists. The recent case of Pyotr Pavlensky, who 
had set fire to the entrance of a Federal Security Service building in Russia, also illustrates the 
point (Morton, 2016). 
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activities because he does accept boundaries, use traditional media too (books), 
and he fundamentally defends poetry and art. Polish art group Azorro‘s 
Everything Has Been Done: 
 
confronts the paradigm of originality in art [too]. The absurd exchange of 
innovative ideas for a work of art, each of which turns out to have 
already been used, undermines the requirement of uniqueness imposed 
on artists (Dawicki et al., 2003). 
 
Azorro have created an art work about the impossibility of making art, but one 
which is screened in galleries and museums. 
There are pragmatic reasons for accepting both the physical architectures 
and organisational arrangements which have evolved. The white cube format 
permits work to be appreciated without visual interference. Plinths are suitable 
devices for similar reasons but also because of their connotation now thanks to 
a history of use. On the digital front similar reasoning can be applied. Despite 
episodic challenges to its pre-eminence, and hostility to its lack of design 
elegance, PowerPoint so far proves unbeatable as a way of containing and 
presenting ideas, via images, text and links. Acceptance of certain aspects of 
cultural infrastructure is what allows those structures to be played with, 
subverted or even ingeniously mocked. Technological change has had a 
dramatic effect in expanding the means of presentation but interestingly has 
given new life to dying formats. Print-on-demand services threaten to eliminate 
the power of publishers, but increase physical book production and so obstruct 
the path to purely digital reading. Likewise, freeware for creating stop-frame 
animations regenerates interest in that set of craft skills. New formats exist in 
parallel with seemingly obsolete constituents of the cultural landscape. The 
technological mix reflects itself inside galleries, art spaces and governmental 
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funding bodies which simultaneously deal with digital, a variety of new 
practices, and traditional expertise.  
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3.2.4. Media and materials 
 
Though art long ago ‘liberated itself from craft specificity’ (John Roberts 
NCCA Recording, 2014) and medium-specificity there still exist both pressures 
and justifications for recognising distinct categories. As it happens practitioners 
rarely function in complete state of flux media-wise. This list provides a 
summary of resources, materials and media I have used in the past decade: 
 
a) Live performance, typically using a professional actor, but at 
times involving other participants and I. 
b) The simupoems: short looping films using virtual modelling 
techniques, physics-engines, mathematical principles, simulation and 
incorporating imported imagery and sounds. 
c) Video recordings of live performances and interventions. 
d) 2D imagery or photography usually mounted in a way which 
alludes to the overlap of form with content. Included here would be the 
production of artists’ books (footnote cf. supra, p.153). 
e) Selected physical ready-mades - for a period this specifically 
meant containers and vessels. Beakers, mugs and potties were embedded 
into live art and worked with in the creation of moving-image work. 
f) Playback hardware, television sets, DVD players, and other 
equipment used to present media from b and c above. 
g) Selected digital ready-mades, files and data, obtained through 
interventions with functional systems, transport mechanisms and 
legalistic elements of the supply chain. 
h) Food stuffs and organic material, liquids or mixtures such as 
coffee, milk, eggs or urine.  
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3.2.5. Genres and disciplines 
 
For similar reasons to the previous list, of media and materials, the 
works have been positioned according to genre, often for convenience, not 
always choice; to suit funding applications; to facilitate my finding suitable 
critical communities and because hosting organisations, spaces and galleries are 
often medium, discipline or genre specific. The primary disciplines of relevance 
are: 
 
a) Fine Art/Contemporary Art 
b) Photography 
c) Moving-image/Film/Animation 
d) Live Art 
e) Digital Media/Technology Art. 
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4. Conclusions and arguments 
 
4.1. Practice trajectory 
 
The categorisation process and lists produced in section 3.2 do not fully 
specify the trajectory against time and the broader changes in my approach in 
recent years. One key development is that I have moved from a position of 
employing a clown to participate in scenarios directed by me, to one where I 
intervene in the world as a fool of sorts (cf. supra, p.59). These abilities at expert 
idiocy, so to speak, were picked up through observing the professional. In the 
spirit of appropriation, I stole his skillset. 
Secondly, previously I was less inclined to elaborate on the background 
activities involved in obtaining raw materials and creating simupoems. The 
thinking was that the particularities and effort involved in the collecting phase 
would be palpable somehow in the final work. Nor did I want to narrow the 
scope for how work could be experienced by imposing a single narrative. There 
is a danger that any inherent pranksterism becomes the only talking point. 
While defending the idea that art ‘speaks for itself’ (Table 02, point 44 and cf. 
supra, p.130) I have come, now, to see the investigative activity as legitimate to 
communicate about (Table 02, Factor 38). The tension between, being open to 
sharing background stories, and creating work which does not require them to 
be told, may be important in achieving resolution. 
The points made about compartmentalisation in (Table 02, Factor 31) 
hint at another possible course of action. Through being forced to dilute the 
sanctity of designated time periods I became sceptical of the model which 
required complete devotion to a one-dimensional notion of artistic practice. It 
would be interesting to investigate whether a new avant-gardism, or 
challenging modus operandi, might be possible, especially given the 
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relationship between labour and technology now. The opportunity presented 
appears in line what John Roberts was noticing with certain tendencies in art in 
the 1990s: ‘The net effect of this is the further discrediting of the idea of the 
Great Artist; this is the culture of the committed but occasional artist’ (1996b). 
Roberts more recently describes the ‘increasingly reflexive awareness of 
representation and artistic content outside of the professional institutions of 
art… [which] provide an informal culture of artistic production that 
‘nonartistic’ producers participate in and learn from’ (2014, p.1750/6041). What 
if one were to take this process as fact but attempt to invert or misunderstand 
its meaning? Instead of dwelling on the challenges to art institutions, it is 
possible to imagine some difficulty for the world outside when confronted by 
this leakage from those institutional frameworks. It is doubtful whether ABC 
Artists’ Books Cooperative (cf. supra, p.153), would be open to this idea, given its 
orientation towards book fairs and focus on institutional critique, but perhaps 
the subject could be raised there. Or another grouping could be organised, 
which admits to the more radical possibilities inherent in the current conditions 
of art and life. Could participants deny that their ‘day job’, ostensibly mundane 
tasks carried out at home or other ordinary activities, were anything less than 
studio practice? Misinterpretation and deluded readings would be encouraged. 
The strategy differs from those associated with BAVO and other activist artists, 
such as ‘over-identification’ (Boie and Pauwels, 2007), in that here the ambitions 
are not consciously political. No extra production would be necessary: 
individuals would conceptually reappropriate what they already do. Any such 
initiative would need to bear in mind the risks of romanticising labour and 
overvaluing the everyday, in the way that popular culture does by comparison 
with allegedly elitist cultural forms. 
Another directional change is being investigated. By definition 
appropriated data and ‘found’ digital materials, i.e. contemporary readymades, 
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provide a link with the past, but usually the very recent past. Increasingly 
digital archives and less organised sources referring to more distant periods are 
becoming available. Table 02, Factor 15 refers to use of historically significant 
found assets. I supported lead artist Peter Seddon and curator Barry Barker in 
the production of two moving-image works, which appeared in the Musée des 
Beaux Arts, Nîmes in 2007/08 adjacent to Paul Delaroche’s painting Cromwell 
looking at the corpse of Charles 1st in his coffin (Seddon, 2008). By injecting assets, 
relating to historical events and persons of significance (in art, politics or 
technological fields), into a work, and in conflating meaning from different 
periods, untreated linkings between old and new are sometimes discovered. In 
2014 I organised an event at the Silk Museum in Macclesfield to coincide with 
an exhibition of mine entitled From Jacquard to jpeg (cf. supra, p.38) which drew 
attention to the connection between compressed digital image formats and old 
weaving technologies (O’Connell, 2014b). More effort may be put into history-
oriented projects. The notion of artificial stupidity gives permission to pay less 
attention to the usual agendas when revisiting emotionally and politically 
loaded archive materials. 
It was felt necessary in this thesis to defend the right to produce 
simupoems and the reasons why have been given (cf. supra, pp.62-63, 129-130). 
I continue to create these films, which by design are a number of steps removed 
from the search and research activity. Just because some formal limitations have 
been set, does not mean that the works are somehow made to match. One 
challenge, in fact, in creating simupoems is precisely to avoid the complacency 
of succumbing to a style. Raw material for these might come from any ‘project’ 
but appropriation activities of the variety described in section 2.3 (which have 
replaced my interest in designing performances of the type discussed in section 
2.2) are the key source. A number of new initiatives are being worked upon: 
one to do with speed cameras, another which would use satnav and maps apps, 
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and another connected with money flow between bank accounts. From these 
investigations, simupoems, readymades and blatantly descriptive outcomes 
may materialise. 
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4.2. Artificial stupidity’s application to art and the socio-technical 
 
As if to confirm the cogency of the thesis theme, an exhibition of work by 
notable artists, called duh? Art and Stupidity (Bramich, 2015) appeared during 
the final stages of writing. Paul Clinton, who co-curated the show with Anna 
Glitz, had already been guest editor of a special issue of Parallax journal 
devoted to stupidity (2013)71. Coincidently I had noticed No Bra, the electropop 
duo Clinton was one of (Berman, 2007), before knowing of his curatorial and 
academic interests. Their somewhat transgressive act may have lost its import 
for Clinton but queer mixing of other sorts remains evident in his curatorial, 
editorial and research work. The show at Focal Point (Focal Point Gallery, 2016), 
in its extolling of apparently stupid practices, and in its layout – one room, for 
instance, presented visitors with five different moving-image works screening 
simultaneously, all facing in the same direction – provided encounters of an 
unusual order but linked to convention. If fault needed to be found with duh? it 
is that much of this lampooning of the sanctity and aloofness of the art world 
has been done before. BANK collective’s Faxbak (Bedwell, Thompson and 
Russell, 1998; Russell, 2016), an innovativly aggressive reaction to typical 
descriptive and critical commentary or art-speak, which featured in the 
exhibition, is two decades old. It’d be a mistake though to see Clinton’s activity 
only in terms of an antagonism to perceived elitism, because examining 
stupidity - in the way that he, Glitz, the curated artists and Parallax writers have 
done - is contradictory. People can become quite intellectual in their anti-
intellectualism. The collection at Focal Point Gallery and the content of the 
                                                 
71 Articles from the issue of Parallax in question have been referred to elsewhere in the thesis. 
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journal represent an exclusive cultural commitment to the subject72. Their 
stupidity is knowing and artificial. 
A difference with duh?’s emphasis, is that I wish to take account of 
propensities for earnestness and not just irony, comedy, deprecation (Table 02, 
Factor 13). A spectrum of possibilities between the extreme poles of belief and 
cynicism can be imagined. Or one can countenance the simultaneous existence 
of both. 
Secondly, in contrast to duh? and the associated texts, this thesis has not 
been so concerned with identity politics, nor the psychology and social science 
of stupidity. Appendix H interrogates the term ‘artificial stupidity’ more 
comprehensively but the thesis has focused on art practice and the links with 
my interest in the technological landscape, including AI. The writing has been 
informed considerably by past employment which illustrated the uses, but also 
the inadequacies, of scientific modelling and simulation. Anecdotes connected 
with the stupidity of AI occupy me first. The pancake robot fiasco was 
described in chapter 1 (cf. supra, p.43). One does not have to look hard to find 
further amusing or worrying case studies. While participating in Going Digital, a 
doctoral programme run by CHASE, Consortium for Humanities and the Arts 
South-East England (CHASE Going Digital, 2013a), a workshop at the East 
Anglia Film Archive (CHASE Going Digital, 2013b) was illuminating in this 
respect. A senior technician there explained how ‘[i]n digital restoration [of 
film] it is common to use a dust-busting algorithm to remove dirt and dust’ but 
that this occasionally had unexpected effects’ (see e-mail from Peter White, 
appendix G). The technique had removed the rain drops from the movie 
Singing in the Rain! On a more serious note, already referenced, was the air 
                                                 
72 It will surprise few that, compared with the amusements and mini ice rink just outside Focal 
Point Gallery on the day I visited, the free exhibition was poorly attended. Attempting to 
connect with the vernacular does not stop art appearing elitist. 
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traffic emergency caused by bugs, camouflaged due to the sheer quantity of 
code (Appendix I, p.243). In his introduction to AI, Blay Whitby describes a 
potentially disastrous scenario when military specialists were ‘training a neural 
net to recognize pictures containing tanks’ (c2003, pp.57–58). Lastly, at the time 
of concluding this PhD, an article headed ‘Artificial Intelligence fails to beat real 
stupidity’ about a Twitter chatbot which had quickly learned to become 
misogynist and racist, appeared in one of the broadsheets (Whipple, 2016)73. 
An unusual mix of engineering science and artistic impulse informs my 
thinking about intelligence, AI and philosophy. Looked at sequentially, I had 
left technology and industrial systems, for art, but returned to them again, 
armed with alternative modes of reasoning. It would have been natural to align 
with new media practitioners, hackers, net artists, digital activists and 
technology artists, appearing at the likes of Transmediale (Transmediale, 2016), 
Ars Electronica (Ars Electronica, 2016), and championed by groups and venues 
such as Furtherfield in London (Furtherfield, 2016) and Lighthouse in Brighton 
(Lighthouse, 2016). And, to an extent I have done. However, I am uneasy when 
media-oriented criticism appears merely as content (highlighted in Table 02, 
point 10), and that is characteristic of a proportion of the associated work. 
Secondly, at the opposite pole, the frequent unquestioning emphasis on solely 
aesthetic effects is surprising. Thirdly, occasionally, exuberance about new 
technical functionality overwhelms critical thinking (cf. supra, p.46). I was 
attempting to navigate a route which was neither oblivious to these worlds, nor 
seduced by them. Some of my activity resembles institutional critique (cf. supra, 
p.153) though it appears that much of what can be done on that front, has been 
                                                 
73 As well as being due to error, there is the suspicion that ideology and prejudice are somehow 
embedded. It seems that the initial default conditions in the game Sim City are such that 
taxation is applied at the same rate across businesses and all sections of the simulated 
population, reflecting the common real-world media simplification. 
166 
 
done. What is more, pragmatic arguments in defence of institutional formalities 
are easy to list (cf. supra, pp.153-156). A significant difference in approach, 
compared with most digital artists, it my accent on the corporeal. Unlike 
Mishka Henner and Erica Scorti, both of whom I have shared exhibition space 
with, and in contrast with the work of James Bridle and others, who deal with 
the influence of the digital network, visceral elements, mess and bodily 
references are regularly included or inferred (cf. supra, p.93 and Table 02, 
factors 19, 20 & 40). I appreciate Sarah Lucas’ use of eggs, certain work by 
Martin Creed and Paul McCarthy, the references to materiality inherent in Hito 
Steyerl’s montaged films, the fact that Kenneth Goldsmith performs his poems 
and the unpretentious robotic creations of Simon Penny (Penny, 2010) and Paul 
Granjon (Granjon, 2016) which are far removed from sterile clichés of what a 
robot can be. 
The presence of physical mess can be read bluntly as metaphor for an 
intellectual muddying of boundaries, acceptance of fluctuations in 
understanding – as seemingly advocated by the ‘metamodernists’ (Turner, 
2011) - and a corrective for the human propensity to be categorical. Whilst 
reviewing work in this thesis, the approach in confronting key questions has 
been to expand and undermine definitions while remaining conscious of the 
value of the narrow meanings. The necessity of categories but also their 
shortcomings are revealed. Engaging with functional tools, processes and 
bodies of knowledge as though they represented a playground of sorts, serves 
to broaden thinking before sense can be made of probable nonsense. What 
appeared stupid in one circumstance was found to be intelligent for another. 
Feedback loops could be crucial or destructive. Likewise, for feedforward. 
These two concepts are not simply inversely related: feedforward facilitates 
feedback and vice versa. The relationship between platforms, bodies, forms and 
their content revealed itself as not being straightforward either. Form and 
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content can be considered one, or they can be thought of as separate. Similarly, 
code or intelligence can appear inherent to an agent, or as if mapped onto it. 
Representation is problematic and at the same time unavoidable. Performativity 
is advocated against the tendency to model, understand and predict, but - as in 
the feedback-feedforward discussion - both sides of the argument are 
defensible. A conundrum emerges too when memory, history, storage and 
tradition are set up as opposites to action, doing and adapting. And note that 
history can be envisaged as information stored or considered to be intrinsically 
present and evident in current behaviours. Attention was given to the 
significance of distinction-making and the creative acts of systems such as 
autopoiesis. Reproduction can imply giving birth to something identical, i.e. 
duplication, or it can be viewed dialectically: the process of art history is filled 
with new emergences which distinguish themselves as severe reactions to what 
went before. Creative activity can mean undoing existing distinctions and act as 
a remedy to the prospective horrors of entropy, eradication through merging, 
osmosis and their political relatives, complacency and instrumentalisation. The 
possibility of systems which integrate differentiated elements was discussed. 
For harmony it is necessary to evade both the risks of sub-systems merging and 
too-conflictual antagonisms. All of these binary tensions have been teased out 
during the course of discussing practice. Lastly, particular ideas about systems 
thinking and complex systems were proposed which will be returned to in the 
final paragraphs. 
Returning to the social and political usages of ‘stupid’, which have not 
been the main focus of the writing. It is useful to cursorily inquire into them, in 
order to advance an argument which has direct relevance to the thesis. Firstly, it 
is worth saying, that there exists a logical basis for why the word ‘stupid’ is 
problematic. See appendix E which discusses ‘denying the antecedent’. It is 
unlikely that such rationalising explains why careful vocabulary is expected 
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nowadays when commenting on people’s mental aptitudes (though narrow-
minded comprehension of the meaning of exam results is still common). The 
response of my daughter, at the age of eight, to a question on the meaning of 
stupid (appendix C) confirms how the term has become unacceptable. She also 
made a contrary point about it being stupid to call someone stupid, referring to 
the risk of objurgation. And the prospect of schadenfreude is hinted at. Her 
comments reflect a mix, perhaps, of inherent understanding of the illogicality of 
the term and a sense of social pressure not to use it. Given the many objections 
though, what role can, or did, a term like stupid ever play? 
Measurement of intelligence has been, and still ought to be, 
controversial. Avital Ronell, in her weighty discourse on the subject (2002), 
employs the exact phrase ‘artificial stupidity’ (2002, pp.59–60) as exposure of 
what she terms the ‘dreary and terrifying history’ (2002, p.59). Measuring 
intelligence, she asserts, can be a way of ‘undermining an entire class of 
students’ (2002, p.59), of labelling immigrants, and making acceptable terms 
like moron and imbecile (2002, pp.59–60). William Stern’s presumably well-
intended attempt to be objective by inventing the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) in 
1912 (Colman, 2008b) had been adopted by Lewis Terman, an education 
psychologist and prominent eugenicist. Terman’s influence in the US led to 
programmes of forcible sterilisation particularly in California (Larson, 1995, 
pp.32–39). ‘African Americans and foreign immigrants were sterilised at nearly 
twice the rate, per capita, as the general population’ (Larson, 1995, p.38). Ronell 
in turn refers to Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (Ronell, 2002, 
pp.323–324; Gould, 1981). Gould, had, amongst other things, highlighted the 
case of Cyril Burt, a strong advocate of IQ testing in Britain. It is accepted by 
many, that Burt, who influenced the introduction of the Eleven Plus exam in the 
1940s, and was knighted for his contributions in the field of education, had 
falsified his key data (Gould, 1981, p.264). 
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‘”The other is stupid”: this phrasing would characterise one dimension 
of the assertion’, Ronell reminds us (2002, p.39). From ‘stereotyping the Irish as 
wild and uncivilised’ (Judd, 1996) the focus changed in the mid-nineteenth 
century to matters of intellect. It is perhaps no coincidence that the ‘thick 
paddy’ portrayals which persisted until the 1990s74 were instigated by Punch 
magazine in the nineteenth century (Cathcart, 1994) during the infamous 
famine period. Apart from the convenience of jokes as a means of avoiding 
admitting culpability, there may be significance in the caricaturing having 
followed the first wave of emancipatory mass movements75. Women and 
Chartists76 were mocked similarly. Speculatively, the attention shift had 
something to do with the move from physical to mental labour, inevitable with 
the growth of industry. Divisive humour ‘is applied to rhetorically push away 
the “other” and to show that they or their opinions are beyond the pale, of 
common values being invoked’77 (Meyer, 2000, p.327).  
‘Stupid’ may be shorthand for describing alien and potentially 
threatening intelligences then. At the risk of being crass, having touched upon 
the serious human consequences of historical fixations on quantifying 
intelligence: ‘othering’ has certainly been prevalent within the art context. 
Those who laud ‘craft’ and ‘making’ are inclined to ridicule practitioners who 
take and reassemble. Appropriation artists see it as ridiculous to construct 
                                                 
74 The word Irish in fact is still occasionally used to describe ‘a statement or action [which is]: 
paradoxical; illogical or apparently so’ (OED, 2015d). 
75 From the French revolution onwards British power in Ireland was threatened. Various acts, 
attitudes and actions (or in a case of the mid-century famine: inactions) can feasibly be 
interpreted as responses to that rebelliousness. 
76 The period coincided with the rise of Chartism in Britain. Apart from their weight within the 
British working class (Engles, 1845) the Irish were prominent as leaders of the movement, 
exemplified in the political figure Fergus O’Connor. It should be noted that female involvement 
in Chartism was especially scorned in Punch. 
77 Coincidentally with the theme in this paragraph, the phrase ‘beyond the pale’ has its main 
origin as a descriptor for the area outside English and English-Norman rule in Ireland from the 
middle ages onwards. 
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something new in a world already full of stuff. Stuckists confront conceptualists 
(Tate, 2016b) and so on. Returning to technology questions: if there exist good 
reasons for the unacceptability of ‘stupid’ when applied to other human 
groupings, might it be reasonable, or even useful, to be disparaging about the 
apparent intellectual capacities of AI? My practice, after all, is often about 
poking fun at the faultiness of AI, technologies and processes. 
According to Sadie Plant, Ada Lovelace, the prophetess of computing, 
chastised those who too quickly dismissed the possibility that calculating 
machines could acquire independent intelligence: 
 
Research into artificial intelligence (A.I.) has been governed by the 
overriding conviction that any sign of intelligence shown by a machine 
“is to be regarded as nothing more than a reflection of the intelligence of 
its creator,” and developed as a program which might just as well have 
been called artificial slavery or stupidity (1998, p.89). 
 
Lovelace’s thinking was brave and profound for the early nineteenth century. 
Now however it is becoming unorthodox not to join in with apocalyptic 
predictions relating to the power of technology. Fiction prefigured it, but 
contemporary science too presents images of the Frankenstein’s monster 
variety. It would have been ignorant indeed though, not to read Shelley’s 
masterpiece as allegory. Lovelace and Shelley had a loose connection in the 
shape of the, evidently monstrous, Lord Byron, but the appropriate 
interpretations relate to the revolutions of that time: French, industrial, social 
and environmental. Similarly, in addressing the subject of AI, the automatic, 
technological or robotic elements can be thought of as signifiers for overriding 
more nebulous processes. Already, at the beginning of the thesis, licence was 
taken to expand on the definition of intelligence and little was done there to 
distinguish between the human biological and artificial varieties (cf. supra, 
p.35). The potential for technology to programme people was touched upon in 
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response to a question about Contra-Invention in the interview in appendix D 
(p.218). Similar points were made elsewhere in the thesis as wider definings 
emerged (cf. supra, pp.84, 85, 107). ‘Artificial intelligence’ can be stretched to 
include not just ‘[t]he capacity of computers or other machines to exhibit or 
simulate intelligent behaviour…’ (OED, 2016b) but systems and processes of all 
sorts: architectures, customs, rituals and even invented understandings of the 
situation, belief and theory. In one of the Parallax issue articles, Claire 
Colebrook paraphrases arguments of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson as 
follows: humans ‘extend their thought into sophisticated technologies, and yet 
allow that same process of extension to deaden and stupefy the very life it 
initially aimed to preserve’ (2013, p.24). But ‘sophisticated technologies’ do not 
need to be thought of only as tangible. If a wide-ranging conception is accepted, 
then it becomes possible to see the visible interactive elements, almost as 
symbols, for the equally significant bureaucracies and processes which have 
evolved over time. 
The interventions described in section 2.3 reflect my interest in exploring 
the potential for human reaction to these kinds of broadly technological 
concerns. Overlooking social stratification and existing human-human conflict 
is naïve from a political economy standpoint, but, can be a ground for play with 
ideas. Instead of dwelling on the possibility of murderous futuristic robots, 
‘cognitive computing’ destroying jobs (Rotman, 2013) or, worse still, robots 
playing caring roles, it might be useful to recognise what there is now. 
Highlighting the inadequacies, glitches and oversights built into municipal 
processes, supply and delivery systems - illustrated by the mundane 
information which lingers online (Figure 28) - serves to illustrate instead the 
fragility and inherent stupidity of technology. 
Apart from noticing the inevitable imperfections, an aspect of stupidity’s 
etymology includes: ‘[e]motionally or morally dull or insensible; apathetic, 
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indifferent… the characteristic of inanimate things: [d]estitute of sensation, 
consciousness, thought, or feeling’ (OED, 2015f). This definition arose when 
 
 
      Figure 28 Parcel tracking data for repeated delivery attempts and POD signature, 2012 
 
discussing the meaning of silence (cf. supra, p.71) and is referred to in appendix 
H (p. 237). Is intelligent machinery not stupid in precisely this sense? All the 
attempts to convince of authenticity - from vehicles being attributed names and 
imbued with human qualities, to ATM machines which thank their users, to 
technological simulation of affect and even Boston Dynamics’ robots (Atlas, The 
Next Generation, 2016) – are, so far, hearteningly pathetic. The infrastructure, 
sometimes visible, sometimes not, exerts control, but it is, one could say, 
pathologically lacking in empathy. Anxiety about the simulation of affect has 
been touched upon (cf. supra, pp.32, 85) but perhaps there is a fundamental 
reason why the ‘emotional intelligence’ (Goleman, 2004; Chapman, 2005), it has 
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become fashionable to encourage, remains impossible to model78. Referring 
specifically to care-bots recently, ‘Prof [Margaret] Boden said it was unlikely 
that technology would ever succeed in matching the complexity of the human 
brain’ (Knapton, 2016). 
A more obscure point about the stupidity of AI connects with No Bra’s 
scorn for one-upmanship expressed in their Munchausen (No Bra, 2006). 
Exaggerating about experience, ‘name dropping’ or claiming to know what one 
does not, are behaviours characterised as ‘pretentious’. And is artificial 
intelligence not almost a synonym for pretentiousness? AI pretends to know. 
People, found guilty of such, are usually identified, not as being worldly wise, 
nor articulate, but stupid. 
Appreciation of the significance of other agents within a network has 
been advocated (cf. supra, p.98) and the cybernetics philosophy certainly aligns 
with such thinking. It would be a worrying situation though, if the ethics 
applied in human relations, were soon to be extended to machine intelligence79. 
A degree of condescension still identifies the significance of technology (by 
comparison with inert matter) though. Is there not a new case for exploring 
human exceptionalism within this network? Donna Haraway issued the 
reminder that ‘[w]e can be responsible for machines; they do not dominate or 
threaten us’? ‘We are responsible for boundaries…’ she said (2007, p.315)? 
  
                                                 
78 Nick Flynn for instance writes of ‘the immensity of the task’ of building emotional intelligence 
into the justice system which he asserts would require ‘nothing less than a complete 
reconfiguration of emotional and intelligent life’ (2014, p.365). 
79 Though science fiction continues to pose exactly these kinds of questions, most recently in a 
chilling episode of Black Mirror (White Christmas, 2014). 
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4.3. Artificial stupidity and the art system 
 
According to the text on Focal Point’s website, ‘artists have repeatedly 
drawn upon stupidity, or playing stupid, as a form of dissidence, irreverence or 
as a means to cast off received thinking’ (Focal Point Gallery, 2016). This 
proposal gels with my philosophy of what artistic action is: the key phrase 
being ‘playing stupid’. With reference to BANK (cf. supra, p.242) and similar 
John Roberts had already written of a ‘thinking stupidity’ (1996b): 
 
there is the unthinking stupidity of the philistine who sees his or her 
rejection of the dominant discourses of modern art as univocally true, 
and the thinking stupidity of the philistine who sees the rejection of the 
dominant discourses of art as a matter of ethical positioning. 
 
Towards the end of his book on errors he states: ‘I am not advocating passivity 
or stupidity as modes of enlightenment – although acting stupid… has its 
occasional diagnostic and corrective moments of lucidity’ (2011, p.248). Artists, 
he elaborates ‘may spout nonsense, or make fools of themselves with impunity 
and in good faith across aesthetic reason and non-aesthetic reason’ (2011, p.249). 
Artists clearly exploit artificial stupidity then. Is the concept useful in 
describing the things, performances and appropriations which are still labelled 
art though? Appendix A discusses Glenn Ligon’s installation as a system of 
sorts. In section 2.3.3, a cybernetics of Hunt and Darton’s Café (cf. supra, p.107) 
and my work Worn Outing was posited. Both these performative interventions 
appear robust and capable of navigating through geographies of space and 
time. Other works, some physical, some not, were referred to similarly. When 
discussing Richard Pryor’s influence, it was proposed that anything or any 
coherent set of connected data could be considered a system (appendix A, 
p.204). Whether something is art or not, is a purely epistemological question. 
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Given what we have said then, artworks, can be characterised as systems. They 
are, by definition, artificial but are artworks stupid? To be reckoned so, they 
would need to be seen, but, for the most part, contemporary and post-
conceptual artworks are not discernible, except within the art system. About her 
sculptures, Sarah Lucas says that ‘other people don’t pay a lot of attention’ to 
‘formally what kind of object it is’ (Freedman, 2007, p.142) though she believes 
‘the public does like art’, adding crucially: ‘they enjoy having a go at it” 
(Freedman, 2007, p.143). In reviewing a particular work by Goat Island 
Performance Group (Goat Island, 2009), Jane Blocker states that ‘[t]he 
contemporary is, by nature, stupid’ (2013, p.10). On those occasions when 
attention is focused on contemporary artefacts, such as the annual ritualistic 
outcry surrounding Britain’s Turner Prize, the lampooning can be substantial. 
The works are made to appear stupid. 
With reference to ‘the idea of Richard Pryor’ as a system just mentioned, 
the citing of complexity theory (appendix A, p.204), the potential for ‘imagined 
feedback loops’ (appendix A, p.205), Caroline Bassett’s remarks about fuzzy 
cybernetics (cf. supra, p.27), her highlighting the possibility of definitions being 
too hygienic (cf. supra, p.55), and the empirical nature of SD modelling (cf. 
supra, pp.54-56): I am advocating flexible, open, less stable, and even 
speculative applications of system theory. Niklas Luhmann’s treatment of Art as 
a Social System (2000) has been a major influence. However, as implied in the 
discussion on in section 3.1 (cf. supra, pp.135-136), his seeming insistence on 
functional systems’ lack of interference with each other, does not sit completely 
comfortably with the proposal above. 
Luhmann was not dealing with questions of intelligence either but 
motives have been hinted at for why art (as a system) would benefit from 
appearing stupid (from the point of view of other systems). In being seen as 
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harmless80, it profits from the kind of mystique which surrounded the idiot 
savant or court fool of old (cf. supra, pp.79, 96) and the deep affection which 
existed for Rabelais’ ’clowning wisely (en folastrant sagement)’ (Bakhtin, 1984, 
p.60). Special freedoms may be granted artists (cf. supra, p.153), and just as self-
induced stupidity can lead to individual discoveries, the system benefits from 
being able to creatively transform itself. Even though a social system is not 
simply the sum of its human parts (cf. supra, p.137), art can achieve these ends 
just as individual artists would: by refusing to reveal all its secrets, through 
silence, obfuscation and codes, misusing elements from other functional 
systems and wasting time on apparently meaningless production. 
Stupidity alone would not be enough because stupidity is dangerous and 
the system would be putting itself at risk. Art hands over a proportion of its 
output, in the form of objects or ideas of value, to other functional systems81. 
Andrew Pickering intimates that art may be a force for good (cf. supra, p.83), it 
is often considered vital, while others question that (cf. supra, p.135). Ideas 
generated through artistic production are now accepted as academic research. It 
is feasible that, along with the links to critical thinking and activism, artistic 
output influences entrepreneurialism and feeds capitalistic innovation. 
Undoubtedly, especially endorsed artefacts are used to store wealth in the 
manner of gold, giving rise to an art market. In addition, exhibitions, 
performances and artistic practices are commandeered for governmental 
objectives or as part of regeneration exercises. Art is valued for therapeutic 
                                                 
80 It might be argued that art is only tolerated when it is politically unchallenging. A more 
convincing source of the need to play the fool, already highlighted (cf. supra, p.133) – which 
inspired art’s ‘ironization, belittlement, adulteration’ and triggered the ‘deflationary logic’ - is 
1917. That year brought with it Duchamp’s Fountain and also the Russian Revolution (Roberts, 
2015, pp.66–67). 
81 Lewis Hyde’s dealings with the notions of Trickster (2008) and The Gift (1988) would appear to 
map, respectively, onto the two characteristics being attributed to the art system here: artificial 
stupidity and gift giving. 
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purposes or it can entertain. Its infrastructure is often shared with other 
functional systems. No cynicism is intended in these sentences. As Luhmann 
puts it: ‘a self-oriented art system searches for "supporting contexts" that leave 
enough room for its own autonomy and its own choices’ (2000, p.159). The 
proposal here is that art survives by cannily alternating between pretend idiocy 
and gift-giving to other functional systems such as academia, commerce and 
politics. That is not to say that every artist operates in this way, though in the 
past century and with the influence of popular culture, they often have. 
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4.4. Conclusions: contribution to knowledge 
 
What has the ‘contribution to knowledge’ been? The period of PhD 
research provided an opportunity for the relationship between my artistic 
activities and the techo-industrial landscape to be articulated. The invention 
and application of the term artificial stupidity is the first contribution to 
knowledge. I use the notion in three ways: i) as an expression of the 
dysfunctional aspects of AI, ii) as a description of something fundamental to the 
creative process and, iii) as a portrayal of how art as a system operates in 
relation to other functional systems. Additional applications of the term are 
touched upon in the dissertation and listed in appendix H. Secondly, the body 
of practice outcomes itself constitutes a contribution to knowledge. The art 
works, though precedents exist, are original and have been endorsed as such by 
a wider community. Undoubtedly, a reason for the originality, is that the link 
between systems and engineering concepts, and performance-oriented artistic 
practice, is an unusual one. In addition, I have been able to draw conclusions 
which are pertinent to technological spheres, and systems thinking, as well as 
art. The argument that processes of all sorts, which extend outside 
computational hardwares, and whose origins precede computing, are 
analogous to the frequently discussed algorithms, and warrant equivalent 
critical attention, is a third contribution to knowledge. I imply that there isn’t 
something more to worry about with AI, and that warnings about futuristic 
genocidal robots and so on are a distraction from the more urgent matter of 
complacency about less perceptible codes, processes and systems. Fourthly – 
and this is connected with the third use of the term artificial stupidity, point iii 
above - a position is adopted which is somewhere between Niklas Luhmann’s 
insistence that systems do not control each other and John Roberts’ promotion 
of the continuing relevance of an avant-garde. The latter’s arguments must 
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imply a radical political role for art whereas Luhmann would almost deny that 
possibility. In my scheme, systems can and do influence each other but they are 
robust enough to maintain their sovereignty. A cautious defence of art’s 
separation from other systems is made then, but not to the extent that Luhmann 
argues. I speculate that art is a system which maintains its autonomy because it 
appears ‘stupid’ from the perspective of other systems but that it is, 
inadvertently, occasionally functionally useful to these systems. In addition, 
and fifthly, I advocate for flexible and pragmatic applications of systems theory 
rather than seeing ontological truth as their underlying basis. Complexity 
theory calls for such an approach and the empirical usages, frequently made for 
industrial and commercial purposes, amount to additional evidences in support 
of this argument. Along with these five areas, new ground is broken on other 
fronts, either by default, or as side effect. A practice-led research methodology, 
which partially defends an act-first-think-later approach, is established. In other 
words, artificial stupidity is made use of as research technique. Art practice is 
shown firstly to be a valuable means of producing concepts but then practice 
can be woven into the development stages of a research project too. A way of 
interrogating dichotomies and concepts of importance, such as intelligence 
versus stupidity, representation and embodiment, feedback and feedforward, 
the contemporary emphases on performative ontology, distinction making in 
opposition to entropic processes and so on, evolved in the course of the writing. 
Definitions and oppositions are undermined and expanded upon but 
reembraced again, in order to assert their true usefulness while remaining 
aware of potential limitations. The problematics of representation, realism and 
the significance of photography in this regard is something I intend to 
investigate further in the future. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A  Glenn Ligon’s Live (2014) 
 
Live, an installation by New York artist Glenn Ligon (Anon, 2014), acted 
as a guinea pig to test my assertion that feedback loop theories, and the concept 
of ‘artificial stupidity’, were useful frames for discussing art. Interrogating one 
piece of work by an established contemporary artist, and drawing on other 
knowledge, provided a method for treating my set of post-conceptual practices. 
Ligon’s piece connects with my past research into the import of comedic 
performance, and the significance of the joke. An interview with comedian 
Stephen Carlin (Burgess, 2010) who had been asked to visit the installation, 
which informed the writing, is contained in appendix B. 
Ligon had worked with original footage of iconic stand-up, Richard 
Pryor in action. Aspects of a video recording of the comedian’s 1982 
performance, Live on Sunset Strip, were presented via multi-screen installation. 
A total of seven screens and projections, of varying size, positioned or hung at 
different heights, facing inwards or flush with the walls, (Figure 29, p.200) 
replayed moments from the famous one-hour performance. At any point a 
number of screens remained blank while others were active, showing either 
cropped or full frame sections of the same segment of raw material. Crucially 
the installation was silent. Removal of the soundtrack, i.e. joke content and 
responding laughter, intensified the focus on Pryor’s dissected body in action, 
his gestures, hand and arm movements, the lips, face, teeth and crotch area, and 
also his shadow on stage, while he delivered the legendary routine. Stephen 
Carlin describes the room in his words in appendix B (p.207). 
The impact of having groups of screens switch off at unpredictable 
intervals (no pattern was immediately apparent) while others remain active 
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was: a) to deny the possibility of meditating for too long in any one position; b) 
to reduce the emotional impact and the scope for typically empathetic, perhaps 
even pitying or tearful responses; and c) to prevent over-analysis of the 
performer’s methods. In reality all three possibilities for meditation, emotion 
and analysis were inevitable to a degree, they were surely intended in fact, but 
the timings and configuration were such that complacency or the possibility of 
being stupefied by the experience, were ruled out. Instead of spectacularity and 
seductiveness, associations easily made with installations by Bill Viola and 
Pipilotti Rist respectively; Live evoked a feeling of unease, not unlike the 
awkwardness experienced when a comedian falters in their mission to incite 
laughter and ‘dies’ on stage. This skewed link with the stand-up comedy format 
supplemented others, not least the evocation of ‘comic timing’ interpretable in 
the switching on and off of screens. Participant-spectators entering Live were 
kept on their toes, compelled to act, move or turn around. Noticeably some left 
the room and returned again (see appendix B, p.207). Ligon’s creation is 
Brechtian in that awareness of the reality of the situation is heightened at the 
expense of easy escapism. Live is loaded in terms of intertextual references. The 
layout of screens defied usual expectations, though that is not uncommon with 
media art and there are other precedents. Not long before, I had seen a major 
Kazimir Malevich retrospective at London’s Tate Modern, which included a 
reconstruction of his 1915 Last Futurist Exhibition of Paintings (Shatskikh, 2014). 
Though the historical situation was radically different, the arrangement was 
analogous. The focused intimacy generated by Samuel Beckett in Not I (1973) is 
brought to mind too, but Ligon’s subject matter and the significance of colour, 
including skin colour, activates other levels of poignancy. 
While race questions, the issue of bigotry and the recent historical 
condition and experience of African Americans, are not uncommon subject 
matter for Glenn Ligon, the reasons are firstly simply because that is his milieu, 
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Figure 29 Glenn Ligon installation: Call and Response Camden Arts Centre, 2014-15. Photo: Valerie Bennett 
 
the ordinary backdrop for someone born in 1960 in The Bronx. With reference 
to the arguments of Richard Dyer (1996, pp.1–14), attention would not be given 
to a white artist’s dealing solely with ‘white’ topics. So ideally it would be 
possible to escape the cliché of focusing on questions of race when considering 
this work. Interestingly however Ligon does not allow that line to be taken here 
either. The exhibition as a whole, Call and Response, encouraged engagement 
with questions of ethnicity, culture (and gender) if only as a means of 
permitting the viewer/participant to get that over with and appreciate what else 
had been created. There was no discernible message nor overtly political 
objective. Live and the other pieces in this exhibition did not ‘preach’ and clearly 
not out of fear of being explicit. Nor did the results appear pretentious in the 
way that deliberate vagueness or conscious attempts to avoid didacticism can. 
The reductive processes of subtraction and dissection permitted new kinds of 
201 
 
meaning to surface. A similar technique was developed with respect to the 
looping animations I call ‘simupoems’ (O’Connell, 2016b). Efficacious 
combining of something which is loaded both emotionally and politically with 
what might be called aesthetic concerns, is Ligon’s great achievement. One of 
composer Steve Reich’s scores was incorporated directly into another work at 
the exhibition, Blues, and the minimalist’s material was the basis for the content 
of a third room at the exhibition also. The links are no surprise when Reich’s 
Different Trains (Metheny, 1990) is considered, a composition which responded 
to the darkest episode in human history82. Poetry was possible after Auschwitz83 
and Ligon positions himself squarely as one of those who can and should be 
able to face this kind of intensity. 
Taking Richard Pryor out of context, selecting elements of the prior 
recording and eliminating the comedian’s ‘material’ freed-up other forces, 
which is not to say that the thing was ‘open-ended’ in Nicholas Bourriaud’s 
designation, and as critiqued by Claire Bishop (2004, pp.53, 60, 68–69, 72). 
Rather than providing satisfying, but one-dimensional, moments of comedic 
entertainment Live felt like something that ‘approaches the status of humour’ 
(Dennett, Adams and Hurley, 2011, p.280). English professor Stephen Booth 
argues that the 'ideation pun' or 'almost-pun' was crucial in Shakespeare’s 
writing (ibid.). Or sensations associated with being tickled or amused may be 
experienced simultaneously with opposing effects, so that they fuse together or 
repel each other and produce a more complex result. Pryor himself, a twentieth 
century clown, was entertaining but provocative, political yet nihilistic, 
                                                 
82 Reich’s work mixes materials from experiences of his own boyhood travels by rail across the 
USA between the households of divorced parents with references to the trains carrying Jewish 
people and others to the concentration camps during the Nazi regime. 
83 It should be remembered that Theodore Adorno who is credited with the famous phrase ‘no 
poetry after Auschwitz’ later corrected and partially retracted his statement (Adorno, 1973, 
pp.362–363). 
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represented simultaneously underdog and high-status figure and embodied 
other inconsistencies connected with the hegemonic structure of his time 
including those related to sanity and intelligence. 
A word might be said about comedy here. At first sight it would appear 
that to entertain others and make them laugh requires a ‘theory of mind’. The 
mentally unwell, those deemed ‘simple’ or unintelligent were laughed at 
though. Bigotry can be a factor. Through simply making a mistake or behaving 
unusually a person may inadvertently amuse others and unwittingly become 
the butt of jokes. Infants are often on the receiving end of an endearing version 
of this ‘laughter at’. Through trial and error, a person may discover how to 
make others laugh, without presupposing how they think. Stephen Carlin 
alludes to the skills involved (appendix B). Presumably though, learning 
through feedback would lead the joke-teller to refine empirical models over 
time. To be consistent, a comedian like Richard Pryor would surely have had to 
develop more profound insights while perfecting his craft. This is the enigma 
with comedic performance. Incongruously, appearing the fool can be judged 
brilliant. For many Pryor was a genius, and that reputation is amplified by the 
knowledge of his having come from poverty, succeeded against the odds and 
not overtly resorted to undignified ‘Uncle Tom’ strategies. As noted, Ligon 
switched off the sound; all that was left were the performer’s silent movements. 
The content, Pryor’s acute observations formed into jokes, the evidence of his 
intelligence, were not available and thus he appeared vulnerable. Passers 
through the installation were denied the possibility of being able to attribute 
either of the extreme categories, genius or idiot, and instead were worked upon 
by formal and knowingly aesthetic arrangements: the repeated dynamics, the 
fabulous colour of Pryor’s suit in contrast to the surround, rectangular 
compositions, the low resolutions and painterly effects, the oddly seductive and 
yet dissonant musical qualities of the work. Not only that but ironically we 
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were left wondering, or trying to remember, or paying more attention to the 
words that would have been and realising the significance of ‘content’. 
The original Richard Pryor performance was not documented in 1982 
with the expectation that it would be treated like an archaeological specimen or 
utilised as Ligon has. Understanding of that event now has been modified by 
subsequent related events. We can only hypothesize as to whether Pryor 
himself unconsciously wondered about how he would be seen by posterity. 
Even if he had been concerned, any attempt to foresee would have been highly 
tentative. Feedforward, the utilisation of prior knowledge, models, 
representations, memory and ‘intuition’ in forecasting, despite centuries of 
scientific endeavour, is a poor mechanism in complicated situations and for 
determining long-term perspectives. This insuperability in looking ahead does 
not mean that there is no future for whatever entity or system is under 
consideration though. And why should an agglomeration of knowledge not be 
seen as system, robust enough to survive and not be altered to the point of 
destruction through feedback? Feedback allows systems - and here Richard 
Pryor and also a particular event in 1982 are being treated as such - to navigate 
into the future. Feedback, to cite Andrew Pickering, is ‘a mode of performative 
engagement with the world’ (2011, p.19), a means of ‘getting along with… 
systems that can always surprise us’ (2011, p.23). Feedforward and feedback 
play off each other so that bodies of knowledge which are generated and 
changed through navigation in space and time - systems or entities in their own 
right - not only steer a course of their own but spawn offspring in a process 
called ‘autopoiesis’ (Luhmann, 2000, pp.49–50). The suggestion here is a kind of 
hierarchical and overlapping cybernetics where systems contain systems and 
systems give birth to systems. For this several kinds of memory are necessary, 
and these too will be dynamic in nature. Richard Pryor can be seen as still living 
then, giving even more significance to the title of Ligon’s work; the performer 
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emits signals from beyond the grave as it were and is transmuted by 
information flowing back. Ligon is part of the interference. He has taken Pryor, 
filtered, dissected and reworked him so that the world has an updated version 
of the system, object, concept, or (controversially perhaps) brand, to deal with. 
The argument here is in tune with the advanced system thinking and 
cybernetics, proposed in the light of complexity theory (Walby, 2003), though I 
am advocating purely epistemological applications. The title of the show, Call 
and Response, can be interpreted perhaps literally as referring to meta-level 
feedback circuits operating over historical timescales. Looked at in this way, 
what is called art then, is very much involved in the making of history, and not 
just its own. 
Removing the soundtrack meant that the original joke output was 
silenced but, so also was the responding audience laughter. Laughter is 
contagious apparently. People laugh simply because others are doing so 
(Provine, 1996, 2000, p.45) and that second trigger was not present in Live either. 
Ligon’s exercise in deletion, segmentation, and reconfiguration allowed for 
concentration on other facets of, and for new responses to, the performance. 
Richard Pryor though silent in more ways than one - he’d died in 2005 - was 
able to speak to visitors here. These passers-through though constituted an 
active live audience for the dead comedian. 
Also in 2005, I supported the collective Common Culture (Durden and 
Campbell, 2015) with a project of theirs entitled Local Comic. Stand-up 
comedians were hired to perform, but sadistically perhaps in an empty venue; 
empty that is except for the presence of two video cameras which recorded 
them. A variety of experiences were disclosed by the comedians afterwards. 
They’d been asked to complete their ‘set’ and then carry on for as long as 
possible. Despite the lack of tangible feedback, in the shape of laughter or boos, 
some felt they’d done well, others were dissatisfied and a few commented that 
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they’d ‘died on stage’. Most were fatigued by their efforts as if after a real show. 
The practised professionals had been able to imagine an audience, or seen the 
cameras as portals to one, and thus overcome the invented obstacles. Most felt 
they’d learnt from the ordeal. One or two were angry afterwards. The initiative 
raised questions, as did Live, about the comparability of imagined feedback 
loops with ‘real’ ones. The implication is that things can change endogenously 
and that even a ‘closed system’ is not a stagnant one. Our knowledge of Richard 
Pryor changes with time irrespective of what Richard Pryor had done before 
and regardless of Glenn Ligon’s more recent re-presenting. 
The apparently stupid act of deliberately eliminating elements in active 
circuits or tinkering with processes like Ligon and Common Culture do, can 
bring unintended benefits or increase understanding, much in the way stress-
testing or HAZOP studies (Kletz, 1992) are used to improve industrial systems. 
Andrew Pickering used Flann O’Brien’s fictional magic mangle (O’Brien, 2007, 
pp.109–113) which was able to stretch light (2007, p.112) as metaphor in his 
book on ‘the nature of scientific, mathematical, and engineering practice and 
the production of scientific knowledge’ (University of Chicago, 2016; Pickering, 
1995, p.21,23). In other ordinary ways an installation like Live can have practical 
value. By coincidence Stephen Carlin had become interested in the importance 
of non-verbal communication so the experience with Ligon’s work appeared of 
direct relevance. ‘I wish I’d seen that when I started stand-up actually. I found it 
very interesting from a technical point of view’ (appendix B, p.207). Common 
Culture however were not evaluating features of popular culture with a view to 
improving the entertainment experience or helping professional entertainers. 
To state that errors are ‘portals of discovery’  (Ratcliffe, 2015a) is quite different 
to the usual adage about learning from mistakes. It is not normally the aim of 
artists who mess with systems and tamper or hack existing designs, to improve 
their functionality, ameliorate problems, generate academic research papers or 
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make propaganda about the amount of surveillance. Ultimately, meaning is 
revealed or a discovery is made in relation to the art order, its history and 
references. 
I have employed similar methods of subtraction often, notably in the 
creation of two works (simupoems) Dying and Sinking in 2006 (2014d). Dying is 
a looping animation which uses a found recording of Winston Churchill telling 
a joke about his own mortality. The responding laughter was edited out. For 
Sinking segments from an audio track, and other components of an installation, 
were removed until all that remained was ‘canned laughter being played back 
in a darkish theatre-like space containing rows of seats organised diagonally’ 
(O’Connell, 2014d). A key link between my work of this type, Glenn Ligon’s 
Live and Common Culture’s Local Comic, is that the subject matter relates to 
comedians, joke telling and laughter. Jokes are extreme examples of pared 
down language: the craft of comedy writing has everything to do with 
subtraction too. If the comedy entertainment situation itself can be modelled as 
a feedback loop then Live, Local Comic, Sinking and Dying are dysfunctional 
versions, but all four of the works are consistent with criteria of concern to the 
art system. Jokes are devices of interruption just as new artworks are with 
respect to previous: they seem to fit with what Niklas Luhmann says about 
artworks in that the ‘viewer can follow the directives for adequate observation 
embedded in the work's own formal decisions’ (2000, p.76). 
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Appendix B  Interview with Stephen Carlin about Live 
 
The following is an edited version of an interview conducted with professional 
stand-up comedian Stephen Carlin (2014), just after he had spent some time in 
Glenn Ligon’s installation Live (Camden Arts Centre, 2014): 
MOC: Describe what you saw. How would you describe the experience? 
SC: Basically there were various screens showing a comedy performance, 
a stand-up comedy performance by Richard Pryor. There was no 
sound so it was just visual. Each of the screens seemed to be zoomed 
in on a different part of it. For example, one screen showed a close-up 
of his mouth and one showed his left hand, a close-up on that one, and 
his right hand. Others showed his body without his head. 
They seemed to be coordinated, i.e. that it was showing the same 
moment in time from different angles. Some of them had a jerky effect. 
I was curious about how they achieved that. I don’t know if that had 
been imposed upon the film later on.  
Basically the screens came on, I was trying to work out the sequence of 
them as well, what sort of sequence because they weren’t all on all the 
time. I found it interesting. I’ll tell you what, I’ve been watching stand-
up with the sound down recently because I have been focusing on 
body language a bit and facial expressions and that kind of thing. 
MOC: Oh really? That’s a coincidence. 
SC: I wish I’d seen that [Live] when I started stand-up actually. I found it 
very interesting from a technical point of view but then I’m not 
coming at it as a layman in that sense. 
MOC: I was going to ask you how you felt or how you feel about it? 
SC: My attention dipped in and out a bit. I engaged with it and then I’d 
get distracted a bit in my own head and then I’d come back to it. I 
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wonder if audiences do that when they’re watching a comedian 
anyway, that you’re not with them. 
MOC: Yes, I mean a one-hour show is quite a long time so presumably 
people- 
SC: I mean there was one moment where I worked out, he [Richard Pryor 
in the film footage] said, ‘Fuck you,’ or something and I could see that 
very clearly but I wasn’t trying to work out what he was saying at any 
point. 
MOC: That’s interesting. 
SC: I was really watching the stage craft. 
MOC: Was there any emotional impact? 
SC: Yes, I mean it didn’t feel good. I don’t know. I felt in some ways a bit 
disconnected from it because I essentially don’t know what he’s 
saying and you couldn’t always see all of him. I felt in some ways a bit 
left out and alienated from him. 
MOC: What do you think Glenn Ligon, the artist, was trying to do? I mean 
you’re not necessarily thinking about it from a ‘contemporary art’ 
point of view, you’re thinking about it as a comedian but maybe you 
can speculate. 
SC: Possibly that different people take away different things from the 
same performance, that they see different things from the same 
performance, that there’s different elements in the performance. I was 
very conscious of watching his hands. He’d be gesturing with one 
hand and the other hand holding the mic stand or whatever. 
MOC: I mean it’s peculiar in a way because that record of the performance, 
which you can buy on DVD - it’s not on YouTube; there’s bits and 
pieces. I mean ironically there’s an album for sale which is just the 
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audio. It’s ludicrous in a way. It wasn’t intended to be used in this 
way. What was created for one purpose might be used in another way. 
SC: Yes. 
MOC: I was going to ask you, is this of any interest to comedians, and you’ve 
answered that partly already because you yourself have been looking 
at silent versions of other comedians. 
SC: Yes, I’ve started doing it, particularly if it’s a set or a comedian I 
haven’t seen, watching the first five minutes with the sound down. 
I’ve no idea what they’re talking about and then watching it again just 
to see what they’re then talking about. 
MOC: Because there are physical comedians, aren’t there, that are really 
openly energetic? A fundamentalist view of stand-up comedy is that 
it’s about very little movement though. 
SC: Yes. Well I mean I did a gig on Thursday and this woman said at the 
end: ‘You had great presence because you were very still.’ I think 
that’s just the experience of being comfortable on stage. I wouldn’t 
even think about that or know how to go about doing that. I don’t 
know if it’s about being very still. It’s probably an economy of 
movement, where you move, it has a certain purpose and it’s not 
aimless.  
I mean I find, he’s not a comedian obviously, Mark E. Smith 
compelling to watch as a performer because he seems to a) not give a 
shit about the audience and b) have such an absence of traditional 
performance skills that it’s actually compelling- 
MOC: Apparently he’s learning to sing. 
SC: I don’t know how that will affect his acting, taking a new direction. 
MOC: I mean I’ve seen him go off stage and completely disappear with the 
mic for ages while the band continues to play. He knocks on the 
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drums and interferes with the keyboard playing. Ted Chippington 
used to perform at Fall gigs, didn’t he? Have you ever seen Ted 
Chippington? 
SC: I gigged with him once and I do have a boxset of his stuff. I must 
admit I haven’t listened to all of it but yes. 
MOC: I was going to ask you again whether it was difficult, boring or 
interesting in some way to visit the installation. 
SC: It’s definitely interesting. 
MOC: Is it challenging to walk into something like that? 
SC: At moments difficult I think. I didn’t find it boring but funnily I didn’t 
want to leave it. I could have stayed in there for a lot longer. 
MOC: That’s an interesting thing to say because I think it does suck people 
back in, doesn’t it? It seems to seduce people in some way apparently 
because there seem to be puzzles to solve. 
SC: I think so. 
MOC: What are the patterns you noticed? What’s the routine? 
SC: It’s when you can see something and you can’t quite – I don’t know if 
you’ve seen the film ‘JFK’ but there’s a scene where it’s in the 
Pentagon and it’s a conspiracy theory about Kennedy’s death. 
There’s some high guy and his name plate on his desk is just slightly 
out of focus. You’re squinting to see but obviously you can’t because 
it’s the way the camera is. It’s actually the fact that it’s almost there 
and I just can’t quite read it. 
MOC: Well I guess there’s a big difference between let’s say entertainment 
and comedy and that kind of approach [Ligon’s]. Deliberately 
stopping short on satisfaction isn’t something that is common in the 
stand-up comedy world. I think Ted Chippington does it actually, 
hence his failure commercially and all sorts of other ways. 
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Stuart Lee doesn’t do it to the same degree. There is only so far you 
can take that, isn’t there? 
SC: You would think that having more views of it would give you a 
bigger picture and actually I felt the opposite: that it was getting 
further away from me. I couldn’t keep track of it because it felt like 
there were various things going on at once. Of course there always is 
but I didn’t have such a coherent view of the whole performance. 
MOC: Interestingly the piece is called ‘Live’ and maybe part of the point is to 
really let you know that this is very different from live. In fact, all that 
footage gives you something which is precisely not close, you’re not 
close to that individual. Maybe it’s quite multi-layered 
SC: Yes… Well I suppose a comedian’s trick is to make them [audience 
members] feel that you are close to them, you’ve got an affinity, you 
do share something of their world and you understand them and they 
understand you. 
MOC: It is a trick, right? 
SC: Yes, but there [in the installation Live] you feel away from that. 
MOC: It’s potentially a reminder of the truth of the situation, that you’re not 
actually meeting that person on a human level. I mean there’s 
something about live performance that is not direct. Hundreds of 
people on one side, one person on the other, it’s not as if that’s 
intimate. 
SC: Well you must have had that84 where somebody comes up to you after 
a gig and immediately assumes they already know you. The way you 
would have that normal introduction to somebody you’ve never met 
before, they’ve skipped a few levels. There’s a familiarity that they 
                                                 
84 For a period I performed as a stand-up comedian. 
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have with you that you don’t reciprocate at all and it feels odd. You 
have to learn to deal with that. 
MOC: I was shocked by that actually. I mean I only did it for two and a half 
years but I had 10-minutes at The Comedy Store once and it didn’t go 
very well. In fact, the example was at the opposite extreme. I was 
sitting at the bar, because I always liked to watch the other acts. Daniel 
Kitson was on as the headline act after me.  
Before, it was in the interval, I heard two people saying, ‘That Irish 
guy was shit, wasn’t he?’ I was right next to them. It was quite funny 
because they didn’t recognise me. Even though I was dressed the 
same and, five minutes before, I’d been on stage in front of them. They 
just didn’t see me in the same way.  
Also I noticed that if you’ve got a low status character, people 
presume you’re some sort of idiot, which is really embarrassing with 
people pitying you or, if it goes well, thinking you’re some sort of 
genius, which is equally problematic. 
SC: Yes. Well I mean Kitson I assume gets that, people- 
MOC: Think he’s some sort of- 
SC: Genius, that he doesn’t have ‘feet of clay’. 
MOC: Yes. I think I’ll stop the recording there. It [the mobile handset with 
Dictaphone app] nicely ran out of steam.  
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Appendix C  Comments by eight-year-old about the term ‘stupid’ 
 
The following is Betty O’Connell-Rogers’ response to the request ‘Write down 
what you know about stupid’ (O’Connell-Rogers, 2012): 
 
Let’s say you said “you are stupid” to someone. It can be very nasty and 
it means you are really annoying or you’re rubbish at something. It can 
make people very upset. I would say the person who said it, is stupid, 
because they get in trouble if the other person tells. Sometimes people 
make mistakes and someone [observing that] says you are stupid. They 
say that because they think it’s [i.e. some task or question is] easy but it’s 
not easy to the other person. 
 
Usually people who say to someone else that they are stupid, they sort of 
laugh or smile when they do it. They’d say something like “Oh that’s 
easy: you don’t know how to do that.” 
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Appendix D  Interview on UCC 98.3 FM’s Artbeat 
 
The following is a transcript of an interview by Don O’Mahony (Artbeat, 2012) 
broadcast during an exhibition at CIT Wandesford Quay Gallery, Cork City, 
Ireland (Wandesford Quay Gallery, 2012): 
DOM: Currently running at the Wandesford Quay Gallery is Boundary Work 
II, a solo show by Cork-born artist Micheál O’Connell. He’s based over 
in Brighton. I spoke to him at the opening of the show, but he will be 
returning next Tuesday for an artist talk followed by a Q&A session at 
next Tuesday, at 5.30pm. 
 To return to the interview we did with him last month. He operates 
under the name Mocksim and I first wondered; what does Mocksim 
mean? 
MOC: Simply a moniker that I’ve used, initially online as a kind of user-
name. It’s not an attempt to create something to hide behind. I make 
interchanges between that and my name Micheál O’Connell. I guess 
you get that in the world don’t you; a kind of Banksy idea, operating 
secretly in some way? It was more a convenient way of operating 
online. Also, it’s got meaning for me. M-O-C are the initials of my 
name, Sim, I guess, stands for simulation, which is something that 
interests me as an idea; the idea of modelling reality. I put the K in to 
emphasise the mocking aspect of that. 
 I think simulation, itself, is a kind of mockery, so if you attempt to 
mimic reality, that can be seen as complimentary or critical – an attack. 
If I mimic your habits and your accent, you might see that as a 
compliment or as something offensive. 
DOM: Rather than tribute. 
MOC: Yes, so maybe it contains more than at first appears to be the case. 
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DOM: Tell me about yourself. You’re based in Brighton, but where did you 
originally come from? 
MOC: Well, I was brought up in Cork and Blarney really I guess is the place I 
most know. That’s a suburb of Cork you could argue, now, It was 
really a village that had its own distinctiveness. I worked in the 
Woollen Mills Hotel there, growing up and stuff. 
DOM: How did you get into art? Did you go to Art College or did you come 
to art by a totally different route? 
MOC: Well, I’ve always… There were people at the Opening last night. A 
friend of mine John Halpin is a painter and teaches locally. We went to 
oil painting classes at La Verna [Hall] as children and did pottery 
classes at The Crawford. It wasn’t a subject we could do in secondary 
school, when I was growing up unfortunately.  
 Shortly afterwards it became the case. I did Inter-cert Arts anyway, 
outside school. I just sat the test. It’s something that’s always been 
with me, but, because I was good at maths and physics in school, I 
ended up being drawn into engineering and mathematical modelling. 
 And I have to say, that excites me, still and I loved that engagement 
too. I don’t necessarily see that these divisions between, let’s say 
maths, science and art need to be over stated. There tends to be too 
much separation. 
 I then became dissatisfied with the world I was in, really. I decided to 
engage properly with artistic practice, studied, did a degree and set up 
my practice and seemed to gain some recognition for certain activity 
of mine and gave myself that kind of freedom. 
 In the last 10 to 15 years, in particular, really I’ve done very little else. 
DOM: We’ve had a walk through your work. It seems appropriation is very 
much the bedrock of what you do. 
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MOC: I’m interested, potentially, in ticking certain boxes, or, not consciously, 
but when I look at the world in retrospect, it has certain characteristics 
and appropriation is part of that. I’m interested in over-production; 
the fact that there is an abundance of so much. 
 It’s a funny world, where people are potentially poor and 
impoverished in some way, but also there’s an abundance of 
incredibly high quality things. 
 The idea of re-appropriating other peoples’ work seems in keeping 
with, maybe, a principle of avoiding adding more to this over-
production; avoiding throwing more into the world that is already 
full. So, it’s potentially, environmentally sound in an aesthetic way.  
 If I take photographs that traffic wardens have taken of illegally 
parked cars, then at least I’m not adding more images. I’m making 
some sort of statement about what already exists. 
 Potentially, if you have 400 photographs that have been taken for 
some functional purpose, you can pick three or four that you deem to 
be of value, of interest, ‘beautiful’. 
DOM: Yes, I’ve got it. It gives an added value element as well as the 
recycling. 
MOC: Yes, so, you steal something from someone else and add to it. Picasso 
advised that... What did he say? ‘Good artists copy, great artists steal’. 
I think what he meant, and what he was saying is that there shouldn’t 
be copyright, there shouldn’t be a limitation on what you can do, it’s 
up to you to decide what’s of value. Ideally, I think, others would 
respect that. 
 If you take something you can glamorise it in some way. If I take a 
small, poor quality, jpeg image and blow it up to the size of a motor 
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car, I’m certainly changing the situation, but I’d like to think I’m not, 
at the same time, completely starting from scratch. 
 It seems stupid to start from scratch, I mean Pop Art began provoking 
in this way, not to recognise that an awful lot is given to us by, let’s 
say, industry, from factories, from the world we’re in. Items of great 
quality are already produced. By competing with that you’re playing 
Luddite. Maybe that’s healthy. Maybe it’s worth questioning. 
DOM: Do you put a boundary or a limit on the levels of technology you work 
with, or do you enjoy working with things that are, by today’s 
technological advances, virtually obsolete. Not obviously, but have 
been made redundant; there are better quality things? 
MOC: People do tend to discriminate. You meet individuals who are 
obsessed with the latest gadget and who need to use that and are 
excited by what’s brand new and what you can achieve with that. 
 I think, for - okay, I’ll use the term, artist - for artists, so quickly, 
there’s a tendency to move on, if you’re that way inclined, without 
having exhausted the possibilities of something that’s just a few years 
old. I don’t discriminate.  
 I’m happy to use things that are cutting edge. I quite often do, but I 
might, then, stick with it for three or four years, so it’s no longer 
cutting edge to most people, but I’m still using it. I worked with the 
online world, Second Life, for example in a virtual reality landscape, 
when most people weren’t. Recently I was involved in a residency 
where I used a ZX81 computer from the 1980s. 
DOM: Is that a Spectrum? 
MOC: Well, the one before: 1K of memory! I use my mobile phone a lot. I 
haven’t moved on from that yet, but will. I think you don’t need to 
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worry too much. People feel that they’re behind the times or... I think 
that they’re too much concerned with that. 
 So, some of what you see in this exhibition is fixated with what’s 
modern. Some of it is not necessarily. The system here, that the traffic 
wardens use to capture images, the whole system that surrounds the 
legality of parking, in itself, is a technology. It’s not just about 
something hard but software as well.  
DOM: Over the course of our conversation before, I wrote two quotes from 
you, one was ‘Exactitude is not truth’. That was Matisse, was it? 
MOC: Matisse liked to use that quote a lot. I think it, potentially, originally 
came from Delacroix. He was making a very valid point and a 
philosophical point, really, which isn’t just about painting, but, 
potentially is too. The impressionists knew this, didn’t they? Dots and 
dashes give you a stronger sense of the situation than a meticulous 
and pedantic obsession with detail. 
 So, by being anal and obsessed with resolution, you don’t necessarily 
give a more true representation. I’m interested in that as a fact, you 
know? 
DOM: You also like to quote Baudrillard. What’s that saying? ‘The more 
technologically advanced we become the more like robots humans 
become and the more human, machines.’ What is the quote, again? 
MOC: Well, I use live performers quite a lot for a few reasons. One of them is 
I don’t see why you wouldn’t. Instead of creating an animated film, or 
capturing film, or drawing a figure, why not just hire a performer and 
use a real person? 
 Also I’m interested in the possibility that maybe - here you see 
animations and moving-image - you could de-animate people and 
restrict their movements. Often, when there are people in my work, 
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it’s as objects. If I’ve got a professional performer, I’ll try and create 
situations which restrict the possibility for them to do what they do 
best: to show off.  
 Often I think that creates an interesting tension. However, the 
Baudrillard quote, he said: ‘as technology becomes more intelligent, 
people become more robotic.’85 Ostensibly that seems true of the 
world. I think it’s a very interesting comment. If you phone a call-
centre or service-line now, you are often speaking to people who are 
reading from scripts and are behaving mechanically and it can be 
absolutely terrifying, frightening, you know? 
 It is something to worry about. The ability to be intelligent seems to be 
being stolen from us by the new technologies and the systems that are 
developing. I find it quite a relief when you’re prepared to break rules 
and meet people who over-ride that kind of tendency.  
 Maybe it’s connected with a kind of managerialism and to do with the 
way places operate, too. 
DOM: Looking here at the levels of technological advancement you work 
with. [Thinking about] those two quotes, and the fact that just 
something less than perfect [was discovered], and [the fact that] the 
photos of the cars that were hacked from the traffic department: did 
the lack of exactitude – the pixels are like dapples of paint - or the 
[particular] kind of precision [which is evident], is it in some way 
because it’s not perfect [that] it’s somewhat still human? 
MOC: I believe so. Isn’t there an Eastern concept, is it Wabi-Sabi? I can’t be 
certain. An idea about design, or actually beauty, being in the faults or 
                                                 
85 This wording was not possible to verify later. Baudrillard more likely treats the Marxian 
notion as a mere starting point for more complex arguments. But the idea is relevant to the 
work being discussed. 
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in the error – absolutely! So, when people make mistakes and maybe 
when people slip and stop - the Freudian slip, the errors, the stupidity 
in the world - is what’s most healthy and uplifting in a way, a relief, I 
think. 
 I think most of us are probably relieved when we see a lack of 
perfection in some character that’s around us, someone we’re in a 
relationship with, or someone in authority. It makes us feel good. 
Nothing does work perfectly. Science does not provide all the 
answers, can never and will never. 
 With this you also have this less arrogant approach to life. 
DOM: I have to conclude because we’re under some time constraint here, 
but, you’ll be giving a talk here, towards the end of the run at the 
exhibition in October. What issues will you be addressing in that? 
MOC: Well, I’d be interested in seeing how people respond to this work. I’m 
happy to be on the receiving end of criticism and questions, and also 
to discuss the work with other people in a location that’s different to 
where it was born. 
 I would be quite interested in what students, artists or anyone thinks. 
It’s a kind of Q&A, but I’m also prepared to talk properly about the 
work. By that time, I’ll have had an opportunity to think about it a bit 
more, in this context. 
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Appendix E  Denying the antecedent 
 
Something similar to ‘denying the antecedent’, the common error in 
conditional reasoning (Colman, 2008a), may be at play in people’s relationship 
with intelligence measurement. The concept86 which has implications for any 
system of measurement is easily illustrated using the following example. If a 
sensor indicating whether an opaque tank is full of liquid, or contains liquid, is 
not triggered, then it cannot be presumed that the tank is empty. Human beings 
are prone to incorrectly read such situations87 and the likelihood of drawing 
false conclusions is compounded by other factors. Measuring any, even basic, 
human potential will be far more complicated than assessing the level in a tank. 
If Usain Bolt takes one minute to walk a hundred metres that is not proof (nor 
even strong evidence) that he couldn’t run the distance in 9.58 seconds. When it 
comes to cognition then the complexity is greater still. The implications of this 
line of argument are that, even if intelligence was accepted as quantifiable, a 
method for measuring aptitude would not be useful in determining lack of it. 
The thinking applies to exams. Put plainly: the reasons for someone getting a D 
grade in an exam are vast compared with the possible interpretations of an A* 
result. An A* indicates aptitude but D does not very strongly indicate lack of it. 
  
                                                 
86 Also known as the ‘fallacy of the inverse’ 
87 One of the first tasks I was given when working as a process engineer - building training and 
design simulators for oil and gas industry operators - was to simulate the ESD system (IADC 
Lexicon, 2014) to be used on one offshore platform. The job involved firstly converting the 
documentation into Boolean diagrams using AND, OR and NOT as the basic building blocks, 
before coding and testing. It was hugely important to be aware of the potential for ‘fallacy of the 
inverse’ type errors. 
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Appendix F  Feedback loop mathematics 
 
 
Figure 30 Commuter still, 2004 
 
The basic technique in most continuous simulation approaches is to solve 
differential equations using numerical methods. Whilst it is not necessary to 
understand calculus and the mathematics of feedback to appreciate the 
implications, the plots produced through solution of second order ‘ordinary 
differential equations’ (ODEs) are enlightening in that they describe the variety 
of responses typical of self-regulating or cybernetic systems. Practically I have 
incorporated these equations into animations. Similar methods form the basis of 
the physics engines sometimes made use of. A graph produced (Figure 31, 
p.225) through algorithmically resolving second order ODEs, and plotting the 
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results, consolidates in one image the range of dynamic effects. These plots 
show responses to a sudden step change in input for a particular setting of the 
‘time constant’ (τ) at different values of the other main parameter, the ‘damping 
coefficient’ (ξ). Longer τ implies increased inertia and would result in the same 
pattern being spread over a longer time period. The damping coefficient ξ 
effects the elasticity of the system. If the ξ is greater than 1 the system is 
characterised as being ‘overdamped’. In these scenarios, new equilibriums are 
approached without oscillation. If the coefficient is less than 1 then the system is 
said to be ‘underdamped’. Overshoot is a feature: values oscillate around the 
new value before eventually settling. When ξ is precisely 1 the system is 
described as ‘critically damped’. This is an idealised position in which, 
following an upset, the system oscillates continuously (as a sine-wave in fact). 
The dynamics of a simple frictionless pendulum in a vacuum would correspond 
to this movement, also known as simple harmonic motion (SHL). If resistance 
were low (in the case of an actual grandfather clock for instance) then SHL 
would be approached, the system is very weakly underdamped. SHL is a type 
of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ (cf. supra, p.54). If ξ is below 0 then stability will not 
be achieved and the system escalates out of control. ‘Positive feedback’ and 
reinforcing mechanisms are simulated through values of ξ which are less than 
0. Sayings such as ‘success breeds success’, the runaway effect in nuclear 
explosions and the usually undesired feedback associated with microphone-
speaker circuits are all examples88 of reinforcing feedback in action. Luyben’s 
book on process modelling and simulation for chemical engineers is just one 
source of information on such second order systems (1973, pp.187–198). Ross 
Ashby refers to the kinds of equations involved too (1956, p.96). 
                                                 
88 In reality, runaway reactions and other examples of positive feedback would encounter 
limitations eventually through exhaustion of some resource or ‘negative feedback’. The growth 
is not inexorable. 
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2nd Order Ordinary Differential Equations look like this: 
 
                  d2y            dy 
τ 2 ----- + 2τξ ---- + y = 0 
      dt2               dt 
 
where: 
 
τ (tau)  Time Constant 
 
ξ (xi)   Damping Coefficient 
 
dy 
----   rate of change of value y with time 
dt 
 
d2y 
-----   rate of change of the rate of change of value y with time. 
 dt2 
 
 
The plots below in Figure 31 (calculated by solving the above equation 
numerically) show responses to a step change in input at time 10 (with τ kept 
constant for a range of different ξ values as described above) 
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Figure 31 Second order ordinary differential equation responses 
 
Commuter (2004), inspired by noticing slightly inebriated travellers 
standing and maintaining their balance on rickety London Underground train 
carriages, used this equation89. The plots in Figure 32 are the results of 
calculations which were then employed to drive the animation. The curves 
represent responses, in three dimensions, to imposed carriage jolts and  
                                                 
89 This early example of a ‘simupoem’, (Commuter, 2004), demonstrates that weight is given to 
the dynamics before static visual effects. Just enough has been done to create an object which 
would illustrate movement and rotation. The result was a slightly elongated sphere, pinched 
once (Figure 30, p.222). 
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Figure 32 Plots and calculations of simulated train disturbances used for Commuter, 2004 
 
bumpiness. The data would determine the position and rotation of the 
minimalist form (Figure 30, p.222) against time. 
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Note that some effects of the advances in computing, since the mid-
twentieth century, are relevant to my interest in cybernetics and performativity. 
The technology (whether analogue or digital), firstly, greatly facilitated the 
construction of feedback loop control systems, such as those used in process 
engineering, but now increasingly in domestic settings too. Secondly, 
computing encourages the numerical solution of problems which would 
previously have been laboriously worked out (if that were possible at all). The 
use of trial and error methods, which converge in on a solution, became more 
practical and widespread. The underdamped curves in Figure 31, describe a 
similar process, and indicate the crucial importance of overshoot, which by 
definition is error, in discovering a final value. Performative, or cybernetic-style 
approaches then, have tended to replace representation-oriented means of 
solving many mathematical problems. 
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Appendix G  E-mails for reference 
 
Permission was obtained from the senders below to include the contents of 
these e-mails, which are referred to in the thesis: 
 
From Huw Bartlett 
 
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2015 6:52 PM 
To: Mocksim (Gmail)  
Subject: Re: Simupoem comment 
Yes  
Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android 
On Wed, 30 Dec, 2015 at 12:25, Mocksim (Gmail) 
<mocksim@gmail.com> wrote: 
Dear Huw 
Once when I asked you for a response to seeing one of those moving 
image pieces I create you said: “Your work seems to come from 
nowhere.” Are you happy to confirm that you said that? 
Best 
Micheál  
 
From Joan Fontcuberta 
 
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2014 7:06 PM 
To: Micheál O'Connell  
Subject: Re: A quick question 
It was for a class about what I call "reflectograms” (selfies taken in front 
of a mirroring surface.  
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Joan 
El 14/10/2014, a les 18:41, Micheál O'Connell <m@mocksim.org> 
vaescriure: 
Hi Joan 
I’m guessing you are well. A quick question. I sent you this a few years 
ago: http://www.mocksim.org/mocksim_images/Contra-Invention.jpg. It 
was from the traffic warden project I did. One of them had captured a 
self-reflection inadvertently. Was it to use as part of a talk or with 
students? I’m writing up a PhD and wanting to refer to the significance 
of that image you see. 
Best 
Micheál / Mocksim 
 
From: Edward J Higgs 
 
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2016 11:10 AM 
To: Micheál O'Connell  
Subject: Re:  
Dear Micheál 
Fine by me.  I hope the final stages of the thesis go well. 
All the best 
Eddy  
Professor Edward Higgs, BA (Oxon), DPhil, FRHS 
Head of Department 
Department of History 
University of Essex 
Wivenhoe Park 
Colchester 
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CO4 3SQ 
email: ********** 
Tel: ********** 
Web: http://www.essex.ac.uk/history/staff/profile.aspx?ID=1805 
________________________________________ 
From: Micheál O'Connell <*********> 
Sent: 28 March 2016 09:06 
To: Higgs, Edward J 
Subject:  
Dear Professor Higgs 
I’m in the final stages of a PhD. I may include the sentence and footnote 
below as part of a section which questions reliance on procedures, 
systems and processes. I asked you a question at an event in Goldsmiths 
University three years ago ( 
https://chasegoingdigital.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/going-digital-
opening-conference/ ) and your response influenced my thinking on the 
subject. Just sending this to you out of courtesy and in case of 
inaccuracies. 
My sentence in-text 
That is not to dismiss the necessity, usefulness and certainly the initial 
role of codification* but their artificiality can be forgotten: invented 
systems develop auras. 
Footnote: 
* At the opening event to Going Digital, the doctoral programme run by 
CHASE partnership (Lawrence and Black, 2013) I posed the question of 
too much bureaucracy to Professor Edward Higgs, a former archivist and 
government advisor. Interestingly he defended the need for the right 
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kinds of administrative procedure, suggesting that with increased 
digitisation there was too little of this. 
Micheál O’Connell 
 
From Joanna Parker 
 
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2015 10:47 AM 
To: Mocksim (Gmail)  
Subject: Re: Query: Worn Outing 
Hi 
yes, i can confirm this. 
Best regards 
Jo 
On Sunday, 25 October 2015, 10:19, Mocksim (Gmail) 
<mocksim@gmail.com> wrote: 
Can you confirm what you told me, that during your involvement with 
that  Worn Outing intervention I organised in 2012, from warren Street 
to Cork  Street in London that you heard onlookers say “they’re having a 
day out from the mental home” and “this must be some sort of protest” ? 
A reply to this e-mail will do it. 
Thanks 
Micheál 
 
From Peter Seddon 
 
Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 1:12 PM 
To: Mocksim (Gmail)  
Subject: Re: Jasper Johns on art and craft 
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Hi Micheál,  
Yes I think you should be careful here. This supposed remark, when I 
think about it was reiterated to me and some other students on the Fine 
Art Course at Leeds University back in 1969-70 by a tutor called John 
Jones (now deceased). He had been to the States a few years before on a 
year long sabbatical to interview contemporary artists across America. 
These he recorded on old reel to reel tape and sometimes used them in 
teaching courses on American art. In one of them he was interviewing a 
sculptor called George Sugarman and I think it was he who reiterated on 
tape this remark and attributed it to Jasper Johns. Unfortunately these 
tapes were never published and I have no idea what happened to them 
after John's death. So it is all memory and hearsay. However the remark 
is interesting in itself, so a careful note about its source as a memory of 
supposed remark along the lines of above might do. 
Hope this helps 
Pete 
On 07 April 2016 at 12:14 "Mocksim (Gmail)" <mocksim@gmail.com> 
wrote: 
Hi Peter 
I couldn’t find any reference to this below anywhere else. I might refer to 
it, but with a caution, in the PhD using this e-mail below. Would that be 
acceptable to you? 
Regards 
Micheál O'Connell 
mocksim.org 
From: Peter Seddon 
Sent: Sunday, February 15, 2015 3:47 PM 
To: Mocksim (Gmail) 
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Hi Micheal 
If my memory serves me right it was a remark made by Jasper Johns 
somewhere in reflections about the difference between art and craft 
which was that art was good but only just good enough whereas craft 
was also good but usually too good. (For its own good I think he meant 
to imply) 
Best. Pete 
Sent from my iPad 
On 15 Feb 2015, at 11:01, Mocksim (Gmail) <********** > wrote: 
Quick question. I once heard you say, during a talk, lecture or maybe 
conversation, something about how artists tend to do enough to resolve 
their work but not more than that. I’ve found the comment useful when 
trying to defend against accusations of not having done enough of the, to 
my mind, ‘turd-polishing’ when in fact I was being perfectionist about or 
interested in some other aspect of the structure. Was that a point of your 
own or did it come from somewhere else? 
Micheál  
  
From Nenagh Watson 
 
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 7:02 PM  
To: Micheál O'Connell  
Subject: RE: Puppets, Cameras, Clowns  
 
Terrific! Yep I remember you & your work. I'm up to my neck in an 
application - but sure yep yep do use the thought within your phd & if I 
have any futher thoughts I'll drop you an email. I went to a fantastic 
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Performing Objects event at Falmouth Art collage & check out object - 
oriented ontology. 
Very best from NenAGHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH  
 
Nenagh Watson 
Researcher hosted & supported by Royal Central School of Speech & 
Drama  
________________________________________ 
From: Micheál O'Connell [*********] 
Sent: 16 September 2014 16:11 
To: Nenagh Watson 
Subject: Puppets, Cameras, Clowns 
Dear Nenagh 
You may or may not remember me from Puppet Talk at Sussex in 2013. 
Hope all goes well with you. Your commentary and work, as outlined 
there, was really interesting (a word which is a bit overused now but 
meant here) for me. I have just tweeted you about this but one comment 
you made about my Now Man activities (summary here 
http://www.mocksim.org/works/now_man.htm) was that the spinning 
camcorder, not the performer, was the puppet. The statement changed 
my thinking about the piece and I'd like to refer to it in my PhD writing. 
Any problem with that? And any further thoughts would be great but no 
pressure at all. 
 
Regards  
 
Micheál O'Connell / Mocksim 
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From Peter White (EAFA) 
 
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2016 2:50 PM 
To: Mocksim (Gmail)  
Subject: RE: Singing in the Rain - without the rain 
Hi Michael,  
That would have been me. The facts are slightly different though. 
There is no AI involved, nor is the tool used to speed up the digitisation 
process. In digital restoration it is common to use a dust-busting 
algorithm to remove dirt and dust. Locations of dirt and dust are usually 
mapped by scanning infrared, or looking at the change in pixels from 
one frame to another digitally. Sometimes both, and using varying levels 
of checks and processing. 
The instance I refer to was a before and after ‘high removal’ based upon 
pixel-change only in order to see how far it would go if left unattended. 
It removed all the rain due to its fast motion (not remaining in on place 
for more than one frame) and high contrast. 
Other good tests have been ripples in water disappearing (but larger 
waves remaining – very ‘early CG’!) and the removal of a man’s legs as 
he walks down the street (but strangely, not his shadow). These were 
with different software/hardware. I forget which used which – but the 
Snell & Willcox ‘Alchemist’ was involved somewhere, and was 
‘Diamant’. 
With kind regards,  
Peter White 
Senior Technician 
From: Mocksim (Gmail) [mailto:*********]  
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 8:28 PM 
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To: EAFA <Eafa@uea.ac.uk> 
Subject: Singing in the Rain - without the rain 
I know it’s three years ago but I’m trying to substantiate a story we were 
told during this CHASE day at East Anglia Film Archive. The AI tools 
being used to speed up the conversion of film to digital had over-
intelligently removed the rain drops from singing in the rain. One of the 
experts there let us in on this story. Is there a way I can verify that this or 
something like it happened? Or who should I or could I contact at 
EAFA? 
Thanks 
Micheál O'Connell 
mocksim.org 
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Appendix H  Interrogation of the term ‘artificial stupidity’ 
 
Attachment of the word artificial to stupidity generates an assortment of 
denotative and connotative meanings. In 2013 a series of three Lunch Time 
Lectures was given in an artist run space (O’Connell, 2013a) as an attempt to 
improvise with the idea of artificial stupidity and interrogate the term. The one-
hour recordings, notes and feedback permitted me to create an initial 
breakdown which eventually grew into the list below. Included in the mix are 
interpretations, uses and implementations of the term ‘artificial stupidity’, 
which are relevant to my practice and the thesis, and others which are not. 
 
1. Connected with artificial intelligence (AI): 
a. Sadie Plant’s reference to Ada Lovelace’s scoff at those who 
underestimated, before the quest had even begun, the scope for 
machine intelligence. She rhetorically proposes that their ambition 
would be only to create artificial stupidity (Plant, 1998, p.89). 
b. Taking Lovelace’s dismissal as a true assessment of the potential for 
AI, with the benefit of hindsight.  
c. A description of the faults and inadequacies of AI. 
d. Stupidity also has origins in the idea of being stupefied, of stupor, to 
be numbed or emotionally dead…. or insensible  (OED, 2015f). Every 
technology so far fits with this definition. Machines do not feel 
empathy.  
e. Stupidity may be a desire, something to intentionally design into AI: 
i. For fun and entertainment. 
ii. So that technology is more like human behaviour. 
f. Another term for artificial intelligence is pretentiousness and that 
characteristic is generally frowned upon, seen as dishonest or stupid. 
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2. In relation to individual intelligence: 
a. The obstinate lack of imagination, characteristic of those who 
misunderstand the potential of others could be termed artificial 
stupidity. The argument in 1.b could be extended to include all 
underestimating or overestimating of other intelligences. 
b. Ways of thinking of one sort can always appear stupid from another 
point of view. In its attempt to be comprehensive, this list, because it 
is just one construct, could be deemed stupid and it is also artificial. 
The idea that a representation, simulation, documentation, 
description, set of laws or procedures could equal whatever entity or 
process is being signified is either naïve or a pretence. That is not to 
diminish the pursuit of modelling per se. Take language as a means 
of representing, which Avital Ronell says, ‘never scores… [but] it 
engages the experience of failure, opening the test site to the 
irresolvable conflict between cognition and performance’ (2002, p.99) 
[and] language as contest posits such a thing in order to fall short of 
it, to keep itself going’ (2002, p.99). The actions of artists can seem 
stupid to others because the criteria of importance are connected with 
aesthetic reason. Usual design priorities may be ignored for instance 
while seemingly trivial features are obsessed over. 
c. The kind of intelligence required in one situation differs from that 
required in another. Unusual situations may call upon characteristics 
which are useless in others. In that sense stupidity there is an 
artificiality to the term stupid. 
d. Closely connected with b above is Ronell’s usage of artificial stupidity 
(2002, pp.59–60): she makes points about the ideological use of 
apparently scientific measuring techniques. People are falsely 
classified as stupid. 
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e. Through collaboration one can remain ignorant of other disciplines 
but nevertheless benefit from their knowledge. Division of 
intellectual labour is efficient though point 3.c below indicates 
dubious negative applications. And point 3.j refers to the use of 
pretend ignorance as a means of wantonly hampering collaboration. 
3. In the social context:  
a. As a means of deceit in order to outwit others. 
b. As a protective strategy when it would be risky to show one’s ‘true 
colours’. 
c. In order to avoid effort or responsibility. Adorno reflected precisely 
this point from a position of concern: stupidity could be ‘cultivated’ 
(Jenemann, 2013, p.36). 
d. For reasons of efficiency. 
e. In diplomacy (so as not to make others feel inferior or in order to 
permit them to feel superior). 
f. When one believes others would not understand and therefore 
demonstrating knowledge, intelligence or capability would be 
pointless. 
g. When demonstrating what one knows would interrupt other 
activities or conversations. 
h. John Roberts’ point: a political gesture - stupidity as a rejection of the 
dominant ‘intelligent’ discourses (1996b) 
i. As a corollary to point 2.d above and perhaps combined with 3.a, b or 
d: submitting, for convenience, to the presumptions based on gender, 
nationality, class and the dominant hegemony. 
j. To undermine collaborations with others, in order to maintain 
autonomy or for other reasons. 
4. Fooling oneself: 
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a. In performance, particularly comedic acting or clowning. 
b. To avoid taking responsibility for one’s own moral codes or 
conscience. The subtle difference with point 3c is that in this case the 
individual somehow deludes themselves. 3c emphasises cognisant 
deceit. 
c. Focal Point Gallery’s points (2016): i.e. as a means of discovery; for 
creative intent. Artists for example might: 
i. Give themselves limitations 
ii. Use tools wrongly 
iii. Work quickly, on impulse 
iv. Work slowly 
v. Take drugs or alcohol 
vi. Put themselves in unusual situations 
vii. Accept mistakes 
viii. Confront art, its institutions, the art system, yesterday’s habits 
ix. Do the apparent opposite to creativity 
x. Use repetition as a means of not thinking. 
d. 4.c.v above deserves special attention90. A different order of 
artificiality may be achieved through the use of drugs or alcohol. 
Surely inebriation is a perfect specimen of the category artificial 
stupidity. The motivations could include any of 4.a, b and c above but 
pleasure itself is clearly the primary driver of recreational drug use. 
Addiction would imply that the individual is no longer able to 
regulate use so certainly the ‘artificial’ part disappears. 
e. As a route to truth. Stupidity, idiocy and error mostly have pejorative 
connotation but at least there is the association with honesty and 
                                                 
90 Sadie Plant devotes a book to the positive links between drug-taking and literature (1999). 
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truth. Interestingly cunning is often linked to the opposite: 
malevolence. 
5. With respect to systems: 
a. As a description of how systems inevitably are dysfunctional or 
faulty 
b. Willingly dysfunctional systems. 
 
Doubtless the breakdown could be further rationalised or extended but the 
summarising is sufficient for the purposes of unearthing what examples of 
artificial stupidity may be relevant to the thesis and my art practice. 
The antipathy to evaluation, not uncommon amongst creative 
practitioners and artists, could be accounted for by some of the points under 3 
above. A proportion of the objecting must be due to philistinism though or, 
secondly, a genuine belief that the task of trying to understand creativity is an 
impossible one.  
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Appendix I  Samuel Beckett’s Imagination Dead Imagine 
 
Samuel Beckett’s Imagination Dead Imagine (Beckett and Seaver, 1992, 
pp.551–554) presents a closed pulsating system of sorts. Precise dimensions are 
given of a cylindrical vault and the positioning of two bodies within it. The 
nature of the scene, its whiteness, is further described, as are the ways in which 
light intensity and temperature oscillate with time. Given that the novel is 
certainly novel, in its consisting of only 1100 words, making it four pages long91, 
that is about it: a scene and its dynamics are described. More details about 
occasional pauses during the cycle of increasing and decreasing brightness and 
heat, are provided, and the characters’ slight motions: at points, each opens and 
then closes one eye. Despite the plain and algebraic method of sketching out the 
setup and fluctuations with time, the limits of what it is possible to explain are 
reached quickly. Beckett confounds usual narrative expectations further 
through ‘frequent use of paradox with the title itself and in such phrases as ‘No 
way in, go in’ or ‘from this point of view, but there is no other.’’ (Finney, 1971, 
p.65). The writing, ultimately, is about the difficulty of writing; any depicting is 
at least subservient to that. Lastly, Imagination Dead Imagine exposes the 
absurdity of attempting to be comprehensive through being contradictory. 
Having created, for example, a monotone world, the left eyes of the figures are 
observed to be ‘piercing pale blue’ (1971, p.65). Surrender to the inevitability of 
incompleteness is built in. As H. Porter Abbott puts it: ‘the creation in this work 
is abandoned, too: “Leave them there, sweating and icy, there is better 
elsewhere”’ (Abbott and Beckett, 1970, p.45). If a rigorous attempt to represent 
through writing is bound to fail, then imagination fills the gaps. 
                                                 
91 A source was found which stretches the text over seven pages (Abbott and Beckett, 1970, p.45) 
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Beckett created the novel by ‘condensation of a much longer work’ 
(Finney, 1971, p.65), ‘a process of elimination’ (Abbott and Beckett, 1970, p.45). 
With respect to Marshall McLuhan’s concepts of hot and cool media92 Beckett 
veered towards a temperature of absolute zero. 
According to Mieke Bal, for Flaubert language is the ‘culprit of 
generalised stupidity’ (2013, p.50) and perhaps it is the simultaneous illusion of 
precision combined with the impossibility of achieving it, which is being 
alluding to. Analogising with the functional world, in other logical systems or 
languages, with computer code for example, a similar issue arises in that the 
crucial sections often amount to only a small proportion of the overall quantity 
produced. Exceptions need to be accounted for and numerous protections 
applied. Bullet proofing’ is approached asymptotically. The trade-off between 
quantity and rigour is illustrated by a recent air traffic control emergency in 
which a ‘particular glitch was buried in one of… four million lines of code’ 
(BBC, 2016). One difference between documentation and software writing is 
that, with the former, language is employed to represent what did happen 
whereas the latter is an attempt to codify what will happen. Notwithstanding 
the ‘reinvention of writing that digital technology offers’ (Fuller, 2003, p.25), 
three types can be listed: writing can be about the past, aimed at the future or 
overtly fictional. Every combination and permutation of these can be envisaged 
too. 
                                                 
92 McLuhan’s division is also a means of discussing media by comparing channels which are 
information-rich and so leave little to the imagination (hot media) with those which require 
more effort on behalf of the ‘receiver’ (cool media) (2001, pp.22–25). Radio then is cool by 
comparison with Television and immersive computer-gaming would be hotter than chess. In 
employing such terms as hot and cool McLuhan was not making points about whether certain 
technologies are superior or inferior to others. The suggestion is that pared-back approaches 
(cool media) leave more to the imagination and this is surely precisely the question for Beckett, 
given the title of his piece. 
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In the case of artistic writing further questions arises. Any suggestion 
that the task in creative writing is simply to describe an invented situation and 
narrative, was undermined by hostility to representation, and, secondly by the 
unacceptability of passive escapism. The Baudrillardian standpoint, i.e. that 
there exist only fictions (1994), was a provocative inversion of the first of these 
concerns. With poetry and music, the opportunity for work to be understood as 
a thing in itself, i.e. not a pointing elsewhere, was more easily acknowledged. In 
different arenas and with every medium, in the visual arts following the 
invention of the camera, and later for modernist writers, a new era dawned and 
the purported aims changed. So Walter Pater’s often repeated nineteenth 
century adage that ‘[a]ll art constantly aspires towards the condition of music’ 
(Ratcliffe, 2015b) was reflected in actual sequences of events. 
In retrospect though, despite a century or two of such orthodoxy, it is 
hard to imagine fundamentalist satisfaction being achieved at either end of the 
spectrum. There is the human biological predisposition to read meaning into 
anything: ‘[p]eople represent’ (Hacking, 1983, p.144). Second, the particular 
qualities of a medium and the unique structuring of a work are always 
noticeable93. A question posed by artist Valie Export in 2005, referred to in Sara 
Jane Bailes’ The Poetics of Failure, suggests that even live art remains, ‘a symbol 
of something else, the sign of the thing you wish to communicate’ (2011, p.10). 
The, once original, proposal (which has since been surpassed by appropriation 
culture), in Harold Rosenberg’s words, that ‘a work of art ought to be a thing 
added to the world of things rather than a reflection of things that already exist’ 
(cited in Bailes, 2011, p.10) is therefore critiqueable. So the duality inevitable 
with writing is relevant to unconventional performance practices too, but from 
an opposite standpoint. The assumption with live art, from early happenings to 
                                                 
93 The arguments must apply also to the writing here. 
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the present day, is that ‘liveness’ is immune to being semiotic, whereas writing, 
by default, is considered so. 
The point about the ‘the unacceptability passive escapism’ (cf. supra, 
244) is answered by curator Barry Barker: ‘[t]here is no such thing as a passive 
spectator as we all have active thoughts when looking at works of art’ (2007, 
p.163). Lev Manovich too (2001, pp.70–74) challenged the idea that movie 
watching, or observing a painting, is passive by comparison with ‘interactive’ 
media, video gaming or a consciously Brechtian play. All experiences must be 
passive to some degree. And, the desire for escapism is easy to deride but, as 
the phrase ‘suspension of disbelief’ implies, passivity can be temporarily 
entered into, and voluntarily embraced. The result is a kind of active-passive 
experience. 
Links between factors
Table 02
Workaday, themes, methods,
principles and intenƟons
Signiﬁcance of factors
Factors of
importance
Index of Factors 
 
1. Dynamics before static effects: Observations of static effects and the creation of these, i.e. the activities usually 
coupled with ‘fine art’ historically, are of less interest me than the temporal dimension. The nature of the performances 
directed, moving-image pieces created, investigative activities conducted and the subject matter select reflects, firstly, a 
fascination with dynamics.  
2. Cybernetics and feedback loops: The concept of the feedback loop is of continuing interest. These mechanisms may 
be consciously embedded into works or pinpointed in existing processes. Or the associated theories are employed as devices 
for interpretation. Cybernetics, the science and philosophy of feedback loops, has been a key framing paradigm. I’ve been 
interested in problematizing the idealism associated with such theories historically and questioning the received wisdom that 
feedback, in the general usage of the term, is always a positive. 
3. Questions of control: Critical attention is given to the question of control. Work has focused on relationships in 
which hegemony is intrinsic: between director and performer for example; but also between people and things and with the 
applications of technology, hardware and coding. Then there is the question of self-regulation which cybernetic systems 
embody. Self-regulation does not necessarily imply stability but the ability to survive external disturbance or setpoint changes. 
The contradictory tendencies within controlled systems, the variability and frequency of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ (cf. supra, 
p.54), as opposed to absolute stability, are bases for investigation and experimentation. 
4. Copyright/authorship questions: Questions of copyright, ownership, authorship and the axiological systems whereby 
appropriation is given negative connotation, or is seen as equivalent to plagiarism or theft, are broached in the making and 
selecting of work. Simply exposing these as topical issues is not the intention. 
5. Anti-representation: I am sceptical about the easy acceptance of representation in all its forms including figuration in 
art and photography; through notations and codes; documenting; attempts to model and simulate; in drama and on the 
political front. However, it is the paradoxes in any attempt to be fundamentalist about representation which are important in 
influencing production. Techniques of illusion can be linked with the question of representation. The standard tricks of 
perspective or dramaturgical craft have been subverted. A number of the thinkers referred to in, or studied in the course of 
researching for, the thesis, deliberate on problems of representation from the point of view of their subject areas and 
disciplines. Nigel Thrift’s ‘Non-representational theory’ (2008) challenges the usual impulses in social science, Andrew 
Pickering interprets cybernetics as being about getting along with the unknowable and the unrepresentable (2011), and 
philosophers such as Daniel Rubinstein speak about the crisis of representation in photographic realm (2013). Connected 
concerns relate to objectification and self-representation. The creation of profiles and adoption of personae online has been 
normalised with the rise of online social networking. Instead of fully colluding with the way these platforms function I often 
use them half-heartedly and inconsistently. 
6. Boundaries and the frame: Special attention is given to the question of framing and boundaries. This included 
foregrounding issues to do with staging and the proscenium by deliberately ‘breaking frame’ (Goffman, 1986, pp.345–378) by 
taking live-art to unlikely locations, and intervening in everyday situations. In the production of simupoems, such as Training 
(2004), this interest has been interpreted literally, by utilising the traditionally semi-redundant ‘safe-frame’ area.  
7. Other artists and movements: The work of notable modernist and contemporary artists such as Martin Creed, 
Anthony Gormley, Bruce Nauman, Barbara Hepworth and movements such as Abstract Expressionism or Minimalism are 
referred to, in the production of, and in the titling of works. Also works of lesser known practitioners may be confronted as a 
route to discovery and in the spirit of academic and political arguments. The referentialism might be read as lampooning or 
iconoclastic, or accolade: I do not illuminate as to which is intended. 
8. Supply chain and transport: Transportation, the movements of people, goods and traffic around networks and the 
processing of orders and queuing which is inherent in the 'supply chain' are common sources of inspiration. Imagery, digital 
‘readymades’ and other items obtained from investigating or intervening in the these physical and electronic networks, are 
selected for exhibition or used as raw material in the creation of simupoems. 
9. Waste and overproduction: The discovery of the associations with industrialised food production when discussing 
Rearing in section 2.2.2 (cf. supra, pp.88-91) makes more sense considering the trajectory my work has taken since. My 
practice now increasingly involves tapping into the abundance of digital material, data, and other facets of the technological 
landscape. Real materials no longer accumulate within the boundaries of industrial complexes thanks to contemporary 
manufacturing practices but digital information does. And this data often corresponds with tangible products which now 
amass outside the ‘factory walls’, often underused, in domestic settings, institutions and on our streets. 
10. Socio-political art: Socio-political matters have rarely been a conscious influence. Nevertheless, the work has been 
described as political at times, perhaps because I take that for granted as the normal backdrop (this point is made about Glenn 
Ligon’s work in Appendix A, pp.199-201). My intentions are rarely didactic. I am sympathetic to Adorno’s position on 
Commitment (Jameson, 2007, pp.177–195) which he says ‘often means bleating what everyone is already saying or at least 
secretly wants to hear. The notion of a 'message' in art, even when politically radical, already contains an accommodation to 
the world’ (Jameson, 2007, p.193). The distinction between activism and art can be upheld, not just for art’s sake but in the 
interests of politics too. Since the financial crashes and their repercussions in the past decade, the frequency with which work 
appears to be decorated with political meaning has increased. Artist and writer James Bridle’s highlighting the problems of 
surveillance and drones for example is arguably lightweight in its political message and, simultaneously the credence his New 
Aesthetic (Web Directions, 2011) gives to the ‘visual’ seems quaint. An eloquent reminder of the rationale for ‘the antagonism 
towards the visual in Conceptual Art’ was provided by David Beech recently (2016, p.6). These opinions are not to dismiss the 
impact, political and otherwise, of exemplary art. Adorno gives the twist: ‘Kafka's prose and Beckett's plays, or the truly 
monstrous novel The Unnameable, have an effect by comparison with which officially committed works look like pantomimes’ 
(Jameson, 2007, p.191). 
11. The male/gender: It was not a conscious intention to foreground issues of gender, sexuality, nor to consider the 
associated social or psychological questions, while producing artworks and intervening. My opinions gel with Karen Barad’s 
referencing Judith Butler’s ‘notion of gender performativity… gender not as a thing or a set of free-floating attributes, not as 
an essence—but rather as a “doing”: “gender is itself a kind of becoming or activity… gender ought not to be conceived as a 
noun or a substantial thing or a static cultural marker, but rather as an incessant and repeated action of some sort”’ (2003, 
p.808). It might be said that a certain queer disposition has always been crucial to the artistic outlook. In retrospect my 
interest in these questions reveals itself as a concern for the contemporary condition of the ‘cisgender’ male. The work and 
interpretations of it, including A nod to Turing and Creed, An Attempt at an Autobiography, Now Man, Worn Outing, the 
Second Life references, my attention to Glenn Ligon’s output, all point to that interest. My practice is also a ground for 
inspecting whatever prejudices, defensiveness and embracings of failure maleness might entail. 
12. Undermining meaning: Some of the arguments about the socio-political apply here (Factor 10). More boldly though a 
strategy has been to consciously attempt to eradicate meaning. The desire should not to be mistaken with attempts to create 
ambiguity for its own sake. The intended result is not to create ‘open-endedness’ (see Factor 38) but to disturb equilibrium 
and undo understanding. In my experience the reduction of resoluteness on one front opens up latent potentialities in others. 
The desired effect is similar to that of the 'almost-pun' referred to in the description for Factor 13. This deliberate dampening 
of denotative intensity may be one of the factors which distinguishes selective cultural practices from mainstream 
entertainment and promotional constructs. It should be added that, given our biology, tendency to read, make assumptions, 
anthropomorphise (Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, pp.26–27), or to see something as representative, and seek closure 
(Lidwell, Holden and Butler, 2010, pp.44–45), the removal of meaning is no easy undertaking. 
13. Humour and earnestness: Comedy is of interest. It was the subject of my MA writing and I performed as a stand-up 
comedian for three years while completing Art Foundation. It is never my intention to achieve the usual effects of jokes, 
namely laughter, via artworks (and that is not to say that it is easy to write jokes or rouse laughter). A professional clown was 
employed but ‘galgenhumour’ (gallows humour) was a more common result, An Attempt at an Autobiography (cf. supra, 
pp.74-76) being a good example. English professor Stephen Booth’s notion of the 'ideation pun' or something which 
'approaches the status of humour' (Appendix A, p201) is of interest to me. I wish also to defend the right to engage with the 
opposite affect: earnestness. Much is said about the positive attributes of humour though Freud gave some attention to 
tendentious jokes (1989, p.183). Jokes also function as 'get out clause', a means of escaping commitment to an idea or to a 
piece of work. My aspiration is to traverse lines between the human propensities for seriousness, belief and zealotry on one 
side, and irony and cynicism on the other. 
14. Life, death and horror: Engagement with questions of life and death, suicidal tendencies, aging and decay, the 
inevitability in the end of fundamental failure is a preoccupation. These issues hardly amount to original subject matter in art. 
Humour’s sibling ‘horror’ though rarely deliberately sought appeared characteristic of many of the works produced for a 
period. The effect may be brought about in attempts to bring broken objects back to life or amplified through direct inclusion 
of recordings of individuals who have deceased. In providing titles such as Ending, Terminus, Sinking and An Attempt at an 
Autobiography (O’Connell, 2016) these negative themes are embraced. 
15. History: As well as investigating the current infrastructure works have incorporated archive footage and assets. Such 
material is increasingly readily available online but personal recordings are a source too. Examples included a speech by 
Winston Churchill, canned laughter from the BBC and a communication I’d written, being read by iconic radio DJ John Peel. 
16. Appropriation: Conceptualist Douglas Huebler’s statement, in 1969, that, ‘[t]he world is full of objects, more or less 
interesting; I do not wish to add any more’ (Goldsmith, 2011, p.1; Clover, 2014) is a source of inspiration. The concern can 
easily be linked to ethical matters connected with industrial waste and overproduction, but ‘aesthetic reason’ calls for other 
interpretations. Sally Jane Norman points out that ‘[t]he sheer act of selecting stuff may be tantamount to its conceptual and 
perceptual transformation’ (2013, p.276). The fact that nothing about the materiality of a thing makes it an artwork, was only 
really made explicit during the 20th Century. Photography is the extreme case: what is the camera in fact but an appropriation 
machine? Data and information found online represent my key interest currently. ‘Digital readymades’ tend to be topical, 
distinguishing them from the Duchampian ideal – which recommends the deliberate choice of ‘ordinary, functional – and 
rather dull – objects’ (Tate, 2016b). To compensate information is sought which, at least at first sight, is mundane and not 
politically or emotionally loaded. 
17. Collection: My habit is to accumulate raw materials which either are relevant to a particular area of investigation; or 
bear some formal or noticeable relationship to each other. The collecting takes place before any clear use has been decided 
upon. Physical objects as well as digital, and items of knowledge such as mathematical equations are collected. These items 
are compiled into visual diaries or accumulated digitally in folders for later consideration. 
18. Repetition: Repetition is often deliberately injected into moving-image works, performances, presentations of 
objects and 2D work. Acute attention is given to the nature of the repetitive patterns; how many cycles are required; or what 
number of items should be accumulated or exhibited. The process of finding and collecting involves repetition too. Pragmatic 
and empirical, rather than deeply theoretical, considerations influence the decision making, though Gilles Deleuze’s Difference 
and Repetition (1994) may be worthy of study in the future. Given the ordinariness of the materials collected, repetition can 
be important ‘as insistence, that is, the constant pressure of something hidden but not forgotten’ (Rose, 2003, p.1073). The 
cyclical processes and feedback loop systems (Factor 2) are, by their nature, a form of repetition (with difference) too. 
19. Three phases: The basic scientific principle of there being three phases - solid, liquid and gas - is borne in mind as a 
route to increasing variety when exhibiting and generating work. Wet materials or aromas act as provocation in their 
contrasting with dry digital media and technological work. Reality is not so straightforward as to be reducible to the number 
three so the juxtaposing generates ontological questions too. The possibility of overlap, mixing, transient effects, and 
sublimation (in its physical chemistry definition meaning the skipping of the liquid phase so that solid converts to vapour) are 
of interest. The existence of exceptions in the physical world can be read as metaphor for the limitations of theories of stages, 
phases and closed systems. 
20. Liveness and bodily functions: Waste, excreted materials and foodstuffs have been presented alongside audiovisual 
materials and other objects, or used as part of performances. The scatological dimension, making connections between what 
comes out of human bodies and what goes in, literally, if perhaps absurdly, amounts to a feedback loop too. 
21. Change of pace: In live situations changes of pace are introduced to deliberately reduce participants’ ability to cope 
or ‘perform’. Secondly, it is a means of challenging my own capacity to process what is going on. The likelihood of contrivance 
is reduced. The approach is also useful during the construction of works and in the search for raw materials. I may act on 
impulse or attempt to make decisions more quickly than I can think (or to be precise, more quickly than I think I can think). 
22. Digression and diversion: Connected closely to Factor 21 is the permission given to digress at points when 
developing work. Speculatively the technique enables ‘breadth-first’ as opposed to ‘depth-first’ thinking (Norman, 2009). 
Unconscious or semi-conscious drivers are allowed to influence decisions. Or the practice might be framed in terms of 
accepting ‘right brain’ (Colman, 2008a) modes of thinking. There is nothing new in deliberately attempting to access enigmatic 
cognitive modes or in following one’s intuition. Regardless of whether he cared to describe them scientifically, André Breton's 
pure psychic automatism (Tate, 2016a) and methods for introducing randomness achieved similar ends. 
23. Clowning: Since 2005 a professional clown (IMDB, 2016), has regularly been employed, to perform in works. Related 
to this, grotesque characters were created, for instance the Second Life avatar Mocksim Zapotocky (cf. supra, pp.102-104). 
Now I adopt a clownish role with respect to functional systems. Bruce Nauman’s comment that ‘[t]he traditional role of a 
clown is to be either funny or threatening - their position is ambiguous’ (2003, p.374), aligns with the impact I hope to achieve 
through subtraction of meaning (Factor 12). An ominous kind of ambiguity might emerge. Artificial stupidity is patently linked 
to the ‘clowning wisely (en folastrant sagement)’ referred to in Bakhtin’s book on Rabelais (1984, p.60). Lastly, I am happy to 
tap into the clown as symbol of brazenness in the face of power, as Otto Dix did in the era of fascism (Rancière, 2014, p.91). 
‘The medieval clown was also the herald of… truth [fearlessness against mystery and power]’ (Bakhtin, 1984, p.93). See also 
Simon Critchley’s comment (cf. supra, p.79). 
24. Catachresis: In ways which now appear to fit with Rabardel’s notion of catachresis (2002, p.92), functional tools, 
technologies or professional performers, manufactured objects and containers, 3D modelling software, spreadsheets and 
camcorders are used in unintended ways. The points made about Ted Chippington’s anti-comedy, and band frontman Mark E. 
Smith’s attitude, during the appendix B interview (pp.209-210), tie in with this discussion. It is not a matter of completely 
rejecting tradition or ignoring intended uses but of caring less about them, and being open to alternative applications and 
readings. 
25. Errors: Errors occurring during investigation, production and presentation are sometimes allowed to remain rather 
than being corrected. This acceptance of error amounts to a kind of 'truth to materials' (Factor 35) in that faults, or lack of 
knowledge are surrendered to. Such a policy is expedient and permits more attention to be given to criteria of importance. 
Acceptance of error also fits with a wish to avoid demonstrating expertise (Factor 26). Implicit in the strategy is that faults are 
revealing and connected with truth, in the manner of the Freudian slip. I put it thus in the text promoting one symposium 
panel: ‘[i]f relationships with the material and between individuals have been altered due to the new media (and social 
networking in particular) then authenticity is perhaps revealed through the glitches, through intentional mockery or misuse of 
these new systems, hidden codes and artificial intelligence’ (Chevalier, 2013a). John Roberts devoted a whole book to The 
Necessity of Errors (2011). Of course, as Roberts reminds us in the closing pages of that book, not all errors should be 
accepted as positives (2011, p.253). 
26. Against demonstrating prowess: The temptation to demonstrate virtuosity with tools or show-off their 
sophistication, and the quantity of effort expended, is something I attempt to avoid. The aspiration at times runs counter to 
the stated wish to expose illusory techniques (Factor 5) and, secondly, to my increasing preparedness to speak about 
background processes. 
27. Combination and montage: A frequent technique is to force together assets in advance of finding any rationale for 
counterposing them. Mixing elements arbitrarily would appear absurd if it were not a common artistic ploy. Think of Dada, 
Surrealism, the practices of montaging and collage historically, and sampling culture today. Collage broadens the range of 
experiments possible from a given collection of assets. 
28. Lowtech and DIY: New media is used to the extent of my being often classified as a digital artist. I lecture and have 
run courses in these fields, but computing, media technologies, hardware, software and code are firstly, to my mind, so 
ubiquitous as not to warrant separate attention. Latest innovations and technological breakthroughs, as was the case with 
Second Life, 3D scanning and photogrammetry, may be utilised, but not compulsorily. I do not want fondness for older 
formats or devices to be over-influential either (see interview in appendix D, pp.217-218). The Lowtech Manifesto (Wallbank, 
1999) which persuasively expressed scepticism ‘about the consumerist frenzy associated with information technology’ is in 
tune with the attitude subscribed to for a period. Section 2.4.1 dealing with Contra-Invention and similar work outlines my 
position on the relationship between computing and art. Perfectionism may be important at points but so too is the principle 
of ‘expediency’ (Factor 36). The tension between these opposing forces helps produce decisions. 
29. Subtraction: A method of subtraction is utilised. This is raised in appendix A with reference to the simupoems 
(p.206). Elements are removed in resolving work. More precisely the process is iterative, involving taking-away and then re-
configuring. 
30. Destruction and construction: Along with being conceptually interested in what happens when something which has 
been broken is reconstructed, work has been created which practically puts this routine into action. For a period, beakers, 
mugs and ceramic containers were deliberately smashed, then reassembled, as a performative act (You May Not Drink From 
The Holy Cup, 2005) or digitally. I had the pieces of one broken mug 3D-scanned (in 2004/5 before 3D scanning and printing 
was topical) and imported the data to create virtual versions of the original. The digitised fragments were used in three 
different simupoems (Cormac’s Cup, 2005, Ending, 2006, Dying, 2006). These concepts of destroying, then fixing, and paying 
attention to how materials are acted upon incidentally through their experience in the supply chain - the real pieces of broken 
mug were returned by the US-based company which had done the scanning in 2004/5 (fortuitously mounted on cardboard 
and wrapped in cling film for easy exhibiting) - foreshadowed strategies which would become important to my practice later. 
31. Querying compartmentalisation: For practical reasons, I attempt to incorporate what I am doing anyway, or have to 
do, into the creative practice. Likewise, to speed up dissipation, the platform for presenting and executing work is extended 
beyond established locations such as galleries, art venues and performance spaces. Exhibition and creative intervention is 
increasingly encouraged at conferences and at a recent symposium entitled Impact (Hignell and Bright, 2015), instead of 
reading a paper in the usual academic manner, I performed it, yelling the text at the top of my voice. Runs of the performative 
game Now Man (section 2.2.1) were directed at another symposium (Now Man, Puppet Talk symposium, run 2, 2013). 
Creating overlap like this risks mocking established routines and architectures but, at the same time, attention is focused on 
their significance, and grounds for expansion. 
32. Cautious collaboration: Collaborations are undertaken on the basis of agreed-upon rules. Likewise, when I play a 
supporting role for others and when I employ others to support my work, arrangements are sought which are understood by 
all parties in advance. I am sceptical about the compulsoriness of collaboration, teamwork, networking and sharing (cf. supra, 
pp.112-113) and suspect that there is a need, also, to defend autonomy and protect difference. It should be added that 
integration of differences is not the same as merging (the problems of which are mentioned, cf. supra, p.84). The 
collaboration with Stace Constantinou, inspired by how artist Patrick Caulfield had responded to a set of poems described in 
section 2.1 (cf. supra p.66) is exemplary in this regard. 
33. Payment: Unless it is agreed that the work is a collaboration then I endeavour to pay participants. Luhmann’s view 
about commerce’s effect on art (cf. supra, p.45) is directed at the art market and even there he plays down its excesses. My 
motivation refers to another model, one that seems close to what John Roberts’ terms the ‘second economy’ (John Roberts 
NCCA Recording, 2014). Payment in the context of my working practices is not just a matter of employment ethics but a 
means of clarifying the nature of the decision-making arrangement. Payment adds a dimension to the experimentation with 
‘control’ (Factor 3). This interest in the significance of remuneration was triggered partly while working for artist’s collective 
Common Culture (mentioned appendix A, pp.204-205 and elsewhere in the thesis) who are resolute about paying individuals 
situated in their installations (bouncers, comedians, DJs and strippers) at the ‘going rate’ for their respective professions. 
Payment, because of its bearing on the power relationships, is central to the meaning of their work. 
34. Critique from others: While very interested in feedback or recommendations from supervisors, critical friends, artists 
and others, I permit myself to respond in any of the three possible ways: 1) by absorbing what has being said, considering it 
and ignoring it, 2) by making adjustments as a result of a new point of view or 3) by capitulating completely on the basis of 
criticisms or suggestions. Even the third scenario would not guarantee that the critic or advisor is credited or acknowledged, 
on the basis that feedback was possible, only because they were presented with an original work in the first place. 
Commissioned scores and soundtracks for films are generally credited but the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. As 
with Factor 32 and Factor 33, agreements are sought beforehand. 
35. Truth to materials: The concept of 'truth to materials' (Woodham, 2004) popular with the Bauhaus is a 
commandment of sorts. The thinking is extended to include the limitations of software or my own knowledge. Additionally, 
truth to materials could mean submitting to imperfections of other sorts in line with the points made about errors (Factor 25). 
For designers the concept of truth to materials usually entailed locating suitable materials for a particular task. But artists – if 
they are to be distinguished - are liable to reverse that order. Materials can determine the outcome or course of action. This 
principle is also connected with ‘feedback’ which implies a degree of adaption to external forces (Factor 2). These concerns 
align with Andrew Pickering's advocating ‘getting along with… systems that can always surprise us’ (2011, p.23) mentioned in 
appendix A (p.203). Sally Jane Norman’s references to ‘materials speaking back’ in musical contexts, ‘conversations with 
materials’ in interaction design and ‘backtalk’ (2013, p.283) adds weight to the argument that the longstanding design 
principle is still relevant. Truth to materials can be broadened even further to take in practical constraints and funding 
available. And lastly the philosophy is applicable to working in collaborations or with assistants: the ‘material’ in this situation 
would be other human beings. It needs to be stressed that the attitude does not entail complete or unprincipled submission 
to materials, situations or environments: it is about recognising the balance of forces. 
36. Expediency: Linked to my interest in the Lowtech Manifesto and DIY (Factor 28) is the principle of expediency. This 
has, firstly, to do with accomplishing a task in the easiest possible way. Being expedient ties in with the Herbert Simon’s 
concept, in evolutionary theory, of ‘satisficing… taking a suboptimal solution that is satisfactory’ (Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch, 1991, p.196). Analogising with the world of manufacturing and logistics where Just-in-Time (JIT) principles (cf. supra, 
p.68) became progressively popular: it makes no sense to provide more than is necessary, nor to provide something too early. 
It turns out that the human brain processes information according to JIT too (Dennett, Adams and Hurley, 2011, pp.101–104). 
The difference in the case of art is that concepts of efficiency, quality and timing relate back to a particular individual’s 
invented criteria. Jasper Johns reportedly reflected that ‘the difference between art and craft… was that art was good but only 
just good enough whereas craft was also good but usually too good. (For its own good…)’ (see e-mail from Peter Seddon, 
appendix G). Whether and how one is expedient, in terms of time and effort expended and resources drawn, depends on 
many factors. 
37. Appropriate pedantry: Decisions about what to obsess over are not necessarily in line with usual principles employed 
by professionals, designers or other artists in a field. With the stop-motion film Training (2004), the path of the wooden toy 
was brought right to the edge of the camera frame (mentioned illustrating Factor 6). As with the removal of sound in the 
production of Boring (cf. infra, pp.71-72), taking objects in a scene to the frame border is simply incorrect from a video-editing 
perspective. Normally a ‘safe-frame’ area would be allocated. But with Training a proportion of the wooden engine’s 
circuitous path had been determined by the extent of the camera’s framing rectangle. 
38. Against open-endedness and process work: The open-endedness advocated by some artists and critics and 
questioned by others (appendix A, p.201 and cf. supra, p.107) is not something I consider a positive. I am not satisfied to 
present unresolved experiments. Rather the aim is to create finite, self-standing artworks. That is not to impose a ban on 
discussion about ‘process’. Increasingly the intervening, which was initially only a method of discovery, is provided as tangible 
outcome in its own right: as is the case with the works described in section 2.3. Consideration is given to the nature and 
formal qualities (see Factor 45) of this documentary material too though. 
39. Readymades and simupoems: Two broad categories of outcome are produced. Firstly, found materials, digital or 
physical readymades, are worked on minimally, only so that their essence is emphasised. Scale might be increased or 
materials complied into a book. Secondly, simupoems or more abstracted forms are produced which may incorporate, or be 
influenced by, the found material. 
40. Ritual and the carnivalesque: The interest in routine, repetition, the involving of clowns, participants and use of 
bodily fluids and food is driven partly by a desire to link with the significance of ritual. Section 2.2.2 reflects on these matters 
(cf. supra, p.94-99).  
41. The issue of spectacle: The creation of ‘spectacle’ is neither aimed at nor avoided. 
42. Interactivity: Instead of engineering in interactivity which, Lev Manovich stated is ‘too broad [a term] to be truly 
useful’ (2001, p.70), his other definition of the concept is acknowledged: ‘[a]ll classical, and even more so modern art, was 
already “interactive”’ (2001, p.71). Barry Barker’s comment (cf. supra, p.245) about the impossibility of a passive experience is 
relevant here. The degree to which human-human interaction is facilitated or substituted by things, media and other beings is 
of particular concern. One reason for the decision to use real people originally (in 2004) stemmed from a desire to investigate 
the increased relational intensity of unmediated interaction, Marina Abramović style (MoMA, 2010). 
43. Mild provocation: For reasons outlined when discussing Rearing (cf. supra, pp.91-92), ‘shock tactics’ are consciously 
avoided or tempered down. Provocation in my work is intended in the spirit of investigation, of prodding. There is a risk with 
the use of food-stuffs, and human waste of overstepping the mark but in these cases the matter is connected with 
propensities for ‘disgust’, rather than violence say, self-harm or hostile actions. 
44. Art speaks for itself: It would be strange not to extend to artefacts of any medium Picasso’s pronouncement that ‘a 
painting speaks for itself’, and his rhetorical question ‘[w]hat is the use of giving explanations, when all is said and done?’ 
(O’Brian, 1976, p.121). Michael Polanyi’s stating that ‘unbridled lucidity can destroy our understanding of complex matters’, 
(2009, p.18) gives weight to the same argument. An opposite position can be defended however. If a work stimulates 
explanatory responses, then, therein lies its strength. David Beech, for one, strongly defends the relationship between writing 
and post-conceptual art (Beech, 2016). The idea was referred to when discussing the simupoems (cf. supra, p.130). Practically, 
the inevitability of further elucidation on work has to be accepted; I occasionally encourage it; but my belief, simultaneously, 
is that explanatory texts are not essential. 
45. Formal considerations: Whilst a formalist approach (Glaves-Smith and Chilvers, 2015) is not strictly abided by, 
respect is paid to understood principles when deciding elements such as colour, shape, composition, and rhythm. If traditions 
are challenged, that is done knowingly. Additionally, factors of contemporary relevance to digital output such as fidelity and 
levels of compression, and considerations connected to performance interventions, such as a participant’s attire, are laboured 
over in the execution of work. Due to the importance and complexity of these questions of form and alignment with tradition 
more attention will be given to them in section 3.2.3 (cf. infra, pp.153-156). 
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Micheál O’Connell (a.k.a. Mocksim)
Interventions, Selected Works, Statement, Biography
2009-2012 Contra-Invention: car parking contravention images
The artist investigated the evidential photography of Britain's traffic wardens (Civil Enforcement Officers). Hundreds 
of their ‘contravention images’ were collected. Occasionally wardens inadvertently capture themselves in reflection. 
The artist manoeuvred himself into certain images by following the wardens around. The exhibition of this work, 
Contra-Invention, toured Britain and other parts of Europe between 2010 and 2013. Above installation shot: Arts 
Santa Mònica, Barcelona, 2013.
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2013-2014 Missing You: courier company parcel tracking signatures
The artist discovered that courier company parcel tracking data, not just his own, but surprisingly also that of 
others, was easily accessible online. The information even included images of their Point of Delivery Signatures 
(PODS). Exhibitions of work arising from this investigation toured under the title Missing You, a reference to the 
‘Sorry We Missed You’ cards left by couriers when delivery fails. Above installation shot: Macclesfield, 2014.
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2014-2016 Less: supermarket self-checkout machines
It turns out that it is possible to use supermarket self-checkout machines to buy nothing. The artist frequently did 
so, collecting hundreds of the resulting receipts as evidence of these zero-transactions.
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Boring 2012, 3min30sec silent looping film, DV PAL and other formats
Photography captured while snarled up in one of the longest traffic jams in the history of London's orbital motorway in 2011, forms the 
basis. The film was not directly connected with the intervention Contra-Invention but was created during the same period.
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/41018346
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Delivering 2014, 18sec looping film, HD PAL and other formats
Three Point of Delivery Signatures, selected from the intervention Missing You, form the basis for a 6sec looping film. An 18sec score was 
then created, given set limitations, by composer Stace Constantinou. Delivering is part of the Michael Shamberg Turtle Salon collection.
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/112043307
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Exchanging 2015, 4min15sec looping film, HD PAL and other formats
The transcription of one conversation with a member of staff, conducted while using a supermarket self-checkout machine, to buy 
nothing, is sung. An image of the receipt obtained is used in the film. Voice: Ruby O’Connell-Rogers. Part of the intervention Less. 
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/126480392
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Busting 2016, 3min looping film, HD PAL and other formats
Elements include a plaster bust which was 3D-scanned roughly using photogrammetry techniques, satnav recordings and words from a 
historical conversation. Voice Eliza Jaye. This is new work, unconnected with Contra-Invention, Missing You or Less.
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/164911795 (password required: James)
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Contra-Invention Prints 1 2010, three pairs of 1.2x1.8m C-type prints mounted on corrugated plastic and one spirit level
Three 'night shots', selected from hundreds of ‘contravention images’ collected, depicting the same parking violation, were blown up to 
car-size. Each is split vertically so that there are six sections in total. Part of the body of work created for Contra-Invention.
Link to other Contra-Invention exhibition shots: http://www.mocksim.org/works/contra-invention.htm
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Contra-Invention Images 2010-2012, 1) The Artist captured by Civil Enforcement Officer (CEO), 2) CEO captures herself in reflection.
Two images selected from the hundreds of contravention images collected between 2009 and 2012
Further Contra-Invention images and documentation: http://www.mocksim.org/works/contra-invention.htm
W
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Delivering being screened in the back of a high-top van, 2014
The film was screened as part of Art Language Location, Cambridge and Turtle Salon, Birmingham in 2014. Delivering was produced 
during the intervention Missing You.
Further Missing You images and documentation: http://www.mocksim.org/works/Missing_You.htm
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PODS 2013, 3min silent moving image piece, DV PAL and other formats
Point of delivery signatures (PODS) from intervention Missing You played in sequence.
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/73614369
W
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A0 Zero Receipt Poster 2016, B&W print on paper, How to buy Nothing 2016, 1min4sec YouTube video
High resolution scans of zero-transaction receipts printed t A0 size and Instructional video describing how to obtain zero-transaction 
receipts. All produced as part of intervention Less.
Instructional video link: https://youtu.be/6Gx_6-JfXHc
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Now Man 2013, 1min39sec, DV PAL and other formats, Worn Outing 2012, slides
A run of Now Man, executed at a symposium in 2013 and stills documenting the Worn Outing intervention in 2012
Links: https://vimeo.com/72409786 and https://1drv.ms/p/s!AuJICo08lFyD2nlW35jqdM3tO190 respectively.
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Less 2014, Hardcover book, 104 
pages, 15.24 x 22.86cm
One hundred collected Point of 
Delivery Signatures.
Less 2014, Paperback book, 112 
pages, 10.8x17.48cm
Receipts collected as evidence of 
buying nothing during a three 
month period.
Contra-Invention Catalogue 2010, 
Paperback book, 84 pages, 
20.98x29.69cm, Full colour interior
All of the ‘Contravention images’ 
collected between 2009 and 2010, 
along with meta-data for camera 
type, shutter speed, aperture, other 
photo-metrics. An essay by Hito 
Steyerl and commissioned writing by 
Huw Bartlett is also included. Photos 
include examples in which the 
wardens inadvertently capture 
themselves in reflection .Others 
include the artist, who manoeuvred 
himself into images by following the 
wardens around. This catalogue was 
included on ‘Martin Parr’s Best 
Books’ list 2010.
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More Less 2016, Paperback book, 
116 pages, 20.98x29.69cm
Receipts collected as evidence of 
buying nothing between 2015-2016, 
blown up to fit A4 pages.
A Tribute to William Klein 2012, 
Paperback book, 92 pages, 
16.84x26.04cm
Images captured on phone handset 
at a major retrospective of the work 
of an iconic street photographer.
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Delivering screening at CCA 
Cinema, 2016, 3min24sec clip 
On the launch date, 12th May 2016, 
people were asked to screen on any 
device and return documentation. 
Now Man at Puppet Talk 
Symposium 2013, 20sec clip
A run of Now Man at a symposium, 
14th March 2013, University of 
Sussex.
A Nod to Turing and Creed at 
Occupant, 2012, 58sec (2 clips)
From Artists Talk 27th April 2012, 
Occupant Residency, Grey Area 
Gallery.
Delivering a Paper at Impact 
Symposium, 2015, 48sec clip 
Instead of reading a paper in the 
customary academic way, this one 
was shouted out. 3rd July 2015.
Rearing at Matt’s Gallery, London 
2014, 1min35sec clip 
Performed as pert of event in the 
proximity of Futuro House. 10th
December 2014.
How to buy Nothing, 2015/16, 
2min40sec (3 video clips)
Further demonstrates of how shop 
self-checkout machines can be used 
to buy nothing. Intervention: Less.
Worn Outing, 2012, 58sec (2 video 
clips)
From intervention Worn Outing, 
London 3rd March 2012. Includes 
expulsion from an underwear shop.
Click on image for link to clips. Note: much of the footage here is incidental, and 
of poor quality, but gives a sense of the experience.
Now Man, 2010, (2 clips)
Execution of the game 30th October 
2010 when three players competed 
to get in frame..
Biographical Statement
Micheál O’Connell a.k.a. Mocksim has exhibited in locations as diverse as Whitechapel Art Gallery in London, the online world Second
Life and a campsite in Venice. Typically he produces short looping films or 'simupoems'. He also designs and directs performances which
involve appropriated materials and he compiles found data and imagery into books. Live art, organic materials and real objects are often
presented along with digital work.
Strategies involve investigation of everyday functional processes, attempts to re-understand through tinkering with systems and
inventing new routines and procedures. Subject matter includes car parking contravention, courier company delivery mechanisms and
supermarket self-checkout machines. O'Connell's key interest is in the mediation of human relationships through technology, the curious
dynamics, feedback loops and ritualistic aspects.
Contra-Invention (an exhibition of the photographs traffic wardens take as proof of parking violation) was invited to Les Rencontres
Internationales de la Photographie d'Arles 2011, subsequently nominated for the Deutsche Börse Photography Prize 2012 and part of
From Here On at Arts Santa Mónica, Barcelona in 2013. Thanks to Arts Council England and other funding sources the show also toured
Britain and Ireland in 2012/13. The original catalogue for Contra-Invention was included in Martin Parr's Best Book List in 2010 and
O’Connell is now part of ABC Artists' Books Cooperative which advocates the use of Print on Demand approaches as well as querying the
status of publishing and book production generally.
Work from his project Missing You was exhibited in Macclesfield, supported again by Arts Council England, in 2014. A public event was
run to coincide with the show, entitled From Jacquard to JPEG, at the famous Silk Heritage Centre with artists Rut Blees Luxemburg and
Mishka Henner. In 2014 also the artist's film Delivering was screened in Birmingham as part of Turtle Salon, initiated by producer and
director Michael Shamberg, and along with another work Recay, it is now formally part a that collection.
St
a
te
m
en
t
Online
Web site www.mocksim.org
Twitter https://twitter.com/Mocksim and https://twitter.com/Mocksim_Latest
Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Mocksim/
Vimeo https://vimeo.com/mocksim/ (final video and simupoems)
YouTube https://goo.gl/vnPg0o and https://goo.gl/V1VL2V (process work, clips, research)
Education
2010-2016 Practice-led PhD (P/T), School of Media, Film and Music, University of Sussex 
2004-2006 MA Fine Art (Distinction), University of Brighton 
Selected Exhibitions and Events
2016 ABC Artists’ Books Collective, Offprint, Tate Modern, London
Low Tech Lab, London
2015 Delivering a Paper, Impact, Lighthouse, Brighton
2014 Rearing, Matt’s Gallery, London
ABCEUM, Offprint, Beaux-Arts de Paris, France 
Turtle Salon, Article Gallery, Birmingham
ABCEUM, Grand Parade Gallery, Brighton Photo Biennial
Missing You & From Jacquard to JPEG, The Silk Museum, Macclesfield
2013 Visual Urbanism, British Library, London 
Milkbar, Subterranean Art House, California 
From Here On, Arts Santa Monica, Spain 
LIPS. Ormston House, Ireland 
2012 Contra-Invention Plus, Over and Out, Lincoln 
Boundary Work II, Wandesford Quay Gallery, Cork 
Disruption II, Elysium Gallery, Swansea 
Contra-Invention Plus, Marburae Gallery, Macclesfield 
Trainofthoughts, The Horse Hospital, London 
Turtle Salon, Meter Room, Coventry 
Occupant, Grey Area Gallery, Brighton 
Art of Architecture, The Public, West Bromwich
2011 Rear Window, Cinecity APEC Studios, Hove 
Artists Disguised Procession, Cecil Sharpe House, London 
Les Recontres D’Arles, Atelier de Méchanique, France 
2010 Brighton Photo Biennial, Friese-Greene Gallery, Brighton 
Mockeyah, The Joinery, Dublin 
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Selected Exhibitions and Events contd.
2009 MakeShift, Camping Fusina, Italy 
2008 Testing Grounds, Permanent Gallery, Brighton 
Digiville, Lighthouse, Brighton 
2007 Vacancy, Grey Area Gallery, Brighton 
Critical Incident, Freeman Centre, East Sussex 
2006 Wormhole Saloon, Whitechapel Gallery, London 
See Sea Asymptote, University of Brighton, Brighton 
Trouble With Them, Grey Area Gallery, Brighton 
Athens Video Art Festival, Various locations, Greece
2005 Giving Birth To Monsters, University of Brighton, Brighton
Max10, Falmouth Art Centre, Cornwall
2004 Big Blip 4, Sallis Benney Theatre, Brighton
Zeroes & Ones, Fairfields Arts Centre, Basingstoke 
Awards, Funding, Press
2014 Arts Council England grant Missing You/From Jacquard to JPEG
Studentship, PhD Creative and Critical Practice, University of Sussex
2013 Interactive, Art + Copyright special issue #50 
2012 Nominated for The Deutsche Börse Photography Prize
London Sinfonietta's Blue Touch Paper workshop 2012 
Artbeat Cork Interview Boundary Work II
Final shortlist Eva International
Review of Trainofthoughts at The Horse Hospital, Criticismism 
Arts Council England grant Contra-Invention
2011 Selected for Les Recontres d'Arles 
Articles From Here On Photoworks, The Guardian and Criticismism 2011 From Here On
2010 West of England Academy Autumn Exhibition 
London Evening Standard and Brighton Argus
Catalogue included in Martin Parr's Best Books 2010
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